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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Trends in the space economy 
Reality is complex. In order to understand something, we must abstract from it. 
Academics tend to do this by generalizing from numerous observations. Social 
scientists often search for trends and express these in models. They are more con-
cerned with the dominant processes and phenomena than with the exceptions, the 
deviations from the 'norm'. So too regional economists and economic geographers. 
Scott's account of the main trends in geographic development since the beginning of 
the 1950s, is revealing. In the mid 1950s, the major capitalist economies seemed to be 
split into two spatial realms. One was a core of manufacturing regions with dense 
concentrations of population and economic activity. The other consisted of peripheral 
expanses of less well developed territory, largely dedicated to agriculture and local 
service activities, with occasional clusters of industrial employment in a few favoured 
places (Scott 1988a). Furthermore, many theorists considered the contrasts between 
the core and the periphery to be extremely durable and likely to intensify (Hirschmaft 
1958, Myrdal 1957). 
During the 1970s, however, this pattern began to shift dramatically. As the 
postwar boom came to an end, the major capitalist economies (North America and 
Western Europe) entered a long period of crisis and readjustment which continues to 
the present day. More and more of the basic industry of the core regions - steel, 
shipbuilding, car assembly, machinery, electrical goods, and so on - have moved to 
the world periphery. There they can take advantage of increasingly attractive produc-
tion conditions (particularly low wages and regressive labour relations). 
The net result of these developments is a major crisis in the core regions of 
North America and Western Europe. The crisis first became apparent in Britain and 
the United States in the late 1960s, spreading in the early 1970s to France, Italy, and 
West Germany. In many formerly prosperous industrial regions, investment in new 
plants and machinery has slowed to a trickle. Large units of fixed capital are written 
off in an epidemic of factory closures and layoffs. In the United States, several major 
cities are at the brink of bankruptcy, as their tax bases shrink in response to their 
declining economies. 
Nevertheless, even as these processes of decay and decline reach their greatest 
intensity, some regions in advanced capitalist nations are moving counter to the 
general trend. They are actually experiencing a rapid formation of new manufacturing 
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capital and a rapid rise in employment. These exceptions comprise either (a) a 
number of enclaves within older manufacturing regions (e.g., Route 128, The Scientific 
City Ile de France, the M4 Corridor), or (b) more importantly, a series of regions 
located in formerly peripheral and semi-peripheral areas (e.g., Third Italy, Orange 
County, Silicon Valley, Grenoble, Montpellier, Sophia Antipolis, Toulouse, Cam-
bridge) (Scott 1988b). By the mid-1980s it was clear that these regions had not only 
weathered the storm of restructuring of the 1970s but were also functioning as major 
foci of industrial innovation and expansion in their own right. It was now quite 
evident that a series of new industrial spaces had come in existence, and were 
beginning to form important alternative centres of capitalist accumulation. This 
process was based on a strong social division of labour, the proliferation of small to 
medium-sized businesses, and the reagglomeration of production. According to Scott, 
reagglomeration occurs at all geographic levels. A new combination of economic 
activities occurs on the international and national scale; this also takes place at the 
regional level, particularly in new growth areas. 
The above overview sketches in rough contours, the geographic pattern over 
the industrial development of the past three to four decades, as Scott sees it. There is, 
however, one development which Scott tends to neglect: the come back of many large 
cities and core regions in the 1980s. Their economic perspectives improved either 
because of a revival of existing industries (e.g., Swiss watchmaking) or because of the 
boom the service sector is enjoying. Services have been concentrated in large cities all 
along, either in the city centre or in the urban ring. In the 1970s and 1980s, the inten-
sity of concentration actually increased (Storper and Walker 1989). In sum, the geo-
graphic development of Western Capitalism since the beginning of the industrial 
revolution can be classified in three successive stages: concentration, decentralization, 
and reconcentration. 
1.2 The main thrust: agglomeration and inequality 
The three above-mentioned processes have formed the focal point of geographic 
studies and the object of model-building. In the course of time, the concentration and 
inequality model has come to predominate. Spatial proximity of business ventures 
and facilities generates major economic advantages, it is argued (the next chapter 
expands on this topic). Geographic polarization is viewed as a process of spatial 
optimization. This model posits that tight clustering in large cities and (new) indus-
trial areas is the optimal location pattern for many economic activities. Consequently, 
international and interregional inequality of growth is seen as an inevitable concomi-
tant and condition of growth itself (Hansen 1970). This is held to be true even during 
the decentralization period of the 1960s and 1970s. Many researchers point out that in 
this period decentralisation was not an integral and complete fanning-out process 
(Crum and Gudgin 1977, 150; Goddard 1978). Businesses only decentralized their 
routine production activities. To be sure, much employment also moved in the 
decentralization process, but these were large blue-collar jobs or requiring a low level 
of skills. Ultimately this trend held back the development of provincial centres. The 
research departments as well as the management stayed behind in the large cities. 
These eschelons were (and are) thought to be bound to a highly educated labour 
market, tight information flows and old-boys networks. In other words, the swarm-
ing-out process did not fundamentally challenge the core-periphery model of 
economic growth. And indeed, many countries, both Western and non-Westem reveal 
marked differences between thriving core areas and depressed peripheral areas. The 
distribution of industry, generally speaking, is still rather clustered than dispersed 
(Chapman and Walker 1991). On the whole, agglomeration and regional inequality 
comprise what Abler (1991) terms "the laws of economic geography". 
1.3 The actual trajectories: deviancy and contradiction 
However, the spatial structures are not as unambiguous as the above model would 
suggest. Differences exist between countries, sectors, and activities. In a (small) 
country like the Netherlands, for example, it is difficult to observe a strong recon-
centration of production in one or a few favoured growth areas in the aftermath of 
decentralization. After a comprehensive analysis of the economic geographical 
developments in our country, De Smidt and Wever (1990) conclude that the tradi-
tional core-periphery model is being dismantled. This is evident from in the spread of 
promising industries, the magnitude of innovation in the diverse regions, the 
receptivity to innovation stimuli, the location of industrial head offices, the geography 
of Philips plants, etc. It is increasingly clear that the differences within The Nether-
lands are only minor. De Smidt (1988,126) concludes that the distribution of affluence 
within regions is more extreme than between regions. A similar picture emerges from 
an analysis of the spatial pattern of business vitality1 in the Netherlands by Tordoir 
and co workers (TNO 1992). Among other things they observed that areas of above 
and below average business vitality sometimes lie very close to each other. 
Gaebe (1988) reaches the same conclusion regarding indicators of regional 
development in West Germany. The differences in demographic and economic 
characteristics are greater within the member states than between them. In the United 
States, Kasarda (1988) concludes that since 1983 there has been a convergence of the 
interregional differences in employment opportunities between the Northeast, the 
Midwest, the South and the West. Nevertheless, the South and the West will continue 
to lead population and employment growth until the turn of the century at the least. 
Anyway, Kasarda is more worried about the development of intraregional than 
interregional differences. In particular, he points out that the contrast within metro-
politan areas between the central core and the suburban ring only increases the 
prosperity of the latter. In England, on the other hand, researchers concern themselves 
mainly with differences in development at the interregional level. They are especially 
interested in the growing split between the problematic North and the prosperous 
South (Harrison and Hart 1992). 
But the level of aggregation of these outcomes is high. Thus, the figures mask 
the difference between many contradictory developments and processes. The overall 
picture is often made up of a mix of concentration and decentralization tendencies, 
and possibly a substantial portion of spatial arbitrariness. For example, take the 
spatial figures in the Netherlands. On several fronts, there is a flow out of the major 
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agglomerations of the Randstad towards less urbanized areas, such as the southern 
and eastern areas of the country This flow consists of business movements (Pellen-
barg and Kemper 1991), high-technology industry (Louter 1991), and general employ-
ment growth (Lambooy and Manshanden 1992) Other factors work to the advantage 
of the Randstad In this area we see an overrepresentation of foreign investments 
(Loeve 1989, Buck 1988), head offices (De Smidt and Wever 1990), high-quality 
business services (Louter 1992), and new business establishments (Kemper 1992, 
Bleichrodt and Louter 1991) According to Kemper, closure rates are remarkably 
similar across space However, Wever (1984), Bleumink et al (1985), Vaessen (1986), 
and Gordijn and Van Wissen (1992) report very high death rates in the major Dutch 
cities, whereby their advantage of high birth rates vanishes into thin air This has also 
been observed in London (Peters 1991) 
The spatial pattern is strongly differentiated for a phenomenon such as business 
vitality (TNO 1992) In this regard the picture is varied and runs counter to every 
model of regional development Kleinknecht and Pool's (1992) 'multi-dimensional' 
conclusion regarding the spatial pattern of R&D activities of private businesses is also 
very useful for demonstrating the diversity and ambiguity of spatial processes in the 
Netherlands Kleinknecht and Poot find little evidence that firms m centralized 
regions engage more often in R&D or undertake relatively greater amounts of R&D 
than similar firms in other regions Yet, it appears that industrial firms in the central 
region (the Randstad) are more intensively involved m product and service-related re-
search, while industrial firms located elsewhere are more deeply involved in deve-
lopment activities (though the differences are not large) At first sight, this image of 
higher quality of industrial R&D activities in the Randstad compared with the rest of 
the country seems to get reinforced by the spatial pattern of the service sector Service 
firms in the four major cities are more R&D intensive than those outside those cities 
However, contrary to indications in manufacturing, service firms in the Randstad 
appear not to be more involved with fundamental and applied research in compa-
rison with service firms located elsewhere In short, "The question whether regions 
matter for R&D cannot be answered with a simple 'yes' or 'no'" (Kleinknecht and 
Poot 1992, 230) Both a 'no' and a 'yes' may be justified 
Outside the Netherlands, the diversity of geographic development is hardly less, 
as some simple examples demonstrate In England, spatial trends are unmistakably 
dominated by the divide between the deprived northern and the prosperous southern 
part Yet some figures do not fit this picture at all For instance, variation in new firm 
formation does not conform to the core-penphery model of economic performance. 
Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland show higher rates of job creation than the UK 
average, together with the South East, the Midlands and East England Below-average 
regions are the South West, the North, Yorkshire and Humberside, the North West 
and the West Midlands (Peters 1990, 12) Another example which runs counter to the 
picture of the North-South divide in Great Britain is the spatial variation of new 
biotechnology firms This sector forms an indicator of economic development perspec-
tives These firms are very dispersed spatially, Oakey and Cooper (1989) note that no 
less than 75% of the new biotechnology firms are located in rural and peripheral 
areas Concerning the geography of all high-tech development, Keeble (1988, 80) con-
cludes that ' the geography of high-technology development in the 1980s is one of 
widely dispersed growth in most regions of Britain, but with a particular focus on a 
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broad band of southern English counties...". In any case, high-tech activities are in no 
way restricted to one or a few so-called 'high-profile' areas. 
Keeble's conclusion fits the results of research by Oakey and O'Farrell (1991) 
concerning state-of-the-art production technologies in the form of computer numeri-
cally controlled (CNC) machinery to ensure high quality output at a competitive 
price. Oakey and O'Farrell compare the adoption of CNC equipment in the core 
(Southeast England) with two peripheral regions (Scotland and Wales). The differen-
ces seem minor; surprisingly, there is a (slightly) deeper commitment to CNC 
machinery in Scotland and Wales (presumably a regional policy effect). Analysis of 
the growth performance of high technology companies runs even more counter to the 
prevailing North-South picture within the United Kingdom than analysis of the 
location of these activities. Keeble (1993) made recently some very interesting 
observations in this respect. He noted that though much fewer in number, NTBFs 
[New Technology Based Firms] established in 'hostile' environments often achieve 
high - and indeed higher - growth rates than their counterparts in more favourable 
environments. NTBFs in the three peripheral and old industrial regions of Scotland, 
Northern England and Wales reported percentage employment and turnover growth 
rates 1987-90 which were on average substantially greater than those for NTBFs in 
southern England, with employment growth three times faster than in London, and 
turnover growth five times faster than in the South East outside London. Further-
more, he added that this difference cannot be explained by size differences2 since 
Peripheral NTBFs are in fact on average larger than those in any other region (ibid 7). 
In Germany, just as in England, biotechnology firms and information technology 
activities are widely dispersed at the interregional level, though there is a particular 
concentration in Baden Wurtemberg. However, in contrast with the British Isles, the 
spatial pattern largely follows the urban hierarchy at the intraregional level (i.e. 
within the federal states). These activities are concentrated respectively in urban areas 
95.1% and 93.7% (Henckel 1989). Thus, the the overall spatial pattern is polycentric. 
The strong German Mittelstand enterprises, on the other hand, seem to operate much 
less in large cities. These small and mid-size companies, which are at key to 
Germany's export success, work out of small plants often located in towns most 
people have never heard of (Business Week 1991). Observing such diversity, Gaebe 
states that opinions about a region's development potential just depend on the size of 
the areas studied and the indicators used. It is thus no surprise that the descriptions 
of regional development in Germany differ. Some observe pronounced disparities 
while others see a more balanced growth (Gaebe 1988, 179). 
Unlike Britain and Germany, France displays strong concentration of both high-
tech establishments and employment. The preferred locations are the Ile de France 
and the 'Grand Sud'. However, France's spatial dynamics are less clear-cut. The 
number of establishments in the field of high-tech consulting remained highly 
concentrated between 1976 and 1987. Meanwhile, a substantial decentralization of 
employment opportunities occurred in this period (Moulaert et al. 1991). 
Furthermore, no matter how emphatically research results confirm the agglom-
eration imperative, researchers are continually confronted with exceptions to the 
general rule and deviations from the norm which challenge conventional logic. Take, 
for example, electrotechnical and instrument industry in Great Britain. In accordance 
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with a priori expectations, most firms in these branches are located in areas of concen-
trated economic activity. Nevertheless, a considerable minority (25%) are located in 
rural and peripheral areas (Oakey and Cooper 1989). The same emerged from 
Oake/s, Rothwell's and Cooper's comparison of R&D expenditure by firms in the 
San Francisco Bay Area (including Silicon Valley), Southeast England, and Scotland 
(Oakey et al 1988). As 'expected', firms in the core areas - the Bay Area and Southeast 
England - are more R&D-intensive (respectively 91.7% and 85.0% of the firms conduct 
internal R&D) than in Scotland (77.8%), a problem area. At the same time, these 
figures clearly reveal that firms with R&D activities are not restricted to 'high quality 
areas' such as Southeast England and Silicon Valley. Small independent firms in 
peripheral areas can also develop technological innovations. 
And even if percentages are quite small, we should not ignore the absolute 
number that can be included. Although only a minority of six per cent of West 
Germany's information technology and biotechnology firms is located in rural areas, it 
still comprises about 250 firms. Similarly, Appold (1991) reports that industrial 
research laboratories in the United States tend to locate within metropolitan counties 
(90%). The remainder locate in rural counties. However, this 10% encompasses no less 
than 1055 establishments. No matter how much support we find for the assumption 
that new and innovative firms are concentrated in the centre or at the top of the 
urban and regional hierarchy, it is not a hard and fast rule. 
The consequences of 'deviant cases' for spatial theory might be more far-
reaching than their quantity suggests. In fact, every successful firm located outside of 
the key centres of development can provide information about the conditional nature 
of the agglomeration imperative assumed in spatial theory. In theory-forming, the 
question of whether the spatial structure of the economy is determined by centraliz-
ing or decentralizing factors should be replaced by a query about the conditions 
under which clustering or dispersal occurs. 
Apart from scientific arguments, a close analysis of 'paradoxical' cases, e.g. 
profitable enterprises in peripheral areas, can open up new perspectives for regional 
policy. Policymakers could learn from counterfactual businesses which have shown an 
ability to maintain their productivity and competitiveness in 'unfavourable' produc-
tion environments. That may be more productive than putting all the effort into 
improving external conditions. Malecki and Nijkamp (1988) point out that it is 
impossible to offer compensation in peripheral areas for the wide range of compara-
tive advantages in large urban core areas. 
1.4 Research question and scope of the book 
In sum, this thesis takes the variety of spatial developments and patterns as its point 
of departure. In doing so, it breaks with the tradition in geographical studies to 
analyse the dominant or prevailing developments. This means that the aim of the 
book is to find a starting point for an analysis of how similar firms develop in 
different environments; that is in economic core regions as well as economic periph-
ery regions. It thus responds to Mason and Harrison's call for further research (1985, 
4-5): "...there does remain a need for more detailed studies of the formation process 
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and the role and growth of new and small firms in contrasting regional environ­
ments " 
In this vein, the general research question of this thesis asks What is the 
underlying logic whereby some firms in the periphery are no less competitive than 
their counterparts in the centre' During the field-work, this broad research question 
gradually unfolded into three more specific questions 
1 How do prospective firms respond to economic conditions in the production 
environment, both opportunities and limitations7 
2 What can be said about the strength or efficacy of environmental responsive­
ness of small firms' 
3 What are the ultimate sources underlying the firms' environmental responsive­
ness
7 
The structure of the book is as follows After this introduction, Chapter Two critically 
evaluates the views on firm environment interaction as propounded in spatial theo­
ries Its mam point of criticism is the inferior or inadequate role of the micro-level, ι e 
the entrepreneur and his firm, in mainstream theory of regional science Chapter 
Three proceeds to examine the relationship between a firm and its environment in 
another field of science which concerns itself with this subject, ι e organization 
theory In a sense, organization theory takes an opposite tack to regional science, as 
the former tends to overestimate the role of the organization or its management Yet 
we keep in mind that organization theory has recently been changing in this respect 
The chapter examines how we can utilize insights from organization theory in the 
fields of regional economics and economic geography in order to meet the objections 
against spatial theory, set out in Chapter Two Chapter Four explains the methodo­
logical aspects of the research Chapter Five goes on to extensively describe and 
interpret actual firm behaviour in relation to the characteristics of the regional 
production environment (research question number one) This chapter is based on the 
material from our own in-depth research among successful small and medium-sized 
businesses Contrary to what is implied by mainstream regional development theory, 
entrepreneurs do not resign themselves to the whims of the production environment 
They not only exploit the opportunities of the local production environment but also 
counteract regional shortcomings and disadvantages However, defiance of the 
environment often involves additional investments and expenditures, which send 
production costs upward With reference to this, Chapter Six poses the question 
whether, m the end, strategies to overcome environmental contingencies really can be 
of use, especially when competitors in more benign environments appear to be free of 
such investment The firms investigated suggest that the answer to this question 
nevertheless might be affirmative The chapter puts forth some arguments for this It 
elaborates on the effectiveness of environmental resistance strategies (research questi­
on number two) Chapter Seven attempts to identify the possible fundamental sources 
of the businesses' ability to grow and resist external contingencies (research question 
number three) Chapter Eight, finally, summarizes the findings and puts forward 
some implications for policy and research 
Notes 
1. Business vitality is measured in this TNO study on the basis of real turnover growth, 
increase of investments and net profit growth between 1982 and 1991) 
2. Very small firms can sometimes achieve high percentage growth rates simply because 
of the low base level from which calculation is made. 
Chapter Two 
Firm and environment in regional science 
2.1 Introduction 
An analysis of theories m regional science with respect to the relationship between 
(business) organization and environment brings to light two perspectives The first 
infers the behaviour and functions of organizations from the environment in which 
they are located The second reasons more or less in the opposite way, the environ-
ment in which the firm locates is seen as a result of the firm's behaviour and 
activities The first emphasizes the study of the environment as such, especially the 
urban or regional environment From this perspective, the spatial environment is of 
overriding importance for the formation, behaviour, and performance of organizati-
ons Consequently, little if any leeway is left for the firm to influence the environment 
in which it is located The second perspective presupposes a much greater freedom of 
choice for organizations It pays close attention to the decisions and organizational 
structures and the influence these have on the spatial environment This school of 
thought views firms and organizations as area organizing institutions These two 
alternatives can be referred to respectively as the environmental versus the 
organizational approach The environmental perspective is also referred to as an ecologi-
cal view (cf Lambooy 1984) The organizational perspective represents the whole 
micro level, pointing to the effects of both organizational structure and entrepren-
eurial or management behaviour Accordingly, it may also be called the behavioural 
approach in this thesis The present chapter examines both perspectives in greater 
detail and will evaluate them critically (section 2 2 and 2 3) 
The dichotomy exploited m this exercise may suggest that regional science is 
strongly divided Yet several theories contain the seeds of convergence of the environ-
mental and organizational approaches Section 2 4 discusses several ways in which 
the environmental and organizational logic may be linked to each other 
2 2 The primacy of the environment 
The supposition that the actions (including the choice of location) and performance of 
a firm are heavily affected by the attributes of the environment in which it is located 
forms the intuitive basis of mainstream thinking in regional science However, in the 
course of time, the impact of the environment has been assigned different forms in 
various spatial theories. We begin by discussing two schools of grand theory in which 
the spatial environment conditions business behaviour and performance. These are 
traditional location theory and modern regional development theory. 
2.2.1 Location theory 
The focus of traditional (i.e., classical and neo-classical) location theory is the single-
plant firm. According to conventional location theory the behaviour of a (single-plant) 
firm is determined by a strong urge to occupy the best or so-called optimal location. 
That is to say, an entrepreneur's location decision is guided by either spatial differ-
ences in total production costs or by spatial differences in total revenue (or demand), 
or by both. It should be added, however, that traditional location theory has been 
preoccupied with the cost side of production rather than with the demand side. 
According to Smith (1987, 27), this is partly due to the greater conceptual and 
practical difficulty of dealing with demand and revenue. 
In any case, classical location theory, with its roots in the work of Weber, is 
centred on the firm's search for the location where production costs are lowest (i.e., 
least-cost location). There is only one least-cost location for a firm. The theory 
assumes that the cost of acquiring the quantity of a particular input necessary for 
production of a certain volume of output differs from place to place (i.e., the spatial 
cost surface). Furthermore, it is assumed that spatial cost surfaces differ according to 
the input material. All individual input cost surfaces add up to a surface of total 
costs, from which the least-cost location can easily be derived. 
A major shortcoming of variable cost theory is its neglect of demand consider-
ations. Hotelling, Lösch and others changed this situation. The least-cost location 
became counterbalanced by the maximum-revenue location. It is assumed that 
(locational) behaviour of firms is most strongly determined by revenue or demand 
conditions, which vary from place to place. This may be due to spatial differences in 
price (for example because of varying distribution and production costs). But it may 
also be due to the number of consumers and their characteristics, such as income, 
taste and preferences. Thus, "Revenue also becomes a continuous spatial variable, 
analogous to the total-cost surface, with one point at which total revenue will be 
maximized" (Smith 1987, 28-29). 
Smith (1966) brings together the least-cost approach and the maximum-
revenue approach in a single model. According to Smith, the optimal location for a 
firm is the location where the difference between costs and revenues is greatest i.e. 
the maximum-profit location. Apart from the optimal location, there are second-best 
areas in which revenues exceed costs. On these locations, production is profitable as 
well, though profits are not maximal. Smith refers to this as the spatial margin to 
profitability. 
In traditional location theory, either spatial profitability differentials between 
firms or firms' locational behaviour are assumed to be completely determined by 
locational cost and demand conditions. Furthermore, the incorporation of non-
optimizing behaviour in location theory (by introducing the concept of spatial margin) 
creates more latitude for making location decisions. However, this does not apply to 
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business performance, because it is assumed that every deviance from the Optimal 
location' is accompanied by a proportional decrease in profitability. Consequently, the 
spatial margin concept is just as spatially deterministic as the rest of traditional 
location theory. 
2.2.2 Regional development theory 
In the early 1950s, both classical location theory (Weber) and its neoclassical version 
(Lösch, Hotelling, Isard, Smith and others) started to attract criticism. This criticism 
came from urban and regional economists and geographers. Regional inequality was, 
in reality, much greater than could be explained with a plant-by-plant analysis. Vari-
ous economic activities showed a striking and stubborn inclination to cluster in large 
cities and urban areas. The economic landscape was perceived to consist of fast-
growing, densily populated urban core areas on the one hand and lagging, sparsely 
populated peripheral areas on the other. This conspicuous regional split was the basis 
on which various regional development theories were elaborated. Examples are 
Friedman's (1966) centre-periphery model, Myrdal's (1957) cumulative causation 
theory, Perroux's growth-pole theory (1950/1970, 1988), Vernon's (1966) product life-
cycle theory, the filtering-down hypothesis (Lonsdale and Seyler 1979), and, recently, 
the geography of flexible specialisation (Scott 1983, 1988a, Scott and Storper 1987, 
Piore and Sabel 1984, Schoenberger 1988). All of these examples emphasize the 
quality of the environment as a factor in the fortunes of economic activities by 
employing the concept of agglomeration advantages. "The idea is that, spatial 
propinquity allows better access to the inputs and outputs necessary for production, 
thereby raising revenues, lowering costs, and increasing productivity" (Walker 1986, 
248). 
In this theory, urban areas offer noticeably better conditions for production 
than thinly populated peripheral areas (Richardson 1973). The theory has developed 
considerably through the years and has thereby taken on different forms. Weber was 
the very first to use the concept of agglomeration economies. He assumed that the 
advantages of clustering of economic activities lie mainly in lower transportation costs 
for mutual deliveries of input materials. The importance of these costs has decreased 
in the course of time; their share in the total cost of production is now far less than in 
the past. Along with the development of spatial theory, the scope of the principle of 
agglomeration economies has been widened considerably. It is no longer limited to 
material relations. This concept is also applied to immaterial relations such as 
exchange of know-how, service linkages and labour market relations. It is assumed 
that factors other than transportation costs cause the total production cost to be lower 
in urban cores than elsewhere. Those factors include information, communication and 
transaction costs. Furthermore, urban locations offer more than cost advantages. They 
provide a higher information density, a more differentiated and better qualified local 
labour pool, the presence of professional services, and greater possibilities for 
contracting out, which allows firms to specialize in their core activities. These 
opportunities all serve to make urban firms more advanced, more innovative, and 
therefore more profitable. In other words, agglomeration economies are not only 
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expressed in lower production costs but also in so-called differential advantages. All 
in all, in the course of time, the interpretation of the concept of agglomeration 
advantages has been widened. From a concentration on transportation costs, the focus 
has shifted to the much wider concept of 'accessibility to factors of production'. This 
concerns the opportunity costs of time and money. As society becomes more and 
more complex, entrepreneurs must go to some trouble and expense in order to obtain 
information, to establish and maintain contacts, to enter into contracts, and to perform 
transactions in a given quantity and of a certain quality. 
The invention and development of the idea of agglomeration economies has 
done no harm to the field of spatial economics. The concept not only helps to explain 
differences in economic prosperity between different regions, but it also has clear 
macro economic implications (Nijkamp and Davelaar 1989). The reason is that spatial 
economics provides some answers to the persistent questions regarding the origins of 
(technological) innovation and economic growth. This contribution seems to be 
penetrating into other branches of economics. In any case, the role of the local 
business environment is becoming a 'hot issue' in the debate about the 
competitiveness and thus the economic growth of the domestic economy. There is 
increasing awareness that the economic success of some nation-states rests on the 
achievements of certain areas within them (Pollard 1982). Also Porter (1990) emphasi-
zes the quality of the production environment in explaining a country's economic suc-
cess. He comes to the conclusion that "While economic geography has not been seen 
as a core discipline in economics, my research suggests that it should be" (ibid, 791, 
note 23). 
To sum up, in regional science, theoretical work is dominated by the idea that 
levels of regional development can be traced to attributes of the business environ-
ment. These characteristics influence the behaviour as well as the prosperity of firms. 
This environmental paradigm underlies the explanation of the territorial equilibrium 
models of traditional location theory. At the same time, it is embedded in the expla-
nation of the structural and cumulative inequality models of regional development 
theory. 
2.2.3 Criticizing the primacy of the environment 
This section offers some critical notes on the environmental paradigm in spatial 
studies. Its use is assessed regardless of whether it underlies spatial decentralization 
and interregional convergence on the one hand, or spatial concentration and diver-
gence on the other. It must be emphasized, however, that the reduction of patterns of 
geographical development to characteristics of the territorial business environment is 
not devoid of internal logic. Actually, the ecological argument is rather self-evident 
and provides powerful explanations for general patterns of economic development 
across space. Nevertheless, several points of critique can be made on the presupposed 
influence of the environment. In particular, we dwell on how the ecological argument 
has found much support within the concept of agglomeration economies. Objections 
to its use can be raised on the methodological as well as on the theoretical plane. 
Methodological problems 
Methodologically, the question is how to convincingly measure the role of the 
production environment in the behaviour and economic functioning of firms. 
Traditionally, spatial researchers have mainly used quantitative methods of statistical 
inference. These methods are, however, plagued by problems of internal validation. 
Do they adequately represent what they are intended to measure? Stated differently, 
an important problem of quantitative methods is how to interpret the statistical 
associations measured. Briefly, this section outlines the problem at hand. It uses three 
different clusters of approaches to measure the impact of elements of the production 
environment on the behaviour and performance of private firms. 
Analysing aggregate business location The problem of internal validation lies primarily 
in the methods that relate the number of activities in a certain area to the environ-
mental characteristics of that area. For instance, spatial agglomeration of firms in 
urban areas is almost automatically attributed to the impact of agglomeration 
economies. This should be recognized as dubious logic. Agglomeration theory 
predicts the clustering of activities but the concentration of activities does not prove 
the operation of agglomeration advantages. Britton (1974, 368-369) notes that the con-
centration phenomenon could be interpreted in behavioural terminology just as well 
or even better than in terms of true economic arguments. According to the behaviou-
ral approach, firms cluster together as a result of management's limited knowledge of 
less visible but equally suitable alternative locations. Their choice is often exercised by 
imitation in order to reduce uncertainty about competitive conditions, costs and 
demand. 
Apart from imitation, there is another way to interprete clustered location 
patterns. This option is based on the results of studies of new firm formation. It 
appears that new entrepreneurs do not make active location decisions. They simply 
begin in their own living or working environment, irrespective of local economic 
conditions, (cf for example Gudgin 1978, and Cooper 1985). The growth of new firms 
will then eventually strengthen the existing spatial differences, for non-economic 
reasons,. This too can be denoted as a behavioural explanation for the location of 
businesses and firms. 
If such behavioural standpoints hold true, the existing spatial pattern cannot 
be simply viewed as a causal necessity, at least not as an economic necessity. 
Nevertheless, this tendency is present in much spatial research. In this regard regional 
science deserves the criticism voiced by Braverman. From his point of view, the 
modem social sciences still suffer from the urge "to accept all that is real as necessary" 
and "all that exists as inevitable" (Braverman 1974). 
Horvers and Wever (1989) express this discord between reality and necessity 
when comparing the locational behaviour of large internationals and migrant firms 
with the spatial performance patterns of successful existing firms. The former have a 
strong preference for the best-equipped locations with reference to the presence of 
universities, characteristics of the labour pool, the access to airports etc. That is not to 
say that these firms would function less well in other locations. According to Horvers 
and Wever, the decentralized location pattern of the second group, i.e. 'successful' or 
'alert' existing firms (winner of awards, fast-growing small and medium-sized firms 
and businesses which use innovation stimulating measures), proves that less eye-
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catching, alternative, locations need not to hamper business performance. This 
possibly could be relevant and encouraging information for regional policymakers. 
Analysing aggregate external linkages A second way to study the influence of the 
production environment is by analysing the spatial relations between organizations. 
Agglomeration advantages could, for example, be expressed in the locally oriented 
external linkages of firms in concentrated urban core areas. These linkages are 
abundant, as opposed to the sparse, long-distance linkages of firms located outside 
the agglomerations (e.g. Malecki 1991, Scot 1983, Czamanski 1976, Streit 1969). 
However, according to McDermott and Taylor (1982), even the mapping of patterns in 
linkages is not sufficient evidence for the operation of agglomeration economies. An 
unequal spatial dispersion of contacts can just as well result from the limited spatial 
information of firms. Local networks are then the result of a lack of knowledge on the 
part of the entrepreneur. He may not be aware of alternative actors who, though 
perhaps more appropriate, are located further away. McDermott and Taylor (1982) 
term this "a behavioural explanation of spatial interaction". 
Analysing aggregate regional performance A third method is the measurement of 
differences in performance between central and peripheral areas. This concerns indi-
cators such as average regional income, value-added, regional production, invest-
ments, unemployment, employment etc. The problem is that these figures are usually 
only available as averages and aggregates. In those forms, the variation between 
individual activities is lost. Does the environment influence all firms to the same 
degree? Or does the aggregate conceal large differences between individual cases? 
Even if the figures are available at the level of individual firms, they may still 
be ambiguous. It remains unclear whether spatial differences tell us something about 
the conditions of production in an area or about the businesses or entrepreneurs 
operating there. Some authors suggest that differences in regional development are 
not so much tied to variations in the production environment as to divergent 
production structures (for example sector and size differences). Saxenian (1981), for 
example, attributes the growth of Santa Clara County (including Silicon Valley) to the 
growth of the micro-electronics industry. However, other factors can generate regional 
inequalities. For instance, selective population shifts may result in "quality differen-
ces" in population structure (Keeble 1989, Wever 1986, Vaessen & Wever 1986); 
regionally bound cultural factors (Illeris 1986, Brusco 1986, Bleumink et al. 1985), 
social psychological factors, and religious factors (McCLelland 1961), may also 
enhance inequality. 
In sum, the argumentation about the significance of territorial conditions for 
economic growth is only valid when a causal link can be proven to exist between the 
characteristics of economic conditions of a business location and the profits, the total 
costs and/or productivity of individual firms. Obvously, gathering these data is no 
sinecure, so the researcher has to be satisfied with less. Gilmour (1974) suggests that 
these problems of finding appropriate empirical data for validating agglomeration 
theory result from its deductive nature. 
We have pointed out the problems of measurement and interpretation. Yet, we 
have still not mentioned all the problems encountered when using the environmental 
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approach. The ecological paradigm also has a number of theoretical deficiencies. 
These are illustrated in the next section. 
Theoretical problems 
But even if the influence of territorial conditions on economic growth can be 
measured in an unequivocal way, explaining economic advancement from an 
ecological point of view is still full of pitfalls. These problems arise from deficiencies 
at the theoretical level. In this section, we cover three points of criticism of a more 
theoretical nature regarding the environmental approach. First of all, there is the 
question of the origin of 'low-profile' and 'high-profile' production environments. In 
regional development theory, regional differences in production circumstances seem 
to appear out of thin air. McDermott and Taylor (1982) point out that some locational 
advantages - the presence of pools of skills, labour, services and infrastructure - tend 
to follow rather than precede the initial concentration of basic economic activity. This 
problem comes to the fore in an article by Scott and Angel (1987) about the develop-
ment of the semiconductor industry in Silicon Valley. The researchers do not answer a 
keyquestion: Why did such strong agglomeration economies appear so early in Silicon 
Valley rather than at other nascent centres of integrated circuit production in the 
United States (in Phoenix and Dallas, for example)? Saxenian remarks that 'The 
approaches of traditional location and growth theory thus fail to satisfactorily 
illuminate the processes of regional change which have occurred in Santa Clara 
County. Neither provides an adequate framework for understanding the electronics 
industry's original location and agglomeration and the resulting unprecedented 
growth" (Saxenian 1981, 4). The reason is that these theories conceive of regions as 
predefined spatial units, having dynamics in and of themselves and existing in 
isolation from the rest of the economy. In other words, regional dynamics is viewed 
as manna from heaven. 
A second problem is the one-dimensional nature of regional development 
theory. It is only able to predict and deal with cumulative inequality between a given 
centre and an existing periphery. This makes the theory inflexible and vulnerable. 
Storper and Walker (1989), but also Saxenian (1981), point out that neither location 
theory nor regional development theory are able to explain the dramatic changes 
which have occurred in the arrangement of the space economy. These changes have 
been characterized by the creation and destruction of centres and peripheries. They 
have been a feature of civilization since ancient times. In these authors' view, the 
recent North-South and East-West shifts of economic activity are merely the most 
recent expressions of an age-old process. This leads them to conclude that 'The 
evidence suggests that there is something terribly wrong with existing theories of 
spatial development, none of which provides a ready explanation for rapid growth at 
the periphery" (Storper & Walker 1989, 18). 
A third point of criticism is that the ecological approach - thus the principle of 
agglomeration economics as well - neglects the individual organization. According to 
McDermott and Taylor (1982, 7), "Industrial geography [and regional economics] has 
tended to treat organizations all in much the same manner - as black boxes, capable 
of a limited number of actions and responses, which are themselves embedded 
within, and their actions determined by particular environmental contexts." They 
further assert that "many studies in industrial geography remain external to the 
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organization, taking the organization and its internal processes as given and having 
no direct bearing upon spatial patterns of production Nowhere is this stance more 
apparent than in the cost surface approach to locational explanation in which the 
organization is treated as a single plant firm which is no more than a locational 'actor' 
- one dot in a dot distribution" (ibid) Not only in location theory but also in regional 
development theory, there is no elbow-room for an action-taking entrepreneur or any 
independence of the individual enterprise from the environment, let alone any 
question of 'reciprocal influence' Critics use the term spatial determinism (Taylor 
1986, Walker 1985) or spatial fetishism (McDermott and Taylor 1982) Walker (1985, 
250)posits that "It [agglomeration theory] misses the possibility of action at distance 
and of active intervention of businesses in labour markets, local politics and the like 
Industry does not depend only on the passive action of the market, distance, and the 
cumulative weight of many industries to make places suitable for its purposes " 
Such criticism is not recent but dates from the 1960s The fact that these points 
are still being raised is telling Apperently, the improvements on classical location 
theory within regional development theory have not resulted in a more active role for 
the entrepreneur and/or enterprise On the contrary, in the new off-shoot of regional 
development theory known as flexible agglomeration theory (Scott 1988a, Schoenber­
ger 1987), the idea of agglomeration economies once again takes a predominant place. 
However, with the neoclassical locational theories and the modem develop­
ment theories, the arsenal of approaches in the spatial theorizing is not yet exhausted 
There are still other approaches, some of which directly contradict the premises of 
environmental determinism According to these approaches, the forces which control 
an organization's doings and fortunes are not to be found in the environment Rather 
they dwell inside the organization and its management 
2 3 The primacy of the enterprise 
Inspired by the work of Simon (1957) and March and Simon (1958), the socalled 
behavioural school of economic theory arose in the second half of the 1960s The 
behaviounal approach tries to compensate for the lack of attention within classical 
economic thought for the internal aspects of the company The new approach focused 
on how economic choices come about and on the personal motives and behaviour of 
the entrepreneur In economic geography and regional economy, this means that 
attention is given to the underlying forces of locational behaviour as well as the 
spatial implications of behavioural patterns of companies This basic need to open up 
the Ъіаск box of the firm' soon turned into a strongly developed network of sub-
approaches, with mutual points of contact but with just as many nuances of stress 
Seen from the company-environment perspective there are two tangled points within 
this dense undergrowth of behaviourist approaches which require some pruning 
These clusters consist of Ъеііа іоигаі location theory' and 'geography of enterprise' 
2.3.1 Behavioural location theory 
Behavioural location theory crtiticizes a number of assumptions on which classical 
location theory is based. Classical theory assumes that entrepreneurs are omniscient 
and that they are exclusively geared toward the maximization of profits. Central to 
the behavioural critique is the notion that entrepreneurs do not have maximum 
knowledge and that "spatial organization of economic activities is, at any time, the 
product of both economic and noneconomic forces" (Pred 1966, 4). It is thus acknowl-
edged that entrepreneurs act in situations of uncertainty with regard to the choice of 
location. 
It was in the 1960s that Allen Pred made his appeal to embellish existing 
location theory by taking into account non-optimal behaviour, imperfect knowledge, 
other psychological variables, socially dictated constraints, and the impact of existing 
patterns on subsequent patterns (processes) (Pred 1967, 16). Pred does not in any way 
depart from classical location theory. Consistent with tradition, he concentrates on the 
single- plant business. Furthermore, he incorporates Smith's (1966) neoclassical spatial 
margin concept into locational behaviour theory. According to Pred, some decision-
makers have plenty of (relevant) information at their disposal and the ability to use 
that information. Thus, he argues, they are in a position to make rational economic 
decisions. One comes across their enterprises at or close to the point of optimal of 
location. Of course, other entrepreneurs may have little information at their disposal 
and a limited ability to use it. It is likely that they will opt for a non-viable location. 
By the way, Pred does concede that companies can end up in the right place by 
chance. Between poorly and optimally informed entrepreneurs lie the majority, 
consisting of those who are non-optimally but adequately informed. They are not 
seeking the optimal but a satisfactory location (satisficing behaviour). We will not 
come across these companies at the point of optimal location (unless by chance). But 
we will certainly find them within the spatial margin where profit-making production 
is possible. 
Indeed Pred's behaviouristic critique on classical location theory is very 
illuminating. Nevertheless, even in this train of thought, which is based on ideas of 
satisficing behaviour and nonoptimally informed decision makers, environmental 
factors get the upper hand over entrepreneurial action. After all, a lack of information 
creates uncertainty on the part of entrepreneurs. And uncertainty leads to a 'safe' 
choice of location. This means that business owners are inclined to imitate each other 
and that their locational behaviour is governed by a 'herd instinct' (Richardson 1973, 
111). As a consequence, they have a preference for concentration areas, where many 
companies appear to be functioning well, i.e. they prefer the large cities. So, the same 
locational forces which are thought to optimize profitability also minimize uncer-
tainty. The primacy of the environment remains intact and the environmental 
approach incorporates behavioural location theory with little difficulty. 
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2.3.2 Geography of enterprise 
In the wake of the behavioural approach came 'the geography of enterprise' or 
'corporate geography', a development of the 1960s. The geography of enterprise 
emerged out of the constant and ever-expanding criticism of (neo)classical location 
theory. The objections voiced by the behavioural location theorists paved the way for 
its arrival. Two points of critique triggered the emergence of this new field. 
First, enterprise geography rejects the Marshallian idea of the single-plant 
family firm, which supposedly operates in a world of perfect competition and perfect 
information, as the predominant mode of industrial organization. The small firm 
could not remain the basis for modelling industrial geography forever. In the 1960s it 
was recognized that the multidivisional, conglomerate and multinational corporations 
had swept across the United States, then Europe and finally the world. Their ascend-
ancy had to be accounted for (Dicken 1986). McNee (1960, 202), the founding father of 
the geography of enterprise, noted that "The atomistic economy of yesterday, 
composed of millions of enterprises, is increasingly giving way to giant industrial 
combines". 
The second point pertains to the predominance of classical economic thinking, 
with its emphasis on deterministic mono-causalities (Krumme 1969a). According to 
classical location theory, the location of economic activity is completely determined by 
environmental or locational factors. The actors are only capable of reacting to their 
environment by exhibiting mechanical relocation behaviour. However, through the 
spectacles of the corporate geographer, (large) firms are seen to have a measure of 
control over their environment. They can act on the basis of bounded rationality and 
make strategic decisions that enhance their corporate advantage. 
Carr (1983) gives a rough outline of the development of enterprise geography. 
He suggests that it initially emphasized the adaptation of production and organiz-
ation to conditions of the external economic environment. However, nearly all of the 
later behavioural corporate studies ignored the influence of the external economic 
environment on organizational behaviour. Attention turned towards the effects of 
organizational decision-making upon urban and regional development. 
From this brief review two approaches can be distilled within the field of 
corporate geography. One focuses primarily on adjustment behaviour of (large) firms 
in response to environmental conditions. The other is oriented towards the regional 
impact of the structure and behaviour of large firms. The former mentioned approach 
incorporates the environment as an input condition to organizational behaviour. In 
contrast, the second treats the spatial and regional environment as an outcome of 
management decisions. We will refer to these two approaches in enterprise geography 
respectively as 'adaptation corporate geography' and 'regional development corporate 
geography'. 
Adaptation corporate geography 
The initial framework for adaptation was devised by Krumme (1969a,b) and Steed 
(1971a,b,c). In the field of corporate geography, the adaptation approach assumes that 
adaptive behaviour can lead to deviation from the optimum location (Carr 1983). 
Krumme even asserts that companies are rarely located optimally. This is because the 
optimal location is extremely unstable. Both in the external environment and inside 
the companies, the dynamics are constantly changing the operating requirements. 
And this makes the optimal location very changeable. However, the production 
conditions at a sub-optimal location are not necessarily detrimental to the individual 
enterprise. The management may be able to adapt the company optimally or near-
optimally without having to change sites. Decision-makers can even try to work their 
way into the environment and influence it to their own advantage. 
According to Krumme, an entrepreneur is constantly trying to react to his 
environment in the right way. The 'optimum location' of the classical location theory 
is placed in opposition to the concept of 'the optimum path of locational adjustment'. 
Rather than circumstances in the external environment, it is the company's ability to 
adjust, including its locational behaviour (e.g. by relocation), which determines the 
prosperity of an area. Krumme (1969b) used three criteria to classify entrepreneurial 
action: the spatial dimension, the organizational setting and the time frame. 
The spatial dimension The first criterion is the spatial dimension. Do companies react 
to changes in production requirements by making spatial or non-spatial adjustments? 
Spatial strategies change the geography of the enterprise as reflected in the number 
and the distribution of its facilities. Some common spatial adjustments are (integral) 
company relocation; setting up or closing down subsidiaries; and participation in, 
taking over of, or being taken over by companies that are better located. Non-spatial 
or in-situ adjustments occur at the present location. Some typical non-spatial adjust-
ments are the more or less intensive use of existing means of production, introduction 
of changes in factor and/or production combinations, product or process alternations 
in response to environmental forces, and changes in linkage patterns. 
The substitution principle gives entrepreneurs the freedom to choose between 
various means of adjustment. According to Krumme, to a certain extent - within the 
spatial margin - non-spatial adjustments constitute an alternative to spatial adjust-
ments. Using Renner's (1947) terminology, Krumme (1969a, 35, note 18) contends that 
entrepreneurs are often able to substitute high 'economic efficiency' (the degree to 
which an entrepreneur's economic behaviour approximates the optimum) for low 
'geonomic efficiency' (the degree to which an industrial location approximates the 
optimum). Figure 2.1 places this line of reasoning in a core-periphery context. It 
depicts graphically how adaptation geographers think organizational behaviour in 
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Figure 2.1 Substitution of low locationa) by extra economic or adaptation effi­
ciency 
Organizational aspects The second criterion for classification pertains to the organiz­
ational level at which a certain adaptation decision is made or at which it is to take 
effect. In this respect, a distinction has to be made between adjustment decisions at 
the corporate level, at the plant level, and at the level of the individual investor. Of 
course, the investor may or may not be the entrepreneur. The set of possibilities for 
spatial and non-spatial adaptation varies with each of these decision levels. Actually, 
this distinction reveals the great influence of both organizational structure and size on 
a firm's ability to adjust to and generate change. Organizational size in particular is 
considered to affect an organization's adaptability. More opportunities are likely to be 
available for larger firms. Large multi-locational enterprises have, as a result of their 
financial and managerial capacity, significantly more adjustment possibilities than 
small single-location enterprises. This applies to adjustments at the present location as 
well as to the possibility of constantly relocating assets across a number of sites (cf. 
also Rees, 1978; and Watts (1978; 1980). 
The time factor The third dimension is the time factor, i.e. the amount of time that is 
needed to carry out the necessary adjustments. Krumme makes a distinction between 
adjustments on a short, medium, and long term. In agreement with Steed (1971b), 
Carr (1983) adds that short-term adaptations consist of immediate reactions on the 
part of entrepreneurs to the external environment. The entrepreneur responds without 
lengthy discussions or radical investment decisions. Adjustments over the longer 
term, on the other hand, are more geared toward gathering as much information as 
possible and influencing the modifications in the external environment to one's own 
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advantage Moreover, as uncertainty in the environment increases and the rate of 
change rises, the short-term adjustments will become less effective 
Krumme (1969b) reasons that these criteria - space, organization, and time -
are interrelated In the short term, m-situ changes are attainable, whilst in the long 
term spatial adjustment strategies are possible In all instances, multi-locational 
companies have more adjustment options than single-location companies Krumme 
classifies the possibilities of environment adaptation according to the following three 
scenario's (see also Can-1983, 393-394). 
1) The single plant can adapt in the short run The intensity of use of investment 
goods can be varied and input factor combinations can be changed as long as 
new investment is not necessary In this way multi-plant corporations can 
make spatial adjustments at different locations to various degrees 
2) New or abandoned investment, is a feature of medium-run adaptation, when 
it does not involve the addition or removal of totally independent production 
units Again, the scope of adaptation is less for the single-plant firm Medium-
run adaptation can include agreements and cooperation between firms This 
may entail production integration, subcontracting, and research and develop-
ment collaboration 
3) Long-run adaptation involves locational investment strategies These include 
disinvestment, relocation, establishing branch plants, or change in ownership 
(by way of merger or takeover) The scope of adaptation is wider for the 
larger-scale, multi-plant firm that is planning over the long term 
In sum, adaptation corporate geography focuses both on the internal milieu of 
companies and their external interaction The environment, as it expresses itself in the 
external economic conditions, has not been given much attention until recently 
(Dicken 1990) The bulk of corporate geographical studies of the mid-1970s and 1980s 
focus on business strategies These studies trace the effects of those strategies upon 
spatial divisions of labour and regional development 
Regional development corporate geography 
From the end of the 1970s onward, the geography of enterprise became strongly 
biased towards the spatial ramifications of decision-making within large firms (Carr 
1983) Spatial analysts were impressed by the powers of the modern corporations and 
their area-organizing capabilities, as compared with the small firm The locational 
strategies of large firms and the way they organize their internal activities profoundly 
shape urban and regional economies Thus, it has been argued, large firms tend to 
create regional inequality (Watts 1980b, Dicken 1986) Because of their financial, 
economic and political power, it is assumed that large corporations possess consider-
able autonomy in making geographic decisions Place relationships are organized and 
regulated according to elaborate, pre-formulated, corporate plans for survival and 
growth Corporate autonomy makes the objectives set by the management extremely 
important The traditional theory of the geography of price has become fused with or 
even swept away by the geography of administration 
Recently, Walker (1989) made some order out of the amalgam of corporate 
studies The literature on corporate geography seems to revolve around four mam 
issues (1) the spatial bias in location introduced by corporate calculation, (2) the 
corporate spatial division of labour on regional development, and (4) the geographic 
expansion of corporate activities 
The first issue, mainly concerns the reasons why large firms, unlike small ones, 
can manifest spatial patterns deflected away from the optimal or least-cost location 
Locational and organizational adjustment behaviour forms the empirical basis of these 
studies They therefore adhere to an adaptive approach, which has been addressed in 
the previous subsection The second to fourth issues, however, are more amenable to 
what we will term here a corporate regional development approach They make up 
the bulk of studies in the field of the geography of enterprise and will be discussed 
briefly below 
Corporate spatial divisions of labour Some corporate geographers who view uneven 
development as the outcome of management decisions and organizational structures 
of large corporations, link up with the new international division of labour theory of 
Hymer (1972, 1976) and Froebel, Heinrichs and Kreye (1977) In this view corpor-
ations are endowed with an internal division of labour, internalized systems of 
commodity and service flow, multilocational operations, and a hierarchical mode of 
organization The argument centres on the general distribution of such corporate 
facilities as headquarters, research laboratories and manufacturing plants This 
division of labour within the corporation, it is said, is marked by a vertical hierarchy 
which becomes imprinted on the national and global space-economy, as first pro-
posed by Hymer Walker (1989, 48) outlines the general spatial pattern according to 
this approach "the headquarters of giant multinationals are concentrated m core cities 
of developed countries, higher order functions are grouped in secondary cities, and 
lower order activities are shunted off to backward regions or third world countries " 
Corporate branch plants and regional development Another strand of research in the 
corporate regional development approach concerns branch plants Many branch plants 
are in peripheral assisted areas They are depicted as detrimental to regional growth 
for two reasons First, branch plants have relatively few local linkages, hence low 
income multipliers (Townroe 1975, Britton 1976, Britton and Gilmore 1978, Watts 
1981) "They are 'cathedrals in the desert' by virtue of their low impact on their 
immediate surroundings" (Walker 1989, 48) Secondly, branch plants are unstable 
contributors to regional prosperity, prone to closure (Enckson 1980, Bluestone and 
Harrison 1982) 
Corporate spatial expansion Other investigations in the geography of enterprise are 
concerned with the geography of corporate growth It has to be admitted that these 
studies have but indirect links with regional development issues In such corporate 
growth models, the large firm creates a distinct pattern of spatial expansion It 
establishes a core territory within which it conquers its immediate competitors that 
territory forms a base from which the enterprise gropes outward in search of new 
markets and resources Some well-known spatial models of corporate growth are 
those of Taylor (1975), Watts (1980a) and Hákanson (1979) Watt's model is concerned 
with external growth (ι e merger and acquisition) Hákanson's model deals with 
internal expansion of firms (establishment of sales offices and production plants) 
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The dominant stream of research in the geography of enterprise focuses on big 
enterprise strategies and structures, tracing their effects upon communities and 
regions (issue two to four) Thus the emphasis has shifted away from the issues pre-
eminent m traditional location theory and regional growth theory These theories are 
concerned with the influence of the spatial dimension in the economic environment 
(1 e proximity to raw materials, markets etc ) upon industrial location and performan-
ce Corporate geography seems to be avoiding a theoretical confrontation with 
(neo)classical location theory and modern regional development theory 
2 3 3 Criticizing the primacy of the firm 
Behaviounal geography, particularly in the form of the geography of enterprise, has 
clearly enhanced spatial theory's sense of reality Nevertheless, there is a long list of 
objections to this approach The general criticism is that enterprise geography suffers 
from an inadequately developed theoretical framework and an uncontrolled growth 
m the applied methodology (Dicken 1990) Partly because of this, both the value of its 
predictions and its practical application in policy-making are limited (Carr 1983, 
Hayter and Watts 1983, Walker 1989) Further points of criticism are specified below 
In order to meet the objective of this research - explaining small business growth in 
contrasting environments - these objections to the corporate geography approach have 
to be dealt with Stated briefly, the shortcomings dealt with are the neglect of the 
small firm, treating enterprises in isolation, and, if any, an inadequate focus on an 
organization's environment from a geographical point of view 
The neglect of the small firm 
The geography of enterprise neglects small and middle-sized companies Whilst 
interest in the small company has grown since the 1970s, the geography of enterprise 
is still strongly fixed on the large company, which it views as a 'given fact' How 
large companies get started and where they come from are questions the geography 
of enterprise does not ask It ignores the role that space and place might play therein 
Apparently, its practitioners are unaware that large companies must once have been 
small This fixation on the large company diverts attention from the central problem 
in regional development theory, namely the origin and growth of firms Instead, 
attention is directed toward the distribution of economic surplus ' [Geography of 
enterprise] treated the problem of production as basically solved, in order to focus on 
distributional matters " (Walker 1988, 379) 
Firms in isolation 
The enterprise approach is too much of a single-actor or single-region approach It 
does not compare the functioning of companies in different types of production 
environment with each other However much behaviounal theorists emphasize the 
adjustment possibilities of entrepreneurs, in order to avoid a spatially deterministic 
explanation they still have to explain a paradoxical situation How it is that Company 
B, which is located in a badly provided-for (i e peripheral) environment, can make 
adjustments and overcome its locational disadvantage relative to Competitor A, which 
is located in a well provided-for (central) environment? Krumme's assertion that 
managerial adjustment behaviour can compensate for an inadequate location (Figure 
2.1) is rather tricky as it ignores a firm's competitive context. His substitution 
framework passes over the following problems. In the first place, even the most 
staunch adherents of the behaviourial approach cannot deny that adjustment strat­
egies may be combined with extra investments. This combination, in tum, pushes up 
production costs (see Townroe 1974). We should recall that the costs of site relocation 
are second only to bankruptcy as a dramatic event in a company's life (cf. Gruijt-
huisen and Junge 1992). But also other adaptation measures involve considerable 
expense, such as setting up internal supply capacity whenever the environment is 
inadequate in that respect, or training personnel if the regional work force does not 
come up to scratch. Behavioural studies have the tendency to neglect the costs which 
result from the decisions and actions of entrepreneurs. These are depicted in Figure 
2.2 as adaptation costs. If these costs are taken into account, then we must consider 
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Figure 2.2 The fallacy of the substitution framework 
Do the benefits exceed the costs? Small high-tech companies in peripheral locations 
might have to dig deeply into the coffers to acquire highly trained staff. Whether 
these recruits are found by in-house training or by attracting them from far and wide, 
the investment may be out of proportion to the returns. But even if this is the case, 
we are still not home and dry. There is a second possibility. In principle, every 
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catching-up manoeuvre of Company В depicted in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 can be 
responded to by Company A. The latter maintains the initial difference in production 
costs and, in so doing, sustains its initial competitive advantage. If В puts its staff 
under pressure to produce more efficiently, then A can do likewise. If В tries to raise 
productivity by introducing new techniques, then A can do the same. If В brings a 
new product onto the market, then A can reply with a comparable product. In other 
words, A does not even need to be as good an entrepreneur as B. All that A needs to 
do is to keep a close eye on В and respond to each of B's strategic moves. In other 
words, A just has to be a good imitator. It is also possible that A's adjustment costs 
will be lower than those of В as a consequence of agglomeration economies (Figure 
2.2). Thus, the more В fights against his location, the more he can drop behind A. 
This scenario demonstrates the theoretical consequences of the claim that 
enterprise prevails above production environment, or that disadvantages of the 
environment can be compensated by extra initiatives on the part of the entrepreneur. 
If we nevertheless reject the spatial deterministic undertones in regional economic 
analyses, we have to find solutions for the above-mentioned problems. Krumme and 
Renner fail to do this in their spatial interpretation of the substitution principle. 
Chapter Six attempts to meet these shortcomings by taking a closer look at the 
efficiency of organizational adaptation in a core- periphery context. There, we intend 
to throw light on the underlying reasons why locational disadvantages need not 
necessarily get a grip on sub-optimally located firms (irrespective of industry or 
market structure). The main argument evolves around absolute or differential 
advantages which can accrue to a firm from responding to environmental constraints. 
These advantages can downplay the role of the production costs argument. 
Inadequate conception of the relevant environment 
The third point of criticism is that the geography of enterprise either fails to define 
the environmental context or defines it inadequately for explaining regional develop­
ment patterns. In so far as the environmental context is taken into account in the 
geography of enterprise literature, (empirical) research is one-sided. It is focused on 
the spatial consequences of the firms' strategic reactions to economic and technological 
change in the global environment (see De Smidt and Wever 1990b; Kelly and Keeble 
1990; Fuchs and Schamp 1990; Le Heron 1990; De Smidt 1990; Chapman and Walker 
1987, 122). Put differently, corporate geographical research perceives the environment 
mainly as an output of organizational action. In sofar as it views the environment as 
an input condition it considers only the influence of general socioeconomic trends, 
such as technological developments and changes in consumer demand. Meanwhile, it 
neglects the impact of unequal production conditions across space on business 
operation. Dicken warns against this ommision in corporate geography. "Certainly, we 
should be just as concerned with the influence of geographical variety (economic, 
political, social, and cultural) on corporate behaviour and strategy as with the 
influence of corporate behaviour and strategy on geographical space and geographical 
place" (Dicken 1990, 241). 
The neglect of corporate geographers to consider the geographical environ­
ment as an input condition to organizational action and performance undermines its 
own justification. As a result of this ommission corporate geography has failed to 
develope its own stance on the subject of the role of comparative advantages and 
agglomeration economies on organizational action and operation. This vacuum seems 
to be surreptitiously filled in the geography of enterprise literature with principles 
borrowed from environmental approaches in regional sciences (i.e. location theory 
and regional development theory), as it hardly can be a coincidence that corporate 
geography detects exactly the same spatial hierarchical structures and patterns of 
regional inequality as regional development theory does (see pages 19-20). The 
difference is that the geography of enterprise claims that these structures are the 
results of spatial corporate strategies and exploration. However, the work has not 
been done to sort out the organizational impact on the spatial structure of the 
economy from other forces such as (Weberian) cost conditions and other locational 
attributes. Therefore, we agree with Walker that the case for a distinctive 'corporate 
geography' in the modem world has not been made yet (1989, 50). Walker illustrates 
this point clearly. He notes that the hierarchical spatial structure of large corporations 
follows spatial differences in economic conditions and does not precede them. For 
example, corporate headquarters and R&D laboratories are located in major city 
centres to gain access to 'business services' and 'high quality personnel' already 
concentrated there, not vice versa. Similarly, cheap labour conditions in the periphery 
precede the location of corporate production plants, and not the reverse. "There has 
been, in the end, a notable failure of 'geography of enterprise' to show how large 
firms' spatial evolution is different from geographical industrialization under capital-
ism in general" (Walker 1989, 50). 
In the above, we first dealt with viewpoints in spatial analysis which beatify the role 
of the environment. We subsequently dealt with approaches explaining the spatial 
structure of the economy in terms of organizational behaviour. Then we established 
that unidimensional reasoning from either of these points of view leads to unaccept-
able and incredible premises from the other perspective. Now the question arises 
whether the two standpoints can be linked or integrated. Dicken (1990) makes an 
emphatic plea for cross-fertilization between contextual and organizational 
approaches. Up to now this has hardly occurred. 
2.4 Linking environmental and organizational approaches 
Hayter and Watts (1983) point out that most analyses of the interdependence of 
companies and environment apply a case-study approach. In so doing, these analyses 
underline the difficulty of incorporating the relationship between companies and 
environment into models of regional economic analysis. Nevertheless, models of 
spatial analysis almost never deal exclusively with either the environment or the 
entrepreneur. Actually, most models have the potential for blending an environmental 
with an enterprise approach. Thus, theories of regional development, in which 
agglomeration economies play a vital role, incorporate elements of behaviourial 
approaches as well. Conversely, corporate geographers, now more than in the past, 
pay attention to the environmental context in which enterprises operate. In this 
section we will discuss alternative ways to link these approaches. 
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2 4.1 The firm size link 
Growth pole theory 
Some spatial extensions of Perroux's growth pole concept (Boudeville 1976, 1977) pose 
that when one or more big enterprises in a propulsive industry are established in a 
depressed region, development in this area can be turned around This supposition 
implies an alliance between an organizational and an environmental approach The 
organizational aspect is present in the assumption that the dominant, growth-inducing 
firms are able to survive and transform the adverse environmental conditions (i e 
stagnating regions) The environmental aspect is linked to the growth pole theory 
mainly by way of the above-mentioned propulsive firm The arrival of such a 
propulsive firm or unité motrice improves external production conditions for new or 
existing local firms, which can take advantage of the extensive input and output 
requirements of the propulsive firm1 It must be noted, however, that writers are 
ambiguous about the locational requirements of economic growth-inducing activities 
Early geographical interpretations of Perroux's aspatial growth pole theory assumed 
that big powerful enterprises would be able to trigger economic development in 
retarded areas This implied a certain organizational capacity to overcome adverse 
local conditions Later, when the shortcomings of this approach as an instrument of 
regional policy became apparent, critics emphasized that growth poles cannot be 
established everywhere They were only feasible in large urban centres, already 
endowed with sophisticated production conditions (Higgins 1988) With that, the 
organizational aspect was shoved to the background, and environmental determinism 
took the upper hand Another drawback of the theory is that it does not explain 
growth Instead, it takes growth as a point of departure, stating only that it stimulates 
other economic activities (Jansen 1970) 
Product life cycle theory 
A second model in which firm size plays a role in linking an environmental or 
ecological approach with a behavioural or organizational approach can be inferred 
from the product life cycle theory (Vernon 1966) According to that theory, a product 
goes through several stages of development during its 'life' In the innovation and 
early growth stages, the firm is small and dependent on skilled labour, such as 
scientists and engineers, for product and process innovation Therefore, producers 
seek out high-quality locations in the established cores any of the advanced countries 
of the world There, communication is swift and easy, and external economies can be 
tapped In subsequent stages of product development, when the product reaches 
maturity, geographical market extensions and declining production costs come to 
determine sales and profitability of the product At these stages, manufacturers begin 
to shift production to distant and less-developed, low- cost regions and countries 
It cannot be denied that environmental variables, such as market opportunities 
and lower labour costs, are assumed to be the prime impulses for manufacturers to 
internationalize production Nonetheless, Krumme points out some behavioural or 
adaptive elements which invade Vernon's model as products mature Krumme notes 
that "One of Vernon's specific concerns is with a corporation's 'public' relationships to 
its host country A multitude of barriers resulting from the corporation's foreignness 
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have to be met by varying degrees of personal, organizational, and technological 
adaptability to local conditions in order to prevent these barriers from influencing the 
corporation's development" (Krumme 1969a, 39). Furthermore, he adds, "One does not 
need to go all the way to Bavaria or Hawaii to realize that such barriers do in fact 
exist also on an interregional level within countries". 
Summarizing, in the innovation and early growth stages, when the firm is still 
young and small, its growth fully depends on the quality of the external environment. 
However, this changes when the product reaches stages of maturity and the firm has 
grown into a powerful, vertically integrated, multi-plant company, located in 
peripheral regions and nations. Then it encounters a multitude of barriers imposed by 
the spatial environment. By that time, the survival of the business depends on its 
capacity to counteract environmental constraints. 
2.4.2 The market structure link 
Scott (1983) and Storper and Walker (1989) present a very different model of geo­
graphical industrialization. They observe that new industries tend to emerge in new 
places, the so-called growth peripheries. They argue that new or revived industrial 
sectors often require totally new factors of production, not pre-existing. So, at its 
inception, a new industry has to create its own inputs. It is not enough to simply 
compete for a stable quantity of goods and labourpower. In the early phases of 
development (or renewal) specific material parts and equipment may be so novel that 
they have to be produced on the spot. Similarly, the labour skills are likely to be so 
new that they can be acquired only through practical experience and on-the-
jobtraining. The huge production costs which accompany these investments can be 
covered because of the limited competition and huge profits in the early growth 
stages. It follows that new or leading firms in new industrial sectors have a substan­
tial amount of freedom to develop right wherever they are or to locate where they 
please. In its early stages, a new industry can settle on any one of a wide variety of 
locations. These moments of enhanced locational freedom may be seen as windows of 
locational opportunity (Scott and Storper 1987). So new industries may spring up in 
unexpected places. Actually, industrial history is replete with such cases. Storper and 
Walker (1989) mention many instances, of which we can mention a few here. "Henry 
Ford founded his firm in Detroit, a minor city, and made it the center of the US (and 
world) automobile production in the 1910s by virtue of his Model Τ design and 
assembly line methods... John Deere, a blacksmith from Grand Detour, Illinois, went 
no further than Moline to build better plows, and northern Illinois became the US 
(and world) focus of agricultural equipment production... Santa Clara County, 
Phoenix and Dallas, all relatively obscure sites, became early homes of the new 
semiconductor industry in the 1950s and have prospered mightily since... In Japan 
and Korea, supertankers and video recorders are examples of new industries appear­
ing altogether outside the dominant industrial complexes of the Atlantic economy 
after World War II" (ibid., 71-72). 
However, locational freedom does not last forever. As the industry matures, 
price competition between firms intensifies. Total costs of production increasingly 
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determine profit rates, and spatial cost differentials begin to play a part in the 
competitive struggle. Then, locational windows of opportunity diminish drastically. 
One start-up area, that with the most favourable economic conditions, surges ahead, 
while others decline or grow more slowly (ibid., Figure 3.1, 71). In other words, the 
environment has gained primacy over entrepreneurial action. 
The model of geographical industrialization developed by Scott, Storper and 
Walker suggests that spatial diversity of location patterns within an industry is a 
short-term phenomenon in the business cycle. Here, we take a different view. We 
posit that locational diversity is not merely a cyclical phenomenon but contains a 
structural component as well. Competitive firms located outside existing core 
territories can be found at any time, albeit in some periods more intensively than 
others. The point is that the model of Scott and Storper and Walker is not able to 
explain this structural component in the diversity of location patterns. 
2.4.3 The environmental dimension link 
In this 'method', the either implicit or explicit difference between the non-spatial and 
the spatial dimension of the environment is functional. This distinction infiltrates the 
'new' theory of flexible production complexes. 
Flexible production complexes 
Scott's theory of the geography of flexible specialization (Scott 1983; 1988a,b) is a 
spatial interpretation of Williamson's (1975) transactional cost approach. Scott's point 
of departure is the way the industrial sector adapts to a number of socio-economic 
trends, particularly the crisis of mass-production. This crisis is associated with "inten-
sified uncertainty and instability of production, and increased competitiveness in final 
markets" (Scott 1988b, 176). As a consequence, firm structures and strategies in the 
advanced capitalist countries are thought to change dramatically. Mass markets have 
become saturated and unstable. Competitive firms have been responding to these 
shifts by "experimenting with flexible forms of organization which permit rapid shifts 
in output" (Sabel 1989, 18). The central issue in organizational management is how to 
create a flexible management and production system that can react to new technical 
and market opportunities. In order to achieve flexibility in the deployment of labour 
and capital, enterprises increasingly contract out activities formerly undertaken within 
the firm. Meanwhile, they foster interfirm relations and transactions. Inter-esta-
blishment interactions and transactions are becoming more important. At the same 
time, the costs of "transport, communication, information exchange, search, scanning, 
and so forth" (Scott 1988a, 161) become more significant. These transaction costs are 
sensitive to distance: "the greater the spatial dispersion of producers, the more 
onerous these costs will be" (ibid., 176). By lumping together, companies can mini-
mize these potentially onerous transaction costs and continue producing economically. 
On the other hand, where enterprises are located in close proximity, they develop a 
complex and dynamic network of relationships. In stark contrast to this are the areas 
with a low level of economic activity, i.e. peripheral areas. In similar regions, the 
transaction costs can rise too high for the contracting out of supportive tasks to 
remain viable. Companies in these areas tend to internalize activities and display a 
limited degree of external integration. Consequently, in a changed economic environ-
ment, the production of goods and services in non-central areas is now less efficient 
than in the centre. Scott identifies a renewed tendency toward the spatial concentra-
tion of economic activity (Scott 1988a,b). This concentration occurs not only by means 
of active location decisions on the part of enterprises but also as a consequence of 
spatial selection processes. 
We can infer that, according to the flexible agglomeration approach, the 
successful adaptation to macro-economic and technological changes is dependent 
upon the organization's spatial context. Put differently, companies are assumed to be 
basically able to adapt and respond to economic and technological forces effectively, 
but not to territorial hindrances. Thus, when all is said and done, spatial determinism 
comes off remarkably well in this approach. 
2.4.4 The national development link 
We mentioned above that economic developments are spatially dispersed and highly 
differentiated in the Netherlands. The 'urban field theory' of Friedmann and Miller 
(1965) offers a popular explanation for these features of the Dutch space economy. On 
the basis of developments in the United States, Friedmann and Miller discuss the 
ever-widening patterns of interaction in the highly developed world. As a conse-
quence of this process, urban living will extend far beyond existing metropolitan 
cores and penetrate deeply into the periphery. The older established centers, together 
with the incorporated enveloping periphery, "will constitute a new ecological unit of 
America's post-industrial society that will replace traditional concepts of the city and 
the metropolis. This basic element of the emerging spatial order we shall call the 
urban field" (ibid., 313). Increasing real income, increasing leisure and increasing 
mobility make urban populations spread out over surrounding peripheral areas, 
attracted by their space and scenery. Thereby, the full effects of the combined trends 
in income and leisure will be transmitted through the increased mobility which 
modern technology affords. In their 1965 article, Friedmann and Miller focus on 
trends in the spread of population. Yet like many others, they also apply this line of 
thought to the location of economic activities. It is assumed that improvements in 
transportation and communication methods progressively lessen the friction of 
distance. These developments thus diminish the force of spatial proximity, expand the 
spatial outreach of agglomeration economies, and consequently allow industries to 
disperse their facilities. At its most extreme, this line of thought is expressed in the 
belief that industry is no longer bound to particular places at all. Supposedly, it has 
become 'footloose', free to follow the whims or residential preferences of owners and 
managers (Berry 1972). In the Dutch context, this would mean that the favourable 
conditions of the metropolitan core region in the western part of the country, i.e. the 
Randstad, have become accessible and available to firms located at a considerable 
distance. It is assumed that almost the whole country lies within the 'urban field' of 
the agglomeration economies of the Randstad. Lambooy (1976) and Lambooy and 
Huizinga (1977) already recorded these processes in the mid-1970s. 
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However, there is much debate about the extent to which a lessening of the 
friction of distance already has or is currently taking place. Processes such as 
increased need for information, communication, and face-to-face interaction run 
counter to the widening patterns of interaction. Thus, these processes impede the 
advancement of those patterns. Furthermore, enhanced mobility is turning against 
itself. Growing congestion, manifest in endless traffic jams, train delays, accidents and 
many other inconveniences, curbs the growth of mobility and consequently endangers 
the access of outlying area firms to resources and support in central regions. 
Apart from increased mobility, there is another factor associated with econ-
omic development which causes wide dispersal of economic activities across space. 
Decentralization also occurs because of improvement in the quality of the regional 
production environment on the spot. In highly advanced post-industrial communities 
like the Netherlands, prosperity and infrastructural services are spread across the 
country in such a way that economic conditions are favourable for manufacturing 
virtually everywhere. The bigger the pie of national prosperity, the larger the piece 
for creating a favourable production environment in lagging regions. Moreover, it is 
no surprise that national prosperity leaks through to outlying areas more intensively 
in small countries than in vast nation-states (Friedman 1966, 12). In the Netherlands, 
social, educational, cultural, infrastructural and other services are maintained at a 
high level, even in the most outlying areas. That is not to say that the external 
conditions for economic production are evenly dispersed in the Netherlands: they are 
not. If anything, this gap between large urban core areas and smaller outlying regions 
will widen as the process of technological development continues. Major technological 
improvements will be either absorbed by or directed to the major cities earlier, and on 
a larger scale, than to the small towns. In the same way, the telegraph and the 
railroad increased the relative advantages of big cities over small towns and rural 
settlements in the nineteenth century (Pred 1974; 1980). Nowadays, exactly the same 
thing is happening with respect to telecommunications and high-speed rail transport, 
for example. The large cities are receiving more such amenities than small towns and 
rural areas. 
There is no reason to believe that differences in economic conditions between 
the core and the periphery have been evened out in a relative sense. That does not 
alter the fact that circumstances in the periphery have reached an acceptable absolute 
level, which no longer hampers the growth and survival of firms. The remaining 
locational disadvantages in the periphery can be handled by the entrepreneurs 
themselves by means of adaptation behaviour (Horvers and Wever 1989). It is 
assumed that the level of economic accumulation in a company's environment affects 
the development of the industrial sector up to a certain point; beyond that point, its 
influence is much less. This threshold has been exceeded throughout the Netherlands, 
with the possible exception of the two most northerly provinces. That means that 
geographical differences in the functioning of the industrial sector cannot, or at best 
only in small measure, be traced to attributes of the regional production environment. 
Other factors are therefore more relevant. These include the element of chance, the 
quality of the region's management, the production structure, historical and cultural 
factors, and others (Wever 1985,1991; Horvers and Wever 1989). 
Thus urban field theory implies that the balance between organization and 
environment in explaining business growth and performance across space is influ-
enced by the grade of macro-economic advancement. The more a country is techno-
logically developed and economically prosperous, the less importance may be 
attached to environmental space as a hard regional differentiating factor. This is 
because in the developed world the accessibility and spread of economic facilities is 
so wide that even deeply in peripheral areas no prohibitive barriers for business 
growth need occur. Remaining locational disadvantages for outlying area firms vis-à-
vis competing firms in urban core areas, are thus for the former to tackle for them-
selves2. Similar to the adaptation framework, as depicted in Figure 2.1 (page 28), 
urban field theory leaves more room for the entrepreneur to manoeuvre against his 
area of location than other hypotheses of regional development. The challenge is to 
fill in this space. Therefore, the environmental responsiveness of small firms has to be 
made actually visible and the problems attached to this line of thinking (section 2.3.3) 
have to be solved. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Spatial theories concerning the firm-environment debate can be divided into two 
broad approaches. One assigns primacy to the environment over the firm. The other, 
in contrast, assigns primacy to the firm over the environment. The former includes 
traditional location theories as well as modem regional development theories. It has 
come to dominate theory-building in regional science. Organizational approaches, 
such as locational behaviour theory and corporate geography, have never been able to 
develop an adequate theoretical framework as an alternative to the ecological 
approaches. Walker (1989) even writes a requiem for corporate geography. However, 
by abandoning alternative frameworks, one does not absolve the criticism of the 
prevailing environmental paradigm from which those alternatives emerged. One such 
point of criticism concerns the subservience of the individual entrepreneur to the 
dictates of the surrounding economic environment (Chapman and Walker 1991, 25). 
In both location theory and regional development theory, the individual entrepreneur 
is deprived of any ability to counteract his regional context. Furthermore, empirical 
research is crawling with contradictory observations and exceptions to the rule. The 
prevailing ecological frameworks in regional science are not able to deal with these 
counterfactuals adequately. On the other hand, some attempts to deal with growth in 
the periphery have recently been made (Storper and Walker 1989). Thus, theories of 
regional development, in which agglomeration economies play a vital role, are now 
incorporating elements of organizational approaches as well. 
We have evaluated several opportunities for cross-fertilization between 
ecological and organizational approaches in regional science. This exercise reveals that 
the urban field approach, in an extended and moderated form, provides a suitable 
theoretical starting point for dealing with empirical diversity in the location of 
economic activities. A moderated urban field theory downplays the comparative 
advantages for economic activities in the urban core regions of the advanced econ-
omies of the Western hemisphere. But it does not assume them to be completely 
absent for every kind of activity, at any stage in its life cycle and with respect to all 
factors of production. The point is that due to national prosperity economic conditions 
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in outlying areas have become improved such as to meet minimum requirements for 
succesful production. The remaining locational disadvantages in the periphery are 
assumed to be handled by the firms themselves, by means of adaptation strategies. It 
is this bounded organizational adaptive capacity which is supposed to explain small 
business growth in relatively unfavourable environments. This thesis intends to carry 
further an adaptation perspective in the field of regional science. In order to buttress 
such an approach in regional science, the next chapter lays its ears to the ground of 
another discipline in the field of economics which is as preoccupied with firm-
environment relationships as is regional science. 
Notes 
1 In addition to this the environmental aspect plays a role in growth pole theory in the 
debate about which environmental conditions must be fulfilled to make motor 
industries locate themselves in retarded regions. 
2 On the other hand, an ecological approach, which explains regional development 
patterns and differences predominanly from the quality of the regional production 
environment, is preferable where the level of development is lower, i.e. in developing 
countries. In these countries accessibility and spread of elementary economic facilities -
transport and telecommunication infrastructure, skilled labour, supplies, services etc. -
is so constrained that business growth is virtually impossible in non-central locations. 
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Chapter Three 
Organization and environment: the perspective of organ-
ization theory 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter exposed the need for improving the theoretical foundation of 
organizational autonomy and adaptation in spatial science. It also made a case for 
extending that theory to embrace small and medium-sized enterprises. The present 
chapter looks for clues in the administrative literature to counter the inadequacies of 
spatial theory. Can the field of administrative science indicate how to create more 
leeway in regional economics for organizational sovereignty, particularly for small 
and medium-sized enterprises? To answer this question we should conceive of central 
business locations as favourable and peripheral ones as adverse environmental 
operating conditions. How does the business administration literature in general, and 
organization theory in particular, deal with the quality of the external production 
environment? Does organization theory elaborate on the balance between organi-
zational behaviour and environmental conditions as an explanation of economic 
performance? At first glance, there is some indication that organization theory might 
provide some insight. In regional research, the enterprise approach has never posed a 
serious challenge to the environmental or ecological perspective, while in organization 
theory it has. For a long time, the organizational adaptation view actually dominated 
this field of research (Pfeffer 1982, 41; Hannan and Freeman 1977, 291; Astley and 
Van de Ven 1983, 253). 
However, to assess whether regional science can really learn anything from 
organization theory about the interaction between firm and environment, we first 
have to identify which environmental concepts both approaches are using. Are the 
concepts of the administrative and spatial environment related to each other? How 
can these concepts be integrated? After this assessment a second question comes to 
the fore. What perspectives does the administrative literature take in regard to 
organizational action and the role of the environment? How do these perspectives 
compare to the views prevailing in regional science? The third question concerns the 
role of size. In brief, the problem is that adaptability to environmental conditions is a 
function of organizational size, while the ability to attain substantial size depends on 
an organization's capacity to adapt. 
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3.2 The environment 
What struck me while tnOwsing' through the organization literature is the increasing 
attention devoted to organizations' environments in the course of time. In this respect, 
organization theory has come a long way since McDermott and Taylor (1982, 77-78) 
noted that this discipline conceptualized the environment, albeit in an essentially 
abstract manner. In the past two decades, several organization theorists have tried to 
structure this reservoir of 'everything outside the organization'. They stratified the 
environment according to levels of specificity, immediacy, and relevance to the 
organizational phenomenon concerned (cf. Beard and Dess 1988; Castrogiovanni 1991; 
Starbuck 1976). Moreover, for the sake of comparison, theorists have described the 
basic character of environmental elements in terms of various theoretical dimensions 
(cf. Aldrich 1979; Child 1972; Dess and Beard 1984; Mintzberg 1985). Thus, it is 
argued that environments are both multilevel and multidimensional (Betton and Dess 
1985). 
3.2.1 Environmental levels 
The well-known structural contingency model (Petit 1967) conceptualizes the environ­
ment as a stratified structure. This model hypothesizes that organizational structure 
and performance are largely dependent on environmental change and complexity 
(Clark 1985). The model, which has also infiltrated industrial geography, was 
analysed by McDermott and Taylor (1982), who distinguish four environmental layers 
(Figure 3.1). 
Globe I environment 
Societal environment 
Doma ι π 
Task environment 
Organ I zation 
Figure 3.1 Levels in the environment according to McDermott and Taylor (1982, p.78) 
These layers are identification points along a continuum depicting the directness or 
indirectness with which environmental forces impinge upon the operations of a focal 
organization. The organization is conceived as being confronted at the outer level 
with a global environment, which represents all knowledge, technologies and linkages. 
·*—^ 
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The soríetal environment can be regarded as the relevant cultural, political, social and 
economic system context, within which technologies are embedded and evolve. 
Within the societal environment, a particular focal organization establishes an environ-
mental domain. This comprises the set of organizations with which a focal organization 
might potentially interact, given its particular character, the inputs it requires, and the 
output it produces. It is delineated by the industries or sectors with which an 
organization might interact (McDermott and Taylor 1982, 19). In passing, McDermott 
and Taylor's domain environment is similar to Castrogiovanni's (1991) aggregation 
environment. 
Actually, the organization or enterprise will contact only a portion of the domain 
elements. This particular set of trading, business, labour and information contacts is 
called the task environment or organization set. It comprises the set of external elements 
with which actual exchange relationships are established. The task environment is the 
most particularized environmental level. The task environment will have the most 
direct bearing upon the development of the organization. Nevertheless, according to 
Castrogiovanni (1991), it makes sense to dissect the task environment in greater detail 
(Figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.2 Levels in the environment according to Castrogiovanni (1991, p. 544) 
Following Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), Castrogiovanni distinguishes organizati-
onal subunits. He argues that each organizational subunit concentrates on a different 
portion of an organization's task environment. As a consequence, inside the task 
environment Castrogiovanni discerns subenvironments. These are the individuals and 
organizations who control the inputs and outputs, or resources, that are most relevant 
to an organizational subunit. In their study, Lawrence and Lorsch identified (a) a 
market subenvironment relevant to the sales subunit; (b) a techno-economic subenvi-
ronment relevant to the production subunit; and (c) a scientific subenvironment 
relevant to the research and development subunit. The 'lowest' level of the environ-
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ment consists of stocks of particular resources. Studies of how critical various 
resources are to particular organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Pfeffer 7972) are 
concerned with this resource pool level. This is the most specific level of environment 
within which the organization operates. 
In Figure 3.2, the conical shape is intended to convey the notion that each higher 
level encompasses more than the one below. This notion is reinforced by the cylindri-
cal shape indicated by the dotted lines. At the bottom of Figure 3.2, for example, the 
area inside the cone represents a particular resource pool. The area outside the cone 
but within the cylinder represents other resource pools, each of which can be 
examined separately. Moving up the cone, a particular subenvironment encompasses 
two or more resource pools viewed as a composite whole. The area outside the cone 
but within the cylinder indicates the existence of other subenvironments. 
The resource pool level also happens to be the scale at which studies in economic 
geography and regional economics investigate linkages and information flows. The 
present study is no exception. Chapter Five will consider the firm-environment 
interaction with respect to five pools of resources: labour, finances, material supplies, 
services, and customers. These five were chosen because the field of regional science 
has developed theories about the importance to business development of each of 
these resource pools separately. In contrast, empirical studies in organization theory 
have focused attention primarily on the more abstract macro environment, i.e. the 
global and societal environment (McDermott and Taylor 1982, 19). 
3.2.2 Environmental dimensions 
A second issue in conceptualizing the organizational environment is the specification 
of characteristics or dimensions of external elements and their impact on organiz-
ational survival. The range of dimensions of organizational environments, as docu-
mented by Starbuck (1976), is wide indeed. However, there is an emerging consensus 
among researchers that there are three basic dimensions to profit-making organiz-
ations: munificence, dynamism, and complexity (Dess and Beard 1984)1. 
Munificence 
Environmental munificence is the extent to which a given environment can support 
sustained growth (Starbuck 1976). Munificence can be defined either as environmental 
capacity or environmental opportunity/threat. Environmental capacity or the carrying 
capacity of the environment is the level of relevant resources present within an 
environment (Castrogiovanni 1991). Environmental capacity can range from rich to 
lean. In a rich environment, the organization, like a pigeon, can pick and choose the 
nicest seeds. In a lean environment, it has to make do with a few grains, for which it 
even has to fight with competitors. Environmental opportunity/threat is the extent to 
which capacity is underutilized or overexploited. In other words, environmental 
opportunity/threat refers to the relative level of resources availability. Environmental 
capacity and opportunity may not occur always synchronously. For example, places 
of high-technology industrial concentration are known to have a large supply of high-
technology skilled workers. Nonetheless, enterprises in these areas often face serious 
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shortages of this kind of labour. This is because a large local supply may be insuffi-
cient to satisfy a larger demand. This results in an Overheating' of the local labour 
market, causing severe wage inflation (Oakey 1984). A second example of environ-
mental threat in a high capacity environment occurs when abundant resources are 
controlled and withheld by a powerful third party. Many oil companies experienced 
this situation during the oil crises of the 1970s. 
Dynamism 
Environmental dynamism is the extent of unpredictable change in the task environ-
ment. A distinction can be made between environmental stability/instability and envi-
ronmental turbulence (Dess and Beard 1984). Environmental stability/instability is the 
degree of turnover in any of the separate elements of the task environment. With 
stability, changes arise from the interaction of identifiable component organizations of 
an organization set. One example might be a fluctuation in the delivery of material 
input supplies due to the unreliability of a supplier. Sudden shifts in financing policy 
of governmental or private financiers and strategic moves of competitors may also 
affect the stability of an organization's task environment. Environmental turbulence, 
on the other hand, refers to changes which are induced outside the task environment 
of a focal organization X. Environmental turbulence is a result of the increasing 
interconnectedness of the social world. As a consequence, the relationships between X 
and the organizations of its task environment are increasingly influenced by forces 
outside X's task environment (cf Terreby 1968). World-wide changes in technology, 
consumer affluence, international trade and the mutual interaction of these forces 
ultimately affect the transactional interdependencies in an organization's task environ-
ment. The distinction between environmental stability and turbulence is important. It 
is related to the degree of organizational autonomy and the ability to plan for the 
future. Organizations might be able to protect themselves against environmental 
instability through stockpiling, in-house production, multiple sourcing etc. (Thompson 
1967). But hedging against change is much more difficult when it originates in the 
macro environment (Terreby 1968). 
Complexity 
Environmental complexity is conceptualized by Child (1972, 3) as "the heterogeneity 
and range of environmental activities which are relevant to an organization's 
operations." In other words, the more diverse the relevant environmental activities 
and the more there are, the higher the complexity (Jurkovich 1975, 382). The number 
of relevant organizations a focal organization has to encounter is implied by Gerlach 
and Palmer's concentration/dispersion dimension. This is the degree to which resources 
are (un)evenly accumulated across societal segments (Gerlach and Palmer 1981). The 
fewer external elements a focal organization has to deal with, the simpler its environ-
ment is. For example, the market environment of a firm which supplies its products 
to a highly concentrated industry, consisting of only a few very large corporate 
customers, can be denoted as very simple. On the other hand, an enterprise selling its 
output to a very competitive industry consisting of numerous small firms operates in 
a more complex market environment. It has to monitor and anticipate the wishes and 
requirements of many clients simultaneously. The concentration/dispersion dimensi-
on is intertwined with the homogeneity/heterogeneity characteristics of environmental 
47 
factors. This is the degree of similarity or differentiation between the elements of the 
population dealt with. A homogeneous environment rewards the development of 
standardized ways of relating to the domain population. It may lead to the develop-
ment of an undifferentiated set of products or services (Thompson 1967). Homogene-
ity simplifies organizational activities, because a small set of operating routines may 
suffice for a large population. Differentiation of consumer demands, on the other 
hand, forces organizations to utilize knowledge of the desires and demands of a host 
of heterogeneous clients. Their diversity makes market environments more complex. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the environmental dimensions, discussed above. 









Concentra ti on /dispersion 
Following Castrogiovanni (1991), we can cross the three mainstream dimensions 
(Table 3.1) with the environmental levels introduced in the previous subsection 
(Figure 3.1 or Figure 3.2). This exercise results in a conceptual model of the environ-
ment which can be depicted graphically in a two-dimensional (Figure 3.3a) or three-
dimensional manner (Figure 3.3b). 
Having modelled the components and the characteristics of an organization's 
environment, the question remains whether this is useful in analysing firm-environ-
ment relationships in regional science. Before we proceed to assess the relevance of 
this model, it might be helpful to discuss why organizations interact with their envi-
ronment at all. Briefly, what is the raison d'être of interactions or relations between an 
organization and its environment? 
3.2.3 Significance of the environment to an organization 
It is recognized that an organization is not an autonomous entity but instead a unit in 
interaction with its environment. In this vein, the interdependencies between both 
entities are given full attention in organization literature. In the wake of the open 
systems approach, it became clear that the interdependence between the organization 
and its environment takes the form of service delivery or input-output transactions 
(Terreby 1968), and that: "much of the stuff that is the object of these transactions falls 
into the category of scarce and valued resources" (Yuchtman and Seashore 1967, 897). 
Benson (1975), following Yuchtman and Seashore, assumes that interactions at the 
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Figure 3.3 Two conceptualizations of the administrative environment 
acquisition. This means that considerations of resource procurement determine, within 
limits, the nature of interorganizational relations and transactions. Accordingly, 
Aldrich (1979, 61) states that: "Environments affect organizations through the process 
of making available or withholding resources, and organizational forms can be ranked 
in terms of their efficacy of obtaining resources." Furthermore, he notes that even 
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theories that are oriented towards decision processes within organizations, and which 
pay no attention to an organization's environment other than as a source of equivocal 
information (cf note 1), must view information in view of its relevance for resource 
acquisition (Aldrich 1979). Hence, we may say that the substance of firm-environment 
interaction is the obtaining of resources (cf also Van den Bosch 1989). 
From this resource perspective the dimensions of an organization's environment 
can be redefined. They refer to the available abundance (munificence), the variability 
(dynamism), and the number and heterogeneity (complexity) of resources required for 
production. 
Now, how do these notions derived from organization theory - about the 
structure of the external environment and the substance of the interaction between 
organization and environment - accord with the insights from regional science on 
these matters? This question will be the subject of the next section. 
3.2.4 Spatial and administrative structure of the environment 
We now shift attention from organization theory to spatial science in conceptualizing 
an organization's environment. In doing so, we agree with McDermott and Taylor 
that regional science operates within a partially and only poorly developed frame-
work compared with organization theory (McDermott and Taylor 1982, Ch. 3). 
Regional science focuses exclusively on the spatial dimension of the environment, 
while ignoring aspatial aspects of external forces. Thus, according to McDermott and 
Taylor, spatial theory has raised space to the status of the primary and, all too 
frequently, the only focus of concern. This one-sided view of the role of the environ-
ment caricatures the spatial disciplines and obstructs a productive cross fertilization 
between the insights of spatial and non-spatial disciplines in explaining and under-
standing economic reality. In this section we will discuss how the adaptation 
approach within the field of regional science might benefit from making allowance for 
the conceptual models of the environment shown in Figure 3.3. 
Environmental levels in spatial analysis 
First, we will consider the impact of taking into account the level at which environ-
mental forces have originated. All environmental forces which impinge upon an orga-
nization are transmitted through the same ultimate transformation agent, namely its 
organization set. Yet these forces may differ greatly in strength and directness. While 
an organization must comply with some external disturbances, it may be able to 
influence others. This is affected by the environmental level at which these disturban-
ces originated. Child, for example, states that: "this distinction of several boundaries 
proceeding Outwards' from the organization implies that organizational decision-
makers do take positive steps to define and manipulate their own corners of the 
environment" (Child 1972, 9). Similarly, Terreby (1968) stresses the difference in 
difficulty of planning and controlling for changes in an organization's task environ-
ment. The difference depends on whether such changes were brought forth by the 
interacting organizations themselves or whether these organizations only transmitted 
changes which originated in the macro environment. It is not hard to understand that 
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changes within the task environment induced by developments in the global environ-
ment cannot be influenced by an organization. On the other hand, it may be possible 
to deal with disturbances which originated within the task environment. For instance, 
whereas an enterprise is not able to change the ageing of the local population and 
consequently of its labour market, it might have the power to adjust the curricula of 
educational agents within its task environment to better suit its demands. Through 
financing a (part-time) academic chair at a university, through subsidizing a curricu-
lum or academic course, through cooperating with local Employment Exchanges in 
providing training courses, for instance, enterprises may influence the skills of the 
labour markets. And while an organization has to take changes in world technology 
for granted and comply with them, it might be in a position to affect R&D pro-
grammes and production technology of an interacting organization. Actually, this 
mutual influence or interdependence of organizations is implied by new forms of 
subcontracting, like co-makership and main-suppliership. These concepts reflect the 
fact that parent firms are transferring more and more of the responsibility for product 
development to subcontracting firms. As a result, relations between subcontractors 
and parent firms may become increasingly equal. Patrick and Rolen (1987) noted this 
to be the case in Japan over the last 20 years. In sum, we may infer that it is highly 
inappropriate to treat all external conditions as compelling forces that cannot be 
influenced or changed. Actually, regional development theory is to blame for this 
faulty perspective, since it fails to recognize that environmental forces differ in regard 
to the strength with which they impinge upon organizations. And, as Horvers and 
Wever (1989) suggest, within limits, the characteristics of the business region now-
adays are much less important than economic geographers often assume. 
Environmental dimensions in spatial analysis 
The second point to be discussed in the present subsection is an omission in regional 
science, and particularly in corporate and adaptation geography. These disciplines fail 
to elaborate on the basic characteristics of environmental elements that affect a focal 
organization's behaviour and performance. In this context I reiterate the three 
dimensions of the environment of an organization: environmental munificence, 
dynamism and complexity. The question can be raised, which of these three attributes 
is primarily responsible for explaining profit rate differentials and unequal develop-
ment between regions. 
The munificence dimension of the task environment unmistakably bears relevance 
to spatial research, since the availability of resources can vary markedly across space. 
Unequal spatial allocation of customers, suppliers, subcontractors, or knowledge is 
widely held responsible for interregional growth disparities (Aydalot 1988, Malecki 
1991, Scott 1988). The uneven distribution of such resources over space makes some 
locations potentially richer than others. Actually, factor availability lies at the heart of 
the centre-periphery paradigm and is the cornerstone of agglomeration theory. In 
contrast, the dynamism of an organization's task environment, or the degree to which 
environmental factors remain the same over time or are in a continual process of 
change (Duncan 1972), reveals less clear spatial differences. Factors which cause major 
changes in organizations' task environments, including institutional developments 
(e.g. European integration), unpredictable shifts in the economy, increasing differenti-
ation and rapid change of consumer demands, rapidly changing technologies, 
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requirements of environmental protection and many others, originate in the macro 
environment. Thus they are of equal relevance to large bodies of firms, irrespective of 
their location. Perhaps, due to cultural differences, organizational task environments 
may be somewhat more dynamic in metropolitan regions than in outlying rural areas. 
Anyhow, since dynamism or (unpredictable) change contributes to uncertainty 
(Aldrich and Mindlin 1978), more dynamism in core regions is less of an advantage 
than a disadvantage of the urban production environment to individual enterprises. 
Similarly, the complexity of an organization's task environment is only moderate-
ly accounted for by its location. The number and diversity of relevant environmental 
activities depends mainly on such things as an organization's growth strategy 
(specialization vs diversification), industrial sector (cf. a mining company, which 
requires few different inputs, with a micro electronics firm, which requires many 
different input components), and macro-economic developments (e.g. the growing 
technological advancement imperative, intensified global competition, and increasing 
demand for customized products of greater variety and quality). In so far as the 
spatial setting affects the complexity of the environment - and Scott (1983, 242) 
argues that spatial proximity stimulates organizations to enter into linkages (disinte-
gration), which subsequently makes the task environment (actual stakeholders) more 
complex ((though not the domain (potential stakeholders)) - complexity is higher in 
central areas than in peripheral regions. However, complexity, just like 'dynamism', 
contributes to (information) uncertainty. This only means that economic conditions are 
more uncertain and hence less favourable in densely built-up city regions than in 
sparse peripheral areas. 
The conclusion is that interregional differences of organizational task environ-
ments are dominated by the munificence-scarcity dimension of the environment 
rather than by the dynamism and complexity dimensions. Therefore, neither dyna-
mism nor complexity but rather munificence is the key environmental variable in 
studying firm-environment relations from a spatial point of view. This standpoint is 
reflected in Figure 3.4. 
a) Core b) Periphery 
Figure 3.4 The regional component in an administrative model of the environment 
Figure 3.4 depicts the regional content of an organization's environment as a shaded 
band falling within both the environmental domain and the task environment. On the 
one hand the Figure highlights the more pronounced regional bias in the linkages of 
firms located in core areas compared with equal businesses in peripheral regions (see 
also Figure 3.5). On the other hand the Figure stresses the major importance of the 
local business region to the munificence dimension and the relatively minor import­
ance of space to the dynamism and complexity aspects of an organization's task 
environment. 
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Figure 3.5 The regional component built into Castrogiovanni's environmental model 
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This stance is manifested when businesses make location decisions. Firms making 
such decisions unequivocally choose a location in view of its endowment with the 
resources needed for production. They do not choose it because, for some reason or 
other, needed resources fluctuate in one location more than in another. Nor do they 
choose a location because a greater amount and more dissimilar resources are 
required in place A than in place B. This is reflected in the wider width of the shaded 
band in the munificence segment compared to the narrower bands in the dynamism 
and complexity segments. 
Within the field of regional science, the ideas of economic development theorists 
and location theorists clearly correspond to this stance. Their point of departure is 
(either consciously or unconsciously) the resourcefulness of the environment, unlike 
adaptation theorists and other corporate geographers. These latter writers, such as 
Steed (1971), Krumme (1969) and McDermott and Taylor (1982), predominantly focus 
on organizational adjustment to (macro) environmental change and turbulence, 
particularly changes in market conditions and technological progress (Krumme 1969). 
"Correspondingly", they argue, "the optimality of a location for a specific type of 
activity changes through time" (ibid, 16). This argument, however, has a major 
shortcoming. It neglects the crucial question of the impact of structural inequalities 
across space in the general availability of factors of production (core-periphery and 
urban-rural contrasts) on adjustment processes. Actually, uneven distribution of 
resources spatially is a rather stubborn phenomenon which may persist over a 
considerable period of time (Pred 1977). Both Steed and Krumme, on the other hand, 
suggest that quick successions of environmental changes constantly wash away the 
locational advantages, including agglomeration economies, of existing centres of 
production, while creating opportunities for economic development in completely 
different localities. To illustrate this view, Steed (1971, 324) may be quoted: "...locati-
onal analysts need to give careful consideration to the changing environment of 
manufacturing plants and firms, for the original factors underlying a location decision 
will change with sufficient rapidity that local management soon finds itself confronted 
by an entirely different set of environmental constraints and contingencies". This 
contention fails to do justice to longstanding interregional differences in prosperity, 
which are rather well accounted for theoretically by agglomeration theory. 
Just like Steed and Krumme in the 1960s and 1970s, nowadays flexible accumula-
tion theorists like Piore and Sabel (1984), Scott (1988), Schoenberger (1987) and others 
are concerned with organizational adjustments to the instability of the environment, 
albeit under a different theoretical flag. The difference is that they do not forget to 
incorporate the effect of longstanding urban agglomeration economies. This leads 
these authors to conclude that, when environmental conditions change rapidly, 
organizations in or near abundant spaces (i.e. dense agglomerations) are able to adjust 
to uncertainty and instability more efficiently (i.e. at less cost) than those organiz-
ations located in lean environments (periphery). The principal flaw in this reasoning 
is that, without any explanation, it is assumed that enterprises actively seek to deal 
with macro-economic uncertainty while remaining passive towards scanty resources 
in the local business region. There is only one possible conclusion from this stand-
point: it is that whereas organizations are thought to be able to cope with global 
uncertainty, they are assumed to be unable to deal with local resource deficiencies 
effectively. From this conclusion we may infer that if adaptation geographers wish to 
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reduce the deterministic overtones of spatial theory, they must focus less on environ-
mental change or contingency than on an organization's dependency on the availabil-
ity of local resources. What needs to be developed is a model of how (some) organiz-
ations are able to cope with scanty factors of production in responding to macro 
economic forces. Furthermore, such a model has to specify the conditions under 
which this ability might accrue to businesses. 
Searching for some ingredients for such a model, the next section explores the 
mainstream views in organization theory on organizational action and its determi-
nants. 
3.3 Three perspectives on action 
In administrative science a debate is going on about organizational choice vs environ-
mental determinism or internal adaptation versus external selection mechanisms to 
explain organizational forms. That debate is lively and remarkably balanced. Histori-
cally, the bulk of the literature subscribes to an organizational action perspective, 
focusing on environmental perception and decision processes within organizations 
(Hannan and Freeman 1977, 929). However, ecological or contextual approaches 
gradually came to the fore and received increasing attention in research programmes. 
These models argue that an organization's situational context determines its organiz-
ational structure because of certain, mainly economic, constraints which the former is 
assumed to impose. In an influential article Child revolted against this "...simple 
theory" (1972, 2) by introducing the concept of 'strategic choice' in organization 
theory. His contribution was heavily debated and severely criticized by those 
adopting an 'external constraint perspective'. In this section I will give a brief outline 
of this debate among organization theorists, based on Pfeffer 1982. 
To begin with, Pfeffer adds a third perspective to those two mentioned above. 
Pfeffer's three perspectives on organizational action are: (a) action seen as purposive, 
i.e. bounded or intentionally rational, and prospective or goal directed; (b) action seen 
as externally constrained or situationally determined; (c) and action seen as being 
somewhat more random and dependent on an emergent developmental process. 
3.3.1 The rational action view 
The rational action perspective argues that organizations act intentionally and 
rationally to achieve some autonomously constructed goal or value, such as efficiency 
or higher performance. Though originally focused on intra-organizational behaviour 
(i.e. the closed-system approach), Child extended the rational action view to 
organizations' external behaviour. From this perspective, interorganizational transac-
tions are treated as deliberate strategies used by administrators to meet their objec-
tives. Individuals, particularly decision makers, are seen as the basic units of analysis, 
and their intentions and perceptions form the key variables in organization-environ-
ment interactions. Child's strategic choice interpretation of this view perceives 
organizations as not strictly bound to environments. Child gave three arguments for 
this loose tie between organization and environment: i.e. organizations can make 
several choices; organizations enact the environment; and managerial perceptions 
intervene between the organization and the environment. 
Organizational choice 
It is assumed that an organization is largely autonomous in its decision-making. Thus, 
organizational decisions reflect management's preferences rather than environmental 
pressures. Managerial autonomy may be applied both to ends and means. With 
regard to ends, it is assumed that goals, such as efficiency or higher performance, are 
more or less independently constructed. Autonomous choice is also exhibited in the 
type of activities an organization intends to pursue, i.e. its environmental domain 
(Miles, Snow and Pfeffer 1974). Thus, to some extent organizations could choose the 
environment in which they were to operate. Child also noted that, given imperfec-
tions in the market, managers could pursue other aims besides maximum efficiency or 
profits, such as market power or power to control resources. So, the level of perform-
ance sought and the trade-offs between performance and other managerial objectives 
are both elements of intentional and rational action and hence subject to managerial 
choice. 
Considering the means or strategies organizations employ to attain their goals, 
even within the same environment there may be multiple responses (or equifinality, 
in systems terminology) that produce the same basic outcome of successful operation. 
Miles and co-workers observed two publishing organizations whose top management 
perceived a great deal of change and uncertainty in their environments. Nevertheless, 
they made substantially different adjustments to the same set of environmental 
demands and with the same intended outcome. "One firm went through a major 
effort to restructure the organization while simultaneously creating a program to 
financially underwrite a small number of free-lance professionals who were to experi-
ment with new publishing techniques. The other organization, by contrast, retained its 
current overall organization structure but set up several cross-functional project teams 
to develop publishing demands to deal with changing environmental demands" (1974, 
258). Pfeffer (1982, 160) notes that one can employ centralization and personal control 
or impersonal mechanisms of control; one can use surveillance or develop goal 
congruence; one can use output control or behaviour control. Thus, according to 
Pfeffer, there is clearly a range of structural responses available to cope with the 
internal or external stress faced by organization managers. 
Enacting the environment 
In his second argument for a loose coupling between organization and environment, 
Child pointed out that the environment is not to be viewed as a set of intractable 
constraints; it can be changed and manipulated through political negotiation to fit the 
objectives of the top management. Organizations have the power to 'enact' their 
environment. They create and constitute the environments to which they react. Ma-
nagers construct, rearrange, single out, and demolish many 'objective' features of their 
surroundings (Weick 1979). The environment is the output rather than the input of 
organizational action. As an example, Child refers to the work of Galbraith (1967), 
who asserted that large businesses are able to create demand for their products and 
control their competitive environments. In this context Child also refers to Thompson 
and McEwen (1958), who have identified the various procedures which may be 
chosen in order to assert influence, which the controllers of one organization can exert 
over their counterparts in other organizations, and vice versa, in support of organi-
zational goals. 
Managerial perceptions 
Thirdly, Child argued that the effects of the environment were mediated through the 
filter of managerial perceptions (see also Koberg 1987). Thus, the linkage between 
environment and organization was diminished through the operation of perceptual 
mechanisms and the various biasing effects that occur in such perceptions. This leads 
to the contention that environmental elements are of no interest in themselves, but are 
only relevant in so far as information about such elements is attended to by organiz-
ational participants. Environments, in the works of such theorists, consist of informa-
tion about external elements rather than characteristics of the elements themselves. 
Proponents of this information perspective on environments are Dill (1962), Weick 
(1979), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), Duncan (1972) and others. 
In sum, strategic choice theory draws attention to decision-makers, their percepti-
ons and their choices. They are regarded as performing a proactive role; their choices 
are conceived to be autonomous, and their acts are viewed as energizing forces that 
shape the organizational world. Thus, both organizational and environmental change 
and variation are brought about by the actors' definition of the situation - the 
subjective meaning and interpretation that actors impute to their worlds as they 
negotiate and enact their surroundings (cf Morgan 1992). 
In spatial science elements of strategic choice or rational action theory can be 
found in the behavioural approach and particularly in the geography of enterprise 
literature. The most striking resemblance between rational action theory in organiz-
ation theory and geography of enterprise literature is that in both bodies of literature 
focus on the environment as an output of organizational action. 
As already mentioned, Child's article raised lots of dust in administrative science. 
It was seriously debated by theorists who defended an external control view. They 
argued that Child exaggerated the degree to which managers of organizations can 
make a conscious choice in dealing with their environment. Their arguments will be 
discussed in the next section. 
3.3.2 The external constraint or situational control perspective 
The second perspective on action, the external constraint perspective, tends to ignore 
individual or organizational factors, such as personality, preferences, goals and 
information processing. In this view, action is not seen as the result of conscious 
foresight and free choice but as the result of external constraints, demands or forces 
that an organization may have little control over or even no cognizance of. The 
behaviour of an organization may have little to do with the values and preferences of 
its decision makers but instead reflect constraints imposed by limited external 
resources. Aldrich (1979) provides a clear example of this dominance of environ-
mental pressure over management's preferences. He notes that, notwithstanding 
strong preferences among administrators for operating independently and autono-
mously (administrative rationality), many (smaller) organizations have the best chance 
for survival (organizational rationality) if they are attached to a dominant association. 
Similarly, environmental forces can explain the so-called 'paradox of cooperation': 
businesses entering into partnerships with arch-enemies. A growing number of firms, 
particularly in the computer and telecommunication industries, fraternally cooperate 
in technological research and subsequently use the outcomes to wage a life-and-death 
struggle. These companies work together not because they want to but because they 
have to. Rapid technological developments, sky-rocketing costs of R&D, and the 
necessity to become a global player simply command cooperation. A notorious 
example is the mammoth alliance of the European chips manufacturers called JESSI 
(Joint European Submicron Silicon Initiative). 
Whereas the rational action perspective describes the environment in terms of the 
information it makes available to organizations, the external constraint perspective 
conceives the environment in terms of resources (Aldrich 1979, Aldrich and Mindlin 
1978). From this perspective the environment consists of scarce resources sought by 
populations of organizations that compete for as well as share them. Therefore, 
organizational effectiveness is not expressed in an organization's goal attainment but, 
instead, in its competitiveness in resource markets (Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967). It 
follows that according to external constraint theory, the environment is to some extent 
autonomous vis-à-vis the organization; i.e. attention is focused on the environment as 
an input condition. 
Within the external control perspective of organizations, Pfeffer (1982) distinguis-
hes two variants. The first, population ecology, is a Darwinian evolution model of 
organizational forms. It deals with the study of populations of organizations and 
tends to treat the individual organization as a black box. It focuses attention on birth 
and death processes as these are impacted by environmental conditions. The second 
variant, resource dependence, opens up the black box of the individual organization. 
It is concerned with internal adaptations and the politics that occur inside organiz-
ations as a response to external conditions. 
3.3.2.1 Population ecology 
Population ecology deals, as its name implies, with the study of populations of 
organizations. It is concerned with population characteristics and with variables 
defined on a population level of analysis. This only means that the stance of popula-
tion ecology on organization-environment interaction is implicit, not explicit in the 
model. The population ecology model argues that change in populations of organiz-
ations occurs, in part, because of selection processes working on those organizations 
rather than through processes of adaptation. The importance of selection derives from 
the fact that there are both internal and external constraints on organizational choice 
and adaptability (Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1989). The internal factors include sunk 
costs, leaders' limited information about what is going on in the organization, internal 
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politics (e.g. subunit resistance to organizational structural reorganization) and the 
dominance of institutional norms (Hannan and Freeman 1977, 931). External factors 
that produce structural inertia include barriers to entry and exit, external constraints 
upon the availability of information, social legitimacy and uncertainty about the 
effectiveness of a certain course of action. 
Analogous to biological ecology, the population ecology or natural selection 
model in organization theory has three stages: variation, selection and retention. 
Variation within and between organizations emerges for one reason or another. This 
may be either for planned or unplanned (error, chance, luck) reasons. In a seminal 
article, the evolutionist Alchian (1950) doesn't beat around the bush in presenting his 
view on rational action. According to Alchian, planned action is meaningless in a 
world where foresight is uncertain. Organizational success (survival) does not require 
proper motivation but may rather be the result of fortuitous circumstances. Anyhow, 
"the population ecology model... is indifferent to the ultimate source of variation, as 
planned and unplanned variation both provide raw material from which selection can 
be made" (Aldrich 1979, 28). Once variation has occurred these various organizational 
forms are selected according to how well they fit their environment, i.e. the survival 
of the fittest principle. It is important to note that in this selection process, it is the 
environment which optimizes (Hannan and Freeman 1977, 939). Selection pressures 
may favour or eliminate entire groups of organizations, such as industries, and the 
changing population distribution of organizations in a society reflects the operation of 
such selection pressures. The main selection criteria is whether organizational forms 
are suited to the resource base of their environment. Selection occurs principally 
through the competition among organizations for scarce resources. Selection pressures 
are supposed to be lower in munificent environments than in lean environments. This 
means that environments richly endowed with resources tolerate more economic 
acbvities and organizational diversity than poorly endowed environments. From that 
it is assumed that "the more numerous and the greater the heterogeneity of variations, 
the richer the opportunities for an advantageous innovation" (Campbell 1965, 28). In 
hostile environments, in contrast, organizational diversity is reduced because of 
intensified competition. According to Pfeffer and Leblici (1973) competition causes 
increased demand for control. This, in tum, invokes a more structured organization as 
well as less decentralization and less structural elaboration in the process of product 
differentiation. In sum, resource scarcity requires tighter controls and therefore a more 
rigid organizational structure, which, as a side effect, impedes innovation. 
The selected form, then, is preserved by so-called retention mechanisms. Retenti-
on, the last stage of the organizational change process, involves the maintenance of 
the organizational form in the future. Retention processes seem to be quite autono-
mous. Pfeffer (1982, 189) notes that "many of the mechanisms that Hannan and 
Freeman (1977) listed as impediments to adaptation, are at the same time, mechan-
isms of retention" (cf the role of organizational routines; Nelson and Winter 1982). 
The tight coupling in the population ecology scheme between organizations and 
environments bears similarity to classic location theory and modern regional develop-
ment theories. Strictly speaking, in traditional location theory the organization is able 
to react to changing environmental conditions, but it does so in a very limited way. 
The only option available to an enterprise to respond to economic conditions is by 
making locational adjustments, i.e. moving to the Optimal location'. Regional 
development theory also accords with population ecology in assuming that environ-
mental conditions determine both regional specialization patterns and organizational 
productivity and profitability (cf. Malecki 1991). 
3.3.2.2 Resource dependency 
Just like population ecology, resource dependence theory argues that organizations 
are externally constrained. But the latter theory also focuses on the tactics and 
strategies used by authorities in seeking to manage their environments as well as 
their organizations. Because organizations are not internally self-sufficient, they 
require resources from the environment. Thus, they become interdependent with 
those organizations and groups in the environment with which they transact. The 
demands of those in the environment that provide resources necessary for continued 
survival influence an organization's behaviour in that it must attend to these 
demands. On the other hand, it is recognized that interdependence can lead to the 
development of interorganizational influence. 
Thus, Pfeffer (1982, 193) emphasizes that there are two elements in the resource 
dependence arguments. The first addresses the issue of external constraint. He argues 
that organizations will (and should) respond more to the demands of those elements 
of the environment that control critical resources. As a result, resource dependence 
theory pays attention to interorganizational power relations, assuming that an 
organization's position of power affects its activities. The second element argues that, 
for a variety of reasons, managers and administrators attempt to manage their 
external dependencies. They do so both to ensure the survival of the organization and 
to acquire, if possible, more freedom from external constraint2. It is even assumed that 
efforts to manage the environment are directed relatively more toward environmental 
elements as the pressure they exert on the organization increases (Pfeffer 1982, 199). 
According to Pfeffer, this is reflected in a firm's board of directors. Pfeffer (1973) 
found, for example, that the size and composition of hospital boards corresponded 
with their community context (manufacturing community, agricultural community, 
and the like). What is more, Pfeffer also reported that hospitals with boards that more 
closely matched their contextual requirements were better able to obtain additional 
resources (funds) and grow. Similarly, Pfeffer (1972) found that a firm's capital 
structure - specifically its debt/equity ratio, an indicator of financial dependence -
predicted the proportion of bankers or other representatives of financial institutions 
on its board. 
Dorsman and Huizing (1989) suggest that the stronger the perception of environ-
mental pressure in an organization, the more actively it will counteract the environ-
ment. Likewise, Staw and Szwajkowski (1975) hypothesized that the less munificent 
the organization's environment, the more effort the organization will exert to obtain 
resources from the environment. Their hypothesis was over-supported in that 
environmental resource scarcity seems to evoke the commission of illegal acts. This is 
documented by analyses of company and industry data from firms cited for unfair 
market practices and restraint of trade activities. Whetten (1981) refers to accepted 
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principles of organization theory and the common knowledge that innovation lies at 
the heart of adaptive responses to decline-induced organizational crisis ("necessity is 
the mother of invention"). Thus, the second part of resource dependence theory traces 
the various strategy of organizations and their managers to cope with external con­
straints resulting from resource interdependence. In sum, an organization's behaviour 
is affected but not determined by the external environment. 
Coping with resource dependency 
The list of potential strategies for coping with external constraints and dependencies 
is endless. In reviewing the literature, it was rather difficult to find a categorization of 
strategies that cope with the environment that would be applicable to spatial analysis. 
But Prakken's (1987) categorization of strategies in response to environmental 
turbulence allowed me to distinguish four broad groups of strategies of firm-environ­
ment adaptation. These are: manipulation, immunization, adaptation, and utilization. 
Environmental manipulation 
The ability to manipulate or control the behaviour of an interacting organization is 
largely dependent upon the interorganizational power relations. The parties in a 
power relationship are tied to each other by the dependence of one on the other, or 
perhaps by mutual dependence. Note that power is an attribute of the relation 
between two actors and not of actor A or В taken in isolation (Aldrich 1979). It is 
possible, therefore, that A may be dependent upon B, while at the same time having 
power over C. Furthermore, in the case of mutual dependence, it is possible that A 
and В may become increasingly powerful with regard to each other. In other words, 
there is a possibility that increasing interdependence may result in increasing net 
power. It is this possibility on which coalitions rest (Thompson 1967, 31-32). However, 
it must be realized that increasing interdependence between organizations means loss 
of autonomy for each one (Dorsman and Huizing 1989). It is this distinction between 
power and autonomy which serves to classify manipulation strategies. 
Unilateral strategies Organizations acquire and use their power to manipulate environ­
mental elements in a variety of ways. Aldrich (1979) contends that these 'strategies' 
are preferred according to their impact on an organization's autonomy. The most 
preferred strategies are those that can be used while maintaining full autonomy. The 
organization acts without regard to its interacting organizations. Incentive strategies, 
like price cutting, product differentiation, acquiring prestige, and extensive marketing 
work through market forces. Other, more direct, inducements to control the activities 
or relevance of other organizations are unilateral actions, such as cancelling sales or 
purchase orders, withdrawing support, making donations (including bribery), hiring 
employees away from competitors, lobbying or going to court. 
Bilateral or dyadic strategies A second type of strategies requires cooperation or 
negotiation with isolated or small numbers of other organizations. Under cooperative 
strategies, the effective achievement of power rests on the exchange of commitments. 
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These strategies are problem-laden, because they involve giving up autonomy to win 
a greater measure of control over essential resources or an environmental contingency 
(Aldrich 1979, 295). The most preferred cooperative strategies are dyadic strategies as 
opposed to action set formation (Aldrich 1979). Dyadic strategies involve cooperation 
or negotiation with isolated or small numbers of other organizations. Action set 
formation, in contrast, requires the cooperative interaction of many organizations. 
According to Aldrich, dyadic strategies are preferred to action sets because the former 
strategy leaves the interacting organizations more autonomy than the latter. But also 
within dyadic strategies different degrees of cooperation and commitment can be 
discerned. Running down the autonomy scale with which the environment can be 
negotiated in a dyadic context, it is possible to use Thompson's (1967) difference 
between: contracting, coopting, and coalescing. 
Contracting refers to the negotiation of an agreement for the exchange of perfor-
mances. It is not restricted to agreements formally achieved but may also include 
informal arrangements to guarantee the provision of essential resources. Contracts 
may vary from formal long-term arrangements between suppliers and customers to 
tacit agreements among organizations in oligopolistic market structures regarding 
their market behaviour (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Coopting is the absorption of new elements into the leadership or policy-determi-
ning structure to be better able to manipulate flows of essential resources. Cooption 
increases the certainty of future support by the organization coopted. A subtle 
cooption strategy to exert interrimi control is the establishment of interlocking 
directorates (USA) and (partial) ownership (Japan) (Aldrich 1979, Gerlach 1992, 
Glasmeier and Sugiura 1991). 
Coalescing refers to a combination with another organization in the environment. 
This includes joint ventures, mergers and strategic alliances, for instance. These 
strategies drastically reduce the autonomy of every single member. Therefore they are 
not pursued very often compared to other forms of interorganizational activities. They 
are only undertaken to meet severe problems of dependence and uncertainty because 
of suppliers', distributors', or competitors' actions. In this way market power may be 
increased, technological developments can be controlled, and so forth and so on 
(Aldrich 1979). 
Multilateral strategies Many sources of interorganizational dependence and uncer-
tainty cannot be dealt with by unilateral incentives and dyadic cooperation. They 
require the cooperative interaction of many organizations in action sets. An action set 
is a group of organizations forming a temporary alliance for a limited purpose. 
Research on action sets examines the purposeful activities of an aggregate of organiz-
ations to influence environmental forces. Reciprocity between members is a major 
problem for some forms of action sets, such as producer boycotts and cartels (e.g. 
OPEC), as each may fear that the others are taking out more than they are putting 
into the relationship. Other forms of action sets are joint lobbying, public rallies of 
small firms and self-employed persons, and consortia. The limited purpose of action 
sets means that the bonds joining the interacting organizations are usually temporary; 
temporary coalitions are created to carry out projects no single organization could 
accomplish. 
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It would go beyond the scope of this chapter to illustrate every strategy men-
tioned at this point. Examples of many of the above-mentioned 'strategies' will be 
given in Chapter Five, albeit from a spatial perspective. Anyhow, the list of potential 
manipulation strategies is endless, "limited only by the imagination of managers and 
employees' constraints on internal variation, and legal and normative sanctions" 
(Aldrich 1979, 295). 
Besides, apart from striving to adapt the environment to the firm's requirements 
through stronger or weaker external encouragement strategies, an organization may 
have other options to deal with the environment. 
Immunization 
If the environment is too stubborn to be managed by means of inducement strategies, 
an organization may seek to hedge against external influences. To protect production 
from environmental threats, organizations may have recourse to several strategies. 
These are: buffering, rationing, scattering, and vertical integration. 
Buffering includes tactics such as stockpiling, but also the accumulation of a nest egg 
(financial risk reserves or excess resources) to hedge against temporary losses or 
financial shocks. Stockpiling may be an appropriate and important ploy in mass-
manufacturing organizations. But it is less feasible when the product is perishable or 
when the object is inexorably involved in the technological process, as in custom -
production and consulting activities. Furthermore, in a dynamic market, as currently 
is the case, stockpiling bears the risk of obsolescence. On the other hand, operating at 
full capacity (i.e. zero stock principle) makes production processes extremely vulner-
able to slight hitches in the supply of even minor components, causing queues, 
bottlenecks and delays. Thus, operating at excess capacity may eliminate queuing and 
bottlenecks and reduce unpredictable variations in the time needed to complete each 
part of the manufacturing process. As a consequence, investing in lots of excess 
capacity greatly increases delivery reliability (Gertler 1988; Linge 1992; The Economist, 
August 1990). 
Rationing Rationing involves assigning priorities in organizational tasks. An import-
ant and well-known example of a rationing strategy is the current back-to-basics trend 
in private and public organizations. Organizations give new priority to their core 
activities and externalize non-core activities (disintegrating). Growing international 
competition allows an organization to hold market leadership or technological 
leadership in only a very few markets. The current environment is too turbulent and 
complex for an organization to compete on many fronts. The assignment of priorities 
in organizational tasks is clearly illustrated in the case of the multinational electronics 
company Philips. According to Philips's own metaphor, there is a 'Philips tree with 
components as the trunk and with consumer electronics and information technology 
and communications as the branches' (De Smidt 1990, 58). Domestic appliances are 
given less priority, and the company decided to hive off a host of non-core activities 
completely. These included transport and garage facilities, internal accountancy and 
assurance services, architectural and engineering departments, canteen services and 
hotel accommodations, white-goods businesses, diamond tools and many more. The 
company even decided to sell the vast majority of the activities of the product 
division Information Systems to Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC). After having 
been engaged in computer production for 25 years, this decision was charged with 
emotion. However, Philips Computer Systems made huge losses and proved unable 
to withstand international competition. So, this decision released the organization 
from serious external pressures and threats, like a lizard that escapes its predators by 
casting off its tail when attacked from behind. 
Scattering Scattering of dependence is the third strategy which helps to make an 
organization immune to environmental effects. Scattering can be applied to both input 
and output linkages. Scattering of input linkages is known under the term 'multiple 
sourcing'. A producer seeks more than one supplier of a component in order to 
become less vulnerable to the whims of every single one. Scattering of output 
linkages can be achieved by means of diversification, i.e. the development of new 
products and acquisition of services. A multiple product strategy can shield an 
organization from shifts in demand. 
Integration The fourth strategy of immunization from environmental pressures is 
integration or internalization of activities. Integration can occur either internally or 
externally. Internal integration concerns the in-house development of activities which 
otherwise would have been contracted out. External internalization relates to the take 
over of already existing facilities. By internalization, organizations may place the 
incalculable or failing environment under direct control or become immune to it. 
Forward integration may serve to improve quality control and protection of the 
product (for example, bakers owning both a bakery and a baker's shop; computer 
manufacturers providing software and facilities management to customers), or to gain 
better control over sales volume and prices (oil-company-owned petrol stations and 
brewery-owned or financed cafes). Backward integration can make it directly possible 
for an organization to assure (more regular) supply of materials or components from 
sources which otherwise might be controlled by powerful firms in monopolistic or 
oligopolistic markets (for example, oil, paper, and chemicals). Backward integration 
also makes it possible to improve or secure quality control over parts and compo-
nents. Horizontal integration is frequently associated with efforts to avoid competi-
tion. 
(External) integration refers not only to a focal organization's acquisition activities 
but also to the voluntary merging of this association into a dominant, more powerful 
organization. As Aldrich (1979, 268) noted: "Smaller organizations have the best 
chance for survival if they are under the protective wing of a more dominant 
organization." Such reasons underlie the take-over of Volmac, the biggest Dutch 
computer software company, by Cap Gemini Sogeti (the chief European software 
company). Volmac sought contact with Cap Gemini after it proved unable to inter-
nationalize sales and contacts on its own. Consequently, the company feared ending 
up in an isolated position in the international world of computer science (Kosterman 
and Hentenaar 1992). 
Adaptation 
Often organizations are not in the position to either influence or hedge against 
environmental forces. Then they have to accept environmental mandates and comply 
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with them. There has been heated debate on the radical changes that increasing 
customer power and demands have brought about in the way private production 
takes place in the countries of the Western World. As a consequence of both rising 
consumer prosperity and growing international competition, fluctuations in market 
demand have increased, and subtle nuances of taste and need variation in the market 
place have become manifest (Gertler 1988, Valéry 1987). These changing market 
trends are increasingly forcing firms to abandon mass-production systems and adopt 
tailor-made and small-batch production systems. Even giant corporations like IBM 
have to obey these trends and invest heavily in flexible manufacturing systems. They 
must adopt organizational structures totally different from those prevailing under a 
mass-production regime (Kelly and Keeble 1990). 
The increasing flexibilization of production is an example of internal changes in 
organizations to comply with environmental mandates. Here, this will be called 
'adaptation'. Adaptations, conceived of as intra-organizational changes intended to 
fulfil external demands, include product changes, process changes, changes in 
management, and changes in organization structure. It is well known and abundantly 
illustrated how the transition of rigid mass-production to flexible niche-production 
changed the nature of products (e.g. smaller components, higher quality, wider 
product variety), processes (e.g. flexible automation, zero stock production), manage-
ment style (e.g. shift from autocratic and commanding leadership to participatory and 
motivating leadership), and organizational structure (shift from centralized and 
mechanic organization structures to decentralized and organic structures). There is an 
abundant literature on these subjects in administrative science (e.g. De Sitter 1987, 
Morgan 1988, Hitomi 1989, Parthasarthy and Sethi 1992). 
Utilization 
Finally, organizations do not only counteract the environment, they also make use of 
it. An organization's employment of given sources of supply is primarily a function of 
their availability. The presence of the right resources of the right quality is a necessary 
condition for using them. However, it is not a sufficient condition. Other factors may 
intervene, such as an organization's ability to obtain the resources required, the 
organization's need for them and the willingness to use them. The ability and the 
need to procure certain resources may be affected by the growth stage of the firm. 
This may hold good for interorganizational variations in the use of external sources of 
finance within the same environment. Established firms possess a greater ability to 
raise external finance than new and small ones. Also management's willingness, 
abilities, and many more factors may intervene between the availability of resources 
and their exploitation. Variation in the use of external sources of finance, temporary 
employees, scientific knowledge and other elements may be just as much a result of 
different attitudes by the owner-managers or of the availability of these resources 
(Peters 1990). However, this doesn't alter the fact that environmental capacity defines 
the upper limit at which resources can be used. Hence, it is plausible that, by and 
large, organizations in rich settings can tap more readily into their environments than 
organizations in lean environments and thus give the former an important built-in 
advantage. Table 3.2 summarizes the means discussed above which organizations 
may use to manage the external environment. 
[ble 3.2 Means of dealing with the external environment3 
Manipulation Unilateral incentives Indirect: market forces 
Direct: non-market forces 
Bilateral cooperation/nego- Contracting 
tiation or dyadic strategies Coopting 
Coalescing 










Reviewing the resource dependence view, it appears that according to this 
>proach an organization's behaviour is affected but not determined by the external 
ivironment. With this stance, resource dependence steers a middle course between 
ganizational primacy in the strategic choice perspective on the one hand and, on the 
her, the environmental determinism of the population ecology model. Nevertheless, 
e instigating and sometimes directing role of the environment in resource depend-
ice theory leads Pfeffer to consider this view as a particular approach within the 
xternal control perspective of organizations'. 
ie resource dependence view in organization theory bears some similarities to the 
laptation approach within the geography of enterprise. First, in describing adapta-
jn processes in response to environmental constraints or contingencies, both approa-
les see the environment as an input to organizational behaviour and not so much as 
ι output. This is unlike the rational action view in organization theory and corporate 
:ography in spatial science. Secondly, the adaptation approach in geography as well 
the resource dependence approach in organization theory do not view the organiz-
ion as completely powerless or inactive vis-à-vis its environment - as population 
ology on the one hand and location theory and regional development theories on 
e other hand actually imply (see Chapter Two). There is, however, one significant 
difference between the adaptation perspective in geography and the resource 
dependence view in organization theory. This is their conception of the environment. 
Whereas the former focuses on managing environmental dynamism (uncertainty 
perspective), the latter concentrates on dealing with resource scarcity (dependence 
perspective). 
Interestingly, rational action theory and external control do not cover all the 
options. Pfeffer offers another perspective on organizational action, the so-called 
'social constructionist' view. I will address this perspective briefly in the next section. 
3.3.3 The social constructionist perspective 
This perspective on action, according to Pfeffer (1982), fundamentally denies either an 
internally directed or an externally determined rationality of behaviour. In social 
constructionist approaches, in contrast, it is assumed that much organizational activity 
is relatively mindless, in the sense that its sensibility is not questioned or even 
considered, let alone evaluated. Organizational behaviour is conceived of as emerging 
automatically from and responding unconsciously to the socially constructed reality. 
This means that social reality is both the context and the result of social interaction 
processes. Within the social constructionist view of organizational action, Pfeffer 
discusses three streams of research: paradigm theories, decision-process theories, and 
institutionalization theory. 
Paradigm theory 
Theorists who view an organization as a paradigm posit that an organization's 
members act according to the shared understanding and the shared exemplars that 
guide members' actions. "A paradigm is a technology, including the beliefs about 
cause-effect relations and standards of practice and behaviour, as well as specific 
examples of these, that constitute how an organization goes about things... paradigms 
are the glue binding the organization together and differentiating it from its environ-
ment and other organizations" (Pfeffer 1982, 227-228). Brown (1978) maintained that 
the development of shared paradigms is what occurs in formal organizations. Pfeffer 
(1981a) argued that one of the critical administrative tasks involves the articulation of 
the organization's paradigm. In this respect Pfeffer refers to Selznick (1957), who 
noted that a critical leadership task was to provide myths and beliefs that infused 
day-to-day activity with meaning and purpose. 
Decision models 
Decision process models take a bounded rationality view on organizational behaviour. 
Because it is too costly and problematic to ground decision making in the acquisition 
of maximal knowledge, organizations economize on information. Thus, the decision-
process models maintain that the administratively rational thing to do, and what 
organizations actually do, is to develop performance programs, standard operating 
procedures, rules of thumb, and so forth, and use these in making decisions. For 
instance, one commonly hypothesized decision process is that of incrementalism 
(Padget 1980). Incrementalism economizes on information processing and decision 
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time by taking last year's allocation pattern as a base and making marginal adjust-
ments from that base. Decision-process theorists argue that in order to understand a 
given organization, it is necessary and largely sufficient to understand these perform-
ance programs or procedures (Pfeffer 1982, 235). 
Institutionalization theory 
Institutionalization theory is the third approach within Pfeffer's class of social con-
structionist views on organizational action. It addresses the issue of how and why 
meanings, forms and procedures come to be taken for granted and what the conse-
quences of this institutionalization are (1982, 239). Meyer and Rowan (1977, 341) 
define institutionalization as "the processes, by which social processes, obligations, or 
actualities come to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action." For 
institutionalized acts or institutionalized structures, there is a stable structure of 
interaction and definition of the situation, which is not necessarily based on rational 
or instrumental considerations. According to institutionalization theory, actions are 
not undertaken because they are tied to the achievement of a particular goal (rational 
action), nor because they are rewarded or enforced by a powerful third party or other 
intervening processes, but simply because that is just the way things are done. Each 
actor is motivated to comply because otherwise his actions and those of others in the 
system cannot be understood. Institutionalization is rooted in conformity, in the 
taken-for-granted aspects of everyday life (Pfeffer 1982, 240). 
According to institutionalization theory organizations import the shared views 
institutionalized in the environment about what organizations should look like and 
how organizational work should be performed and incorporate them in their struc-
ture as a way to maintain their legitimacy. Organizational and individual action 
reflect the context of the wider social structure, expectations and norms. As Lincoln, 
Hanada and Olson (1981, 114) noted: "...organizational phenomena are shaped by the 
cultural values and beliefs, as well as the institutional arrangements, of the popula-
tions in which they are embedded... Organizational structures may indeed be loosely 
coupled to formal goals, but they are closely tied to the cultural and social orientati-
ons of the people involved with them." 
Ideas from paradigm theory, decision theory and institutionalization theory have 
a wide applicability. For example, they have some bearing on identifying the sources 
of competitive advantage of first Britain, then the United States, and more recently 
Japan during the historic evolution of capitalism (cf Lazonic 1989). Also these theories 
are relevant to the examination of geographical patterns in cross national merger 
activities and cooperation between private and public organizations (Molle 1991). 
In regional economics and economic geography, several strands of research touch 
on the ideas of social constructionist theories. They are found, for example, in 
research on regional identity and spatial images (Pellenbarg 1985) and on cultural and 
social aspects of new firm formation (De Smidt and Wever 1985, Bleumink et al. 1985, 
Illeris 1986, Brusco 1986). Also the ideas regarding the impact of selective urban-rural 
migration of higher-income, highly qualified workers, managers and entrepreneurs on 
current SME (small and medium-sized enterprise) development in many small towns 
and rural areas in Northern Europe (Keeble 1989) reveal social constructionist 
dimensions. Yet, anything like a well-established, clearly recognizable exemplification 
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of social constructionist thought is unknown in spatial economics. Indeed, this is a 
relatively unexplored held, which might account for the many inconsistencies obser-
ved. 
Pfeffer (1982) notes further that culturally conditioned organizational properties 
and behaviour need not have any close connection to efficiency or technical rational-
ity. Child (1972), however, stated previously that a theory of organizational structure 
and action cannot ignore organizational performance The neglect of organizational 
efficiency or profitability is a major shortcoming of the social constructionist approa-
ches. In this thesis, though perhaps somewhat boldly, I take the standpoint that 
socially constructed behaviour is merely a particular case of action or adaptation, 
namely unconscious or mindless adaptation, which could also be pursued rationally. 
Thus, when I discuss firm-environment adaptation, I do not consider whether the 
'strategy' is chosen consciously or unconsciously; hence, both types of behaviour are 
incorporated. Consequently, the following approaches to action are left the strategic 
choice view, the population ecology view, and the resource dependence view. The 
next subsection will summarize them briefly. 
3.3.4 The perspectives on action in retrospect 
The main issue addressed in the previous discussion of views on organizational 
behaviour and performance is whether these are managenally or environmentally 
derived. The classical stance of organization theory is that an organization's existence, 
structure and actions are the result of the goals, preferences and perceptions of its 
leaders. This implies the assumption that managers possess behaviounal autonomy. 
Presumably, they have some choice with respect to organizational behaviour and 
design; the range of alternatives is only curtailed by the subjective meanings, interpre-
tations, and the limited information on the part of the management Furthermore, it is 
believed that strategic choice also extends to the organization's environment. The 
proactive behaviour of management changes and manipulates the organizational 
environment to fit the objectives of the organization In other words, primacy is 
ascribed to organizations in a way that the environment, indeed the whole social 
world, is seen as an output or derivation of organizational behaviour. 
Strategic-choice models have been severely attacked by population ecologists. 
These theorists emphasize the limits on the degree to which autonomous strategic 
choice is possible, because of so-called 'internal and external structural inertia'. This 
means that population ecologists are convinced of the intractability of the environ-
ment to manipulation. As a result, according to this view, organizations are placed at 
the mercy of their environments. They either fortuitously 'fit' into the environment or 
are 'selected out' and fail Change is explained in terms of an autonomous drift of 
resources through the economy, rather than in terms of internal managerial action. 
Population ecology views environments as inputs to organization, not outputs of it. 
Primacy is ascribed to the environment, which inhibits choice by channelling organiz-
ations in predetermined directions. In this sense, the managerial role can be described 
as inactive or, at most, symbolic in population ecology (Astley and Van de Ven 1983). 
Environmental autonomy is also assumed by resource development theorists, but 
unlike population ecologists, they do not accept an inactive role or symbolic function 
of organizational management Because organizations require external resources, they 
become dependent on certain segments of the environment For a variety of reasons, 
however, managers and administrators attempt to manage their external depend-
encies, both to ensure the survival of the organization and to acquire, if possible, 
more autonomy from external constraint Thus, resource dependency also traces the 
various strategies of organizations and their managers to cope with external conditi-
ons In an attempt to create some order out of the chaos of the myriad of 'strategies' 
that might be undertaken, either consciously or unconsciously, these have been 
grouped into four categories manipulation strategies, immunization strategies, 
adaptation strategies, and utilization strategies In a way, the confrontation between 
the proactive organization in the strategic-choice model and the inactive one in the 
population ecology model results in a reactive system in resource dependence theory 
A mapr issue, which remains to be discussed now, is whether these perspectives 
on organizational action are competitive (1 e each one claiming general applicability), 
or whether they coexist d e each one dealing with a different portion of the variety of 
organizations) It has been shown in the previous chapter that regional scientists take 
the latter standpoint, reserving rational and adaptation approaches for large 
multiplant enterprises, while applying a selection approach to small and medium-
sized firms The last section of this chapter explores whether or not organization theo-
ry provides clues for escaping this presupposed deterministic role of size in assessing 
the adaptability of organizations 
3.4 The role of organizational size 
Aldnch (1979) and Freeman (1982) have implied that the potential to alter the 
environment to manage external dependence is a capacity possessed primarily by 
large organizations Thus, they imply that the reactive view of organizational 
behaviour in resource dependence theory is primarily applicable to larger organiz-
ations Also Pfeffer (1982) admits that this view is probably true, taking organizations 
separately Even Child (1972), who defends a rational action view, reserves the power 
to influence the conditions prevailing within environments for large organizations 
Small organizations, according to Child, can only avoid unsuitable environments by 
rationally selecting those types of environment which support the functions the 
organizations perform The other side of the coin is that, as Astley and Van de Ven 
point out (1983), the idea of natural selection in population ecology fits small 
powerless organizations better than big ones 
As noted previously (Section 2 3 3), the statement that large organizations are 
more able to cope with their environments than small ones has a major shortcoming 
The existence of large organizations and their adaptive capacity are taken for granted, 
without questioning the origins and development of these features As Taylor and 
Thrift noted "our concern should be with growth and not with size per se" (1983, 
451) They quote Penrose (1959), who pointed out that growth is a process, whereas 
size is only a state Some authors, however, provide inroads to attack the binary 
distinction between size and environmental determinism. This section dwells briefly 
on these innovative ideas. First, we will offer a critique of the assumption that smaller 
firms are not able to respond and adapt to environmental conditions. Secondly, with 
reference to this critique, we will present a model which accounts for adaptation, 
though not as a static fact but as a cumulative process resulting from dynamic 
interaction between an organization and the environment. 
3.4.1 The primacy of size attenuated 
Authors who presume that smaller firms are powerless vis-à-vis their environments 
fail to take into account the following considerations. In the first place, small organiz-
ations may develop considerable power by banding together in associations. In this 
way substantial control over the environment can be achieved (Pfeffer 1982). Wever 
(1990, 127) derived a clear example from the Dutch dairy industry. "For a long time 
the Dutch dairy industry was dominated by private firms, with milk-producing 
farmers in a dependent position, because of the perishability of milk. To counter this 
dependency the farmers established co-operative dairy plants, the first one in Warga 
in Friesland in 1886. Gradually these co-operatives took over the production of butter 
and cheese. As a consequence the private companies had to look for other product-
market combinations. One of the alternatives was condensed milk." 
So far so good. At the beginning of this century, however, problems arose once 
more, when the demand for condensed milk increased. As Wever continues, "The 
private firms had to buy more milk from individual farmers or from co-operatives. 
They were ready and able to pay a high price for milk, higher than the co-operatives 
did. This created a problem for the farmers of the co-operatives. They knew from 
experience that dependency on the private sector was dangerous. On the other hand 
the milk price could not be overlooked. This conflict between co-operative ideal and 
individual business was solved by the decision of thirty Frisian co-operatives jointly 
to start a condensed milk firm: ccFriesland." In this way ccFriesland, now merged into 
one of the top dairy firms in Holland, was the result of farmers joining forces to fight 
external threats. By the way, co-operative firms currently run the show in the Dutch 
dairy industry. In fact, numerous forms of co-operation between small firms can be 
mentioned, varying from public rallies of farmers, taxi companies, petrol station 
owners and others to more structural forms of cooperation like cooperations as illu-
strated above, sharing the same names and logos, syndicates, cartels etcetera. 
Secondly, small firms actually reveal higher adaptive flexibility than large 
enterprises (Rothwell and Zegveld 1982, Pratten 1991). Paradoxically, this statement 
accords perfectly with ideas of population ecology theory. Remember that, according 
to population ecologists, the adaptive flexibility of organizations is inhibited because 
of structural inertia, both internal (e.g. sunk costs, communication structures, internal 
politics, dominance of institutional norms) and external (e.g. barriers to entry and exit, 
bounded rationality, social legitimacy) to the firm (see Section 3.3.2.1). In Hannan and 
Freeman's (1977, 930) original formulation: "the stronger the inertial pressures the 
lower the organization's flexibility and the more likely that the logic of environmental 
selection is appropriate. As a consequence, the issue of structural inertia is central to 
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the choice between adaptation and selection models." The problem is that population 
ecologists contend that inertia is largely a phenomenon associated with the complex 
department structures of large organizations (Aldrich 1979), whereas they admit that 
selection models fit small, powerless organizations better than large ones (Astley and 
Van de Ven 1983). Betton and Dess (1985) put a finger on this fascinating paradox of 
population ecology. 
The third argument points out the failure of environmental determinists to 
discriminate between the amount and nature of environmental pressures exerted on 
small firms versus large ones. Emerson (1962) noted some time ago that the first of 
two decisive factors of an organization's dependence on some element in its task 
environment is its need for resources or performances which that element can provide 
(see Section 3.3.2.1). Thus, a manufacturing firm is first and foremost dependent on a 
financial organization, to the extent that the firm needs financial resources. It is 
obvious that a small organization needs less financial capital than a large one. 
Actually, new firms rely heavily on resources of personal finance (Storey 1982, 
Donckels 1990). This applies not only to financial resources but also to other factors of 
production. Peters (1990, 20), for example, recognizes that small firms do not require 
the same large pools of labour and investment; therefore, they can successfully be 
dispersed to more thinly populated areas. Similarly, Daniels (1982) and Martinelli 
(1986) argue that large corporate plants use more business services than small firms 
and are therefore dependent on the centres of such activity. Furthermore, smaller 
firms place more moderate requirements on the environment, not only in a quantita-
tive but also in a qualitative sense. For example, apart from the fact that these firms 
cannot afford national or international top managers, they do not need them either. 
This is because management processes are much less complex in small firms than in 
large ones. Large multinational enterprises are also highly vulnerable to fluctuations 
in the exchange rate than small local firms are. This is expressively illustrated by the 
former president of Philips. He "would like to have the entire range of Philips 
products produced on the deck of a supertanker. This tanker would than stop off in 
different countries according to the advantages of moving exchange rates. Philips 
could then rid itself of one of its biggest worries, extreme fluctuations in exchange 
rates, which influence sales and profits in unpredictable ways" (De Smidt and Wever 
1990, 1). Similarly, big companies are increasingly scrutinized by society and therefore 
more susceptible to public opinion and image of the firm than are small ones. 
Consider also the availability of many types of advanced business services like 
management consultancy, legal and financial advice regarding acquisition activities, 
and quotation on the stock market. These and many other resources offered by the 
environment are of utmost importance to larger multiplant enterprises but are totally 
irrelevant to small new ones. As a consequence, by virtue of their size, these young 
companies are also shielded from the threats and contingencies which accompany 
these dependencies. In line with the foregoing, findings by Peters (1990) about small 
business growth are elucidating. He observes that high growth led to more demand-
ing requirements for most business inputs. Consequently, rapidly growing companies 
experienced many more constraints from the environment than slow-growth firms. 
The former had more labour recruitment problems, difficulties with quality of raw 
materials, and the availability of technical help. Moreover, they were less satisfied 
with the services of sales agents and marketing consultants. Peters states that 
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constraints mainly follow from growth; "Most of the consequences of growth were in 
fact likely to be growth-induced constraints." 
In short, small firms, almost by definition, maintain a smaller and less complex 
task environment than large ones. Consequently, the former are exposed to fewer 
(potential) pressures from the environment and therefore have to generate less 
counteractive power and adaptive capacity than the latter to bring firm and environ-
ment in line with each other. The conclusion is that it is not an organization's 
absolute power but rather its strength in relation to the size and complexity of its task 
environment that counts in dealing with firm-environment adaptation. An absolute 
notion of organizational adaptability and power vis-à-vis the environment may reveal 
a clear gap between small and large organizations. However, starting from a relative 
notion, this gap may be much smaller and less self-evident. 
3.4.2 Adaptation development 
This relative idea of adaptability does not alter the fact that, as a prerequisite to 
growth, organizations have to enhance their ability to deal with environmental 
conditions, both threats and opportunities. This focuses attention on adaptation as a 
dynamic process that is the result of the relative strength and power of an organiz-
ation in relation to its environment (Hrebiniak and Joyce 1985, 347). Chakravarthy 
(1982) developed a model which conceives of adaptation as a development process. 
For that purpose he brought together four different concepts of adaptation. These 
concepts are: 'state of adaptation', 'adaptive ability', 'adaptive fit' and 'the process of 
adaptation'. Figure 3.6, page 76, depicts Chakravarth/s model in an adapted and 
simplified form. 
State of adaptation 
The state of adaptation of a business organization is the level of adaptation in which 
it can survive the conditions of its environment. Each level describes the extent of 
environmental complexity that can be dealt with. And the more environmental 
complexity that can be handled by a firm, the better are its chances for long-term 
survival. Chakravarthy differentiates between three states of adaptation. These are 
defined as: unstable, stable, and neutral. 
In the unstable state, a firm's adaptation to the environment is extremely fragile 
and vulnerable to changes in the environment. The manager of such a firm deliberate-
ly creates stability through a series of decisions which lessen the organization's 
interactions with its environment. It is possible for a firm in this state of adaptation to 
show good financial results in the short run. However, its long-term viability is 
severely constrained. As mentioned above, limited integration with the environment 
is a feature inherent to small organizations, rather than large ones, and thus are they 
relatively sheltered from a host of environmental pressures. 
A stable state describes the state of adaptation in which instead of protecting itself 
from the environment, the firm is open to it. The firm reacts to environmental 
changes and complies with environmental mandates. In a neutral state, a firm can 
withstand most environmental changes because they have been anticipated before 
their occurrence and the firm has invested in the requisite adaptive ability. The 
environment may even have been modified to suit the organization's needs. These 
organizations are continuously searching for market opportunities. They often create 
changes in their environment, to which their competitors must respond. 
Although all three states of adaptation, within limits, are viable ways of coping 
with the environment in the short term, they do not have the same immunity from 
environmental constraints in the long run. According to Chakravarthy, the neutral 
state has the highest immunity, followed by the stable and unstable states. A firm 
seeking to ensure its future should prefer a neutral state of adaptation over the other 
two states. However, the state of adaptation that a firm aspires to is predicated on the 
resources that it commands, that is, its adaptive ability. 
Adaptive ability 
An organization's adaptive ability or capacity consists of two basic components; 
material capacity and organizational capacity. The material capacity of a firm includes 
its material resources, i.e. equipment and financial capital. This material capacity sets 
the upper limits to the strategic choices. When the material capacity of a firm is poor, 
the strategic choices open to the firm in order to deal with the environment are both 
limited and conservative, i.e. directed at conserving its limited resources. In contrast, 
a firm with unlimited material resources can explore several strategic actions. 
A firm's organizational capacity describes the quantity and quality of its commer-
cial, technological and human resources as well as the organizational structure. 
Actually, a firm's organizational capacity contains all its non-material assets, including 
its know how and its creative and innovative capacity (Van der Zwan 1990). In Figure 
3.6, material and organizational capacity are assumed to relate mainly, though not 
exclusively, to organizational size and age respectively. Whereas at its start the 
organization already has a certain, albeit limited, capacity (both material and organiz-
ational), namely the founder's own property as well as his abilities and ideas, the 
organizational features of size and age only come into existence after it has been 
started up. This fact is flagrantly overlooked in new firm research, which, by implica-
tion, treats all new firms alike as tabula rasa, being unknown quantities and fully 
dependent on the environment for their resources. Nevertheless, it is just this pré-
existence and start-up capacity which constitutes an important determinant of the 
early growth potential of a new firm. 
In order to withstand environmental pressure and to stay in business, a minimum 
of acceptable material and organizational capacities is required. These minimum 
requirements reflect the pressure on the organization exerted by the environment. It 
can be seen in Figure 3.6 that along with the growth and maturing of the organiz-
ation, the material and organizational capacity of a firm increase, as well as the 
pressure exerted from the environment. 
Adaptive fit 
Chakravarthy's third concept, adaptive fit, must be distinguished from state of 
adaptation, referred to above. "Whereas a state of adaptation ensures survival, an 
adaptive fit ensures in addition the optimal use of the material and organizational 
capacity of a firm" (1982, 40). A state of adaptation can represent several strategies, 
with varying emphases on creativity and productivity. Yet an adaptive fit represents 
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an optimum between creative (i.e. effective) and productive (i.e. efficient) use of 
organizational resources, both material and organizational. In Figure 3.6 all firms are 
adapted to their environment effectively, but only the firms Al, Bl and CI are 
adaptively fitted. According to their state of adaptation, Al, Bl and CI are in an 
unstable fit, a stable fit, and a neutral fit respectively. The most interesting and crucial 
point in Chakravarthy's model is that firms can move both within and between the 
different states or levels of adaptation. They do so through the process of adaptation. 
Process of adaptation 
According to Chakravarthy, "The process of adaptation includes two subprocesses: 
adaptive specialization and adaptive generalization. Adaptive specialization is the 
process of improving the goodness of fit in a given state of adaptation. It refers to the 
rationalization of processes and structure using available material and organizational 
capacity for moving to the nearest adaptive fit. Adaptive generalization refers to the 
process that improves the survival potential of the organization. It is the aim of 
adaptive generalization to enhance the material and or organizational capacity of a 
firm as required to move it to the next higher state of adaptation" (1982, 41^42). 
In order to understand adaptive generalization, Chakravarthy (1982, 42) considers a 
successful firm to be adaptively fitted with its environment. "In such a condition of 
fit, the firm generates a surplus of contributions over the inducements that it pro-
vides. This surplus is called 'slack' (Cyert and March 1963)". This slack can be 
invested in improving both the material and organizational capacities of the firm. 
Through these investments, a firm can consider new strategies for coping with greater 
environmental complexity and dependence. Once a firm has reached a higher state of 
adaptation, it may seek adaptive fit in keeping with its new level of resources 
(adaptive specialization). In this way Chakravarthy's model views the ability to adapt 
not as a given capacity but as a dynamic process, resulting from the cumulative 
interplay between a given level of organizational adaptive capacity, environmental 
forces and organizational adaptation processes. I agree with Hrebeniak and Joyce who 
state that: "it is necessary to think in circles (Weick 1979), to investigate the reciprocity 
of relations between organization and environment, and to study the mutual causa-
tion that obtains" (1985, 347). Chakravarthy's conceptual framework can be used to 
describe how the adaptive capacity and size of a small start-up business may unfold 
and develop in the course of time. The model can describe appropriately how a small, 
new-born business might exploit and expand this adaptive capacity. Beginning with a 
given, albeit modest, amount of adaptive ability (cf the white triangle at the lower left 
in Figure 3.6) - the origins of this important initial capacity will be addressed in 
Chapter Seven - the firm will move to higher domains and scopes of power vis-à-vis 
the environment. 
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Figure 3.6 Adaptive abilities, state of adaptation, and adaptive fits (adapted from 
Chakravarthy 1982) 
3.5 Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to find out whether organization theory provides clues to 
creating more leeway for entrepreneurial action vis-à-vis the spatial context. This 
could be useful to a theory in spatial science which seeks to explain the phenomenon 
of small firm growth in contrasting environments, i.e. both rich core regions and lean 
peripheral areas. We sought to answer three questions. 
(1) How is 'the environment- conceptualized in organization theory, and how can 
this be of use to regional science? 
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(2) How is the interaction between organization and environment perceived in 
organization theory, and how can this be compared to interpretations in spatial 
theory? In other words, where do we currently stand in the debate about organiz-
ational adaptation versus environmental determinism in organization theory as 
compared to spatial science? 
(3) How do organization theorists perceive the intervening role of organizational size 
in the interaction between organization and environment? In more concrete terms: 
does organization theory provide any theoretical notion to break through the 
assumption of the predominant influence of size on the dichotomy between 
organizational adaptation and environmental determinism? 
Castrogiovanni views the environment as being composed of environmental levels 
and dimensions. Environmental levels refer to the directness and strength with which 
external forces impinge upon an organization. This distinction of several boundaries 
proceeding 'outward' from the organization implies that environmental influences 
cannot be generalized and that a distinction must be made between more and less 
compelling forces. Environmental dimensions - munificence, dynamism and complexi-
ty - are specific aspects of the environment to which organizations respond or by 
which they are affected. Formulated in terms of positive action, the dimensions 
capture why a resource is sought (Aldrich 1979, 62). Applying this formulation in the 
sphere of spatial science, the question becomes why organizations may prefer one 
location over another. It is unequivocally not because of dynamic or complexity 
aspects of the local task environment but because of munificence aspects. This 
illustrates the key function of the munificence variable of the environment in spatial 
science. Adaptation geography forms no exception. So, the raison d'être of adaptation 
geography must be how organizations respond to resource scarcity or munificence 
and not to turbulence or heterogeneity. Hence, adaptation geography should explicitly 
incorporate organizational targeting of resource dependence in dealing with infor-
mation uncertainty. 
Regarding the second question about the balance in organization theory between 
organizational and environmental primacy, three standpoints can be identified: a) the 
organization proactively moulding the external environment (i.e. rational 
action/strategic choice perspective), b) the environment selecting organizations 
(environmental selection/population ecology view), and c) the organization reacting 
to external conditions, being affected but not determined by the environment 
(resource dependence theory). Stretching the imagination a little, these viewpoints 
also can be identified in spatial science. Whereas in spatial theory, environmental 
determinism predominates over theory development, in organization theory the 
balance between different approaches is more in balance. The conclusion is that 
organization theory's resource dependence perspective provides useful clues and 
insights for developing a framework. That framework makes it conceptually possible 
that organizations respond actively to external conditions of the local business region 
and handle locational disadvantages effectively. These insights revolve around the 
notion of the reactive organization as well as around four basic means of responding to 
environmental forces: manipulating, immunizing against, adapting to, and utilizing 
the environment. It is the aim of this study to develop adaptation geography further, 
while using these insights derived from organizational resource dependence theory. 
The third question concerns the issue of whether an adaptation approach in 
geography must be reserved for a small elite of big powerful companies, or whether it 
can also be applied to the remaining 70 to 90 per cent of firms, made up of small and 
medium-sized enterprises. Although small firms possess less power to deal with 
external forces, they also place fewer requirements on the environment and hence are 
exposed to fewer external pressures than big enterprises. Irrefutably, there exists a 
wide gap in absolute power between large multiplant companies on the one hand and 
small single-plant firms on the other. Nonetheless, the relative gap may be much 
smaller. If the adaptive capacity of small companies exceeds a minimum level they 
may be well able to cope with the environment in accordance with their needs for 
survival. I proceeded along the lines of a development model of organizational 
adaptability, designed by Chakravarthy (1982). Chakravarthy's framework describes 
how a modest initial adaptive ability of organizations can be expanded along and in 
interaction with the organization's size. Meanwhile, the organization will place ever-
greater demands on the environment and consequently experience ever-increasing 
external pressures. 
Using the insights from this chapter as a point of departure, in Chapter Five I 
will illustrate how small, successful companies in the rich Dutch urban core region 
(Randstad Holland), as well as in less well endowed peripheral and semi-peripheral 
areas, deal with both the opportunities and the constraints of their local business 
region. The examples are taken from my own in-depth research conducted among 13 
small and medium-sized companies. Most of these are young, high-technology 
enterprises, operating both in the industrial and in the service sector (Vaessen 1989, 
Vaessen and Wever 1990). The research is characterized by a qualitative research 
method. This methodological approach is not without criticism. So, before I proceed 
to discuss the nature and development of the responsiveness of these enterprises 
towards their local business region, I will first address some methodological aspects 
and explain the selection of the businesses investigated. 
Notes 
1 Distinguishing these three dimensions of the environment gives rise to two different 
perspectives on firm-environment interaction. The munificence dimension directs 
attention to the dependence of an organization on external resources. Environmental 
dynamism and complexity, on the other hand, direct attention toward lack of information 
and resulting uncertainty. Both perspectives indicate that dependence and uncertainty are 
key concepts in the explanation of firm-environment interaction (cf Aldrich and Mindlin 
1978, Douma and Schreudcr 1992). 
2 Hannan and Freeman (1989), subsume the resource dependence theory under the class of 
adaptation theories. 
3 As discussed above, organizations can deal with their (aggregate) environment in four 
ways: manipulation, immunization, adaptation, and utilization. Although these ways 
have been presented as analyt cally distinct methods, reality is often more obscure. 
Actually, these methods are inextricably intertwined and ambiguous. For example, a firm 
that tries to manipulate the market by enhancing consumer satisfaction first has to 
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improve the adaptation of its product to the market's desires. Similarly, organizations that 
seek protection from the national government against foreign competition (immunization) 
often first have to mobilize the state to intercede (through negotiating, lobbying, making 
threats, and so on) and to take appropriate policy measures (manipulation). The web of 
means of coping with the environment may be much more intricate yet. Before Philips 
could withdraw from the competitive pressure on the computer market (i.e. immu-
nization), the company first had to reorganize its computer division (adaptation) to make 
it fit for sale and to induce potential acquisitors to take over (manipulation). 
Subsequently, Philips entered into talks with Digital and after a year of tough negotiati-
ons the company succeeded in selling its computer division to Digital (manipulation). 
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Chapter Four 
Research method and sample 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two recorded how spatial theorizing in general and modern regional 
development theory in particular failed to incorporate the entrepreneurial factor in an 
adequate way. In Chapter Three, we put our ears to the ground of organization 
theory, seeking clues for improvement. The present chapter explores ways to tackle 
this subject matter methodologically. How can one convincingly highlight organiz-
ational autonomy vis-à-vis the environment within a prevailing picture of centre-
periphery and urban-rural contrasts? This chapter is divided into two parts. The first 
part (Section 4.2) considers the research method used; the second (Section 4.3) reports 
on the selection and description of the sample. 
4.2 A qualitative method 
Getting straight to the point, the present thesis is based on a somewhat unusual, 
though not new, research method in regional science, a qualitative research method. 
This involves the collection and analysis of qualitative data. Barton and Lazarsfeld 
(1961, 95) define qualitative data as "detailed, concrete, non-metric descriptions of 
people and events". The distinctive difference between quantitative and qualitative 
research is that the latter kind is strongly focused on obtaining in-depth knowledge 
about the nature of a particular phenomenon, whereas the former is much more 
oriented towards gaining insight into its representativeness (Maso 1987, 30). Of 
course, there is not only one qualitative research method. Actually, qualitative 
analysis can be pursued in many different ways, and every method is subdivided into 
many different variants, depending on the specific context. The following sections 
address the use of a qualitative approach in the present research as well as matters of 
reliability and validity. 
4.2.1 Features of the research method 
The first distinctive characteristic of the project's research method is that an in-depth 
approach has been applied, resulting in case studies of individual enterprises (cf. 
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approach has been applied, resulting in case studies of individual enterprises (cf. 
Vaessen 1989, Vaessen and Wever 1990). Though the choice for a case study perspec-
tive is a rather unconventional way to study small and medium-sized firms in 
regional science, it is easy to defend. The task of the project was to fill in a void in 
spatial theory; that is, to explain (modem) small-firm behaviour outside of metropo-
litan core areas. This task required an explorative approach. In other words, the 
research was expected to produce one or more hypotheses to fill this vacuum. And as 
Piatt (1988, 8) notes: "it is universally recognised, even by those who scarcely allow it 
any other role, that a case study may suggest hypotheses, interpretations, empirical 
uniformities for future (quantitative) investigation. It does so by showing that things 
are so, or that such an interpretation is plausible, in the particular case, so that they 
might also be so in other cases" (cf also Wester 1987). 
The inclination to conduct case studies is reinforced by a growing dissatisfaction 
on the part of the author with the rough and vague information provided by the 
prevailing quantitative methods. The ready-made choices in structured questionnaires 
and the measurement of statistical associations in conventional methodology drasti-
cally abridge the intricate and multidimensional nature of the everyday world. 
Consequently, any appreciation of the adequacy and the accuracy of the asserted 
relations disappear from view. Too frequently the importance of locational conditions 
for growth is postulated without showing the underlying mechanisms. Case studies 
are assumed to give insight in these matters, because they can provide material which 
is inaccessible or less easily obtained by other measures. Piatt (1988, 11) refers to this 
as the function of micromediation of case studies. 
A second feature of the qualitative research method used here is its comparative 
perspective. Thus, unlike case study research using but one case, the present research 
is based on several cases. The main reason for multiple cases is to be better able to 
control for the impact of the quality of the production environment. Thus, behaviour 
of favourably located firms is compared with the actions of less favourably sited 
businesses. In the Dutch context, it is assumed that the strongly urbanized polycentric 
metropolis in the western part of the country, known as Randstad Holland, offers a 
more favourable production environment for many types of modern and highly 
valued economic activities than do other regions. As a consequence, the present 
research investigates the firm-environment relationship of Randstad firms in compari-
son with non-Randstad firms. In this way the research counters an important 
objection aimed at corporate geography, namely that it is essentially a single-firm or 
at least a single-region approach. Accordingly, corporate geography ignores the effects 
of comparative (dis)advantages on interfirm competitiveness and development. In 
order to put forward hypotheses more confidently, several firms from both types of 
area, central and peripheral, have been investigated. However, the number of cases 
should never exceed the quantity which would make it impossible to retain the 
individuality of each case. Ultimately, 13 firms have been selected for investigation. 
A third hallmark of the present research is its non-interpretative nature. Often, 
qualitative research is considered to be interpretative research. Eyles (1988, 1) even 
suggests replacing the designation interpretative geography for qualitative geography. 
Applying an interpretative approach means that researchers try to perceive the world 
of individuals and groups as the subjects see it. The task of research, it is said, is, 
therefore, to uncover the actor's view on and perception of the social world and how 
this relates to behaviour. This would imply, in the end, that the researcher's hypo-
theses or theories have to correspond with the respondents' opinions. Not so in this 
study. Although this research deals with entrepreneurial behaviour it does not focus 
on understanding the underlying reasons, but on recording actions and assessing 
their influence. Remember that the present study is aimed at explaining small-firm 
success in different spatial settings. Within this context it is largely irrelevant what 
process of reasoning or motivation drives organizational behaviour towards the 
environment. The only thing that matters is whether or not the organization's actions 
contribute to its competitiveness and survival. What is interpreted in this research is 
how an organization's behaviour affects its relation to the environment in general and 
to the regional setting in particular. From this an assessment is made about the 
relative weight of the contribution of the regional production environment to the 
firm's success and survival. So, unlike mainstream qualitative research, the present 
approach views the entrepreneurs or businesses investigated as objects of research 
and not so much as subjects. 
The fourth and last pertinent feature of the research method is that it adopts a 
longitudinal approach. This means that the research is processual and change-oriented. 
Actually, it comes down to reconstructing a firm's behaviour towards the spatial 
environment from its foundation until the moment it is investigated. This is necessary 
because it can be hypothesized that the role of the regional environment is most 
apparent in the early growth stages of the firms. Admittedly, this was not realized 
from the outset. Somewhat naively it was expected that a random indication of 
linkage patterns and an assessment of the entrepreneurs' explanations of their success 
would yield useful material. Supposedly, this would lead to insight into the signifi-
cance of the quality of the production environment to small-firm performance. 
However, soon after the field work started, it appeared that a longitudinal approach 
would be indispensable. Even businesses which were hardly interwoven with their 
local business region at the time of the investigation, have benefitted from their 
surroundings during earlier growth stages. Such items as the career record of the 
entrepreneur and the foundation and early development of the firm, were initially 
brought up only for the sake of formality. Yet these points became the focus of 
attention as the research proceeded. 
Summing up, the research on which this thesis is based can best be typified as a 
qualitative, though objectifying, comparative case-study approach with a longitudinal 
character and an explorative assignment. That is quite a mouthful. How has this task 
been realized? 
4.2.2 Putting the research method into practice 
The collection of the data 
The data which meet the above requirements of the research method are primarily 
obtained from lengthy in-person interviews with the directors of the firms. These 
were informal or semi-structured interviews. Unlike structured or formal interviews, 
the questions asked in informal interviews have a sequence and wording that are not 
standardized and worked out beforehand. In semi-structured interviews, the inter-
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viewer tries to tailor the wording of the questions to each particular individual and 
ask the questions in an order appropriate to the interviewee. The researcher does not, 
however, approach the task without any framework. There is usually a checklist of 
topics to be covered by all respondents. Such interviewing requires great skill on the 
part of the researcher. That individual must not only be an attentive listener but also 
a good conversationalist, able to keep a dialogue going. We will return to these points 
in the discussion about the reliability of the results. 
Anyhow, the interviews took place in two rounds. The first round of interviews 
were conducted early 1988, the second round two years later. The first series of 
interviews was aimed at gathering as much information as possible about the relation 
between the firm and (certain elements of) the environment. In the second series of 
interviews, the questions were much more purposeful. We will first address the 1988 
interviews. 
Because of the absence of an elaborate pre-existing body of theoretical work 
about small-firm growth in peripheral areas, which can be used as a starting point for 
analysis, it was decided to formulate the research question in an open and explorative 
manner. Accordingly, the research question was wide-ranging, directed at collecting 
large quantities of information about the firm's performance in relation to its place of 
location. Three kinds of questions were posed, dividing the conversations roughly 
into three parts. 
In the first part of the interview we inquired about particular events in the 
firm's existence. These questions involve the previous career record of the entrepre-
neur, as well as the company's start-up (why, where, when) and development (shape 
of the growth curve, particular breakthroughs, important events and developments 
with respect to product-market combination, and other significant occurrences in the 
history of the company). The main goal was to identify external links of influential 
events and to unravel the spatial structure of these relations. For example, if a respon-
dent mentioned an innovation during the conversation, I would then ask how the 
original idea was born, who was involved and where they were located. I was also 
interested in whether or not external agencies are called in to assist with the imple-
mentation. This style of questioning, which is labelled haphazard interviewing (Wester 
1987, 34), requires great alertness on the part of the interviewer. 
The second part of the interview was designed to provide insight into the 
general state of affairs in the relation between the firm and its environment. Five 
important environmental elements or external resources, drawn from the literature, 
were considered. These resources are: labour market, financing opportunities, material 
supplies, supporting services, and market opportunities. We were primarily interested 
in the geographical structure of these relations, their dynamism, and their causal 
mechanisms. Thus inquiries had to be made about the ratio of internal to external 
deliveries, the action radius of external linkages (i.e. regional1, national, international), 
and how these linkages came into being. The third and last part of the interview 
contained some questions about the entrepreneur's viewpoint; how does he explain 
the firm's success and how does he perceive the role of the production environment? 
I compiled the profiles from the conversations with the entrepreneurs but also 
used information from annual reports as well as newspaper and magazine articles in 
which their businesses are mentioned. These sources often contained useful clues for 
the interviews. 
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The analysis of qualitative data 
The interviews were tape-recorded and subsequently transenbed This yielded about 
330 pages of text. The processing of the empirical material gathered in the first round 
of interviews went as follows Five interviews were selected to prepare an equal 
number of profiles, which depict the firm-environment interaction in detail. These 
profiles have been published in Vaessen (1989, Ch 3-7) These 'company biographies' 
represent the first step m attempting to understand the role of the environment in 
disparate regions The other eight firms are systematically compared to the five 
companies which have been portrayed in detail (Vaessen 1989, Ch 8) Here we analy-
se this material and draw some preliminary conclusions (Vaessen 1989a, Ch 9, 1989b) 
This exercise yields insights into the relevant research issues for explaining small-firm 
growth under different locational conditions Among other things, it elucidates a 
firm's behaviour in response to the availability and suitability of external resources as 
well as the conditions of initial rapid firm growth 
Then, early m 1990, two years after the first interview had taken place, the 
opportunity arose to visit five firms for a second time This opening occurred within 
the scope of writing a book about those firms (Vaessen and Wever 1990) On the 
second occasion I gathered additional information to buttress the central themes that 
had emerged in the initial analysis Then, after the book was finished, the observa-
tions were re-examined from a theoretical perspective What basic processes are really 
involved, and what are the key issues7 In this alternation and interaction of data col-
lection and analysis, the research questions relevant to growth in contrasting environ-
ments gradually became clear I re-analysed the interviews and profiles in the light of 
new, more precisely formulated questions The present volume is the account of this 
more fundamental reconsideration 
The cyclical procedure explained above is a distinctive feature of explorative 
qualitative research (Wester 1987, Maso 1987, Strauss and Corbin 1990) In taking such 
an approach, the researcher has to go through the empirical cycle several times In 
response to an approximate problem, data are collected, analysed and evaluated 
tentatively. Then, the first general question is narrowed down and the data are analy-
sed agam If initial information is not satisfactory in view of the adjusted research 
question(s), the investigator may even have to return to the field and collect new or 
additional data before he can proceed with the analysis In this way, one cycle follows 
the other 
4 2.3 Objectivity of qualitative research· reliability and validity 
It must be noted that a qualitative research method as explained above is not beyond 
criticism Its major drawback concerns the impossibility of measuring the reliability 
and validity of the findings How can one determine whether the outcomes of 
qualitative research are tied to the idiosyncrasies and personal views of the researcher 
or interviewer, for example7 More than once, qualitative research has been taken to 
task for its subjectivity and arbitrariness (Swanborn 1990) And how about its 
validity? What can be proved on the basis of a close examination of only a few cases7 
Unlike quantitative research, qualitative analysis is not able to present exact calcula-
lions and standards on these matters. However, this does not imply that qualitative 
research is completely inadequate and that 'anything goes'. First we will deal with the 
question of reliability, and then discuss the validity of the present research. 
Reliability 
The problem of reliability is concerned with the control over and/or measurement of 
unsystematic research errors. Reliability may be defined as: the extent to which an 
experiment, test, or measuring procedure yields the same results on repeated trials 
(Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary). Swanborn (1990) considers those research 
outcomes as reliable which remain stable under replication of researcher, instruments 
and circumstances. All three aspects will be discussed below with respect to the 
present research. 
Reliability of the researcher If the same investigation would have been conducted by 
another researcher, would he had achieved the same results? In answering this 
question, which points to the problem of the so-called researcher's bias, we would 
like to address two forces which might have influenced the outcomes and conclusions 
of the research. These are the experience and skills on the part of the researcher in 
conducting in-depth interviews, and the researcher's foreknowledge and interests. 
On aspect of researcher bias with the potential to influence the research out-
comes is the extent of the researcher's previous experience in conducting interviews. I 
myself had some experience in conducting unstandardized in-depth interviews in a 
research context before the start of the present project. To further minimize the 
researcher's bias in this respect, some additional measures were taken. It has been 
noted earlier that unstandardized interviewing requires great skill on the part of the 
researcher, who must not only be an attentive listener but also a good 
conversationalist, able to keep a dialogue going. Regarding the aspect of careful 
listening, it was beneficial that the interviews were recorded on tape and transcribed 
literally, which was, by the way, a very time-consuming job. Tape-recording turned 
out to be particularly useful for detecting inconsistencies and partial answers of the 
interviewees which had been missed during the sessions. These inaccuracies have 
been corrected partially in the second round of interviews and, occasionally, through 
an additional telephone call with the entrepreneurs. 
With respect to the ability to keep the dialogue going, it was of great help that I 
supplemented the standard interview checklist with topics specific to every individual 
firm. These have been derived from annual reports as well as newspaper and 
magazine articles in which the businesses are mentioned or portrayed. Furthermore, I 
underwent a steep learning curve from one interview to the next. In sum, I feel that, 
due to the measures taken and the rapid learning effect, even more seasoned in-depth 
interviewers, all else being equal, would not have achieved different results. At most 
is it possible that a more experienced interviewer might have been able to buttress the 
conclusions more thoroughly. 
What might have influenced the outcomes and conclusions of the present 
research more significantly are the foreknowledge and/or interests of the researcher. 
The first round of interviews was aimed at obtaining information about a wide range 
of aspects on firm-environment relationships, in order to optimize the chance of 
detecting clues for the formulation of hypotheses. Therefore, the data probably 
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contain indications worthy of further investigation However, not all of these signs 
may have come to the forefront Some have simply been overlooked by the 
researcher, whereas others were noticed but underestimated The information selected 
for further elaboration may have been influenced by the researcher's idiosyncrasies, 
such as his foreknowledge and interests. 
Thus, the present research elaborates on the observation that the enterprises 
located outside of the Randstad, from the outset, sold their output mainly beyond the 
local business region on a national and even international scale. This is diametrically 
opposed to the regional orientation of the Randstad firms in the sample as well as to 
what is known from the literature Though I did not fail to notice this during the 
fieldwork, I was somewhat resentful of this discovery I was afraid of becoming 
saddled with confused findings and thus I did not attach much meaning to it at that 
time 1 only recognized its importance later when I suddenly yielded to an impulse to 
elaborate on the causes and consequences of this divergence in geographical sales 
orientation between successful central and peripheral firms Furthermore, apart from 
an emphasis on geographical sales linkages, the research focuses on the pre-existence, 
the foundation and the early-growth stage of the firms This might have been caused 
by my foreknowledge of and interest in the subject of new firm formation, gained 
from previous research experience (Vaessen 1986, Vaessen and Wever 1986) In sum, 
it cannot be ruled out that other researchers in my place, with other backgrounds and 
interests, such as labour market issues or subcontracting, would have come up with 
different outcomes and conclusions. However, this can hardly be a surprising 
conclusion, as this problem - the influence of the view of the researcher - is inherent 
to every kind of research, both qualitative and quantitative 
Reliability of the research instrument An indication about the reliability of the research 
instrument can be derived from a partial overlapping of the three types of questions 
used, which have been mentioned earlier This technique is sometimes referred to as a 
form of triangulation, a term introduced by Campbell (see Smaling 1987, 292) In 
addition to triangulation of interview questions, also member checks have been used 
This means that results and conclusions are presented to the respondents for verifica-
tion 
To what extent did the nature of the questions posed affect the answers given 
by the respondents and hence the outcomes of the research7 In the present research, 
the use of both informative questions (facts) and questions about opinions (attitudes) 
to assess the role of the production environment provides insight into the consistency 
of the respondents' answers. Thus, the general impression about the importance of 
the production environment on the basis of factual data is compared with the general 
picture which emerged from the entrepreneurs' opinions about this matter. Roughly 
speaking, these two images tend to correspond in that entrepreneurs whose firms 
maintain abundant linkages with their regional business environment (ie mainly 
Randstad firms) tend to attach more value to the influence of the regional production 
environment for business performance than entrepreneurs whose firms are less firmly 
interwoven regionally At least, this was suggested by the entrepreneurs' responses to 
two questions whether they thought they would have been as successful if their firms 
would have been located in another area of the country, and what they think of the 
proposition that production conditions are more favourable in the Randstad than 
elsewhere. Besides, this latter question tends to evoke an overreaction among the non-
Randstad entrepreneurs. They are inclined to approve every possible location except 
one in the Randstad. Anyhow, the Randstad entrepreneurs tended to view the 
locational range of tolerance or spatial margin for production in a more restricted way 
than the non-Randstad entrepreneurs (Vaessen 1989). 
However, this difference in valuation of the local production environment 
between regionally more and less tightly intertwined firms, respectively Randstad and 
non-Randstad firms, is ephemeral. It vanishes into thin air when the entrepreneurs 
reveal what they think the ultimate causes of their success are. Irrespective of their 
firm's location, the respondents point to either non-spatial external factors (market 
demand) or to factors internal to the firm, either their own personal characteristics or 
features of the organization as a whole. Thus, when directly asked to name the 
ultimate factors of success, locational conditions disappear completely from the 
picture. This contradicts the impression which emerges from the life histories of the 
firms on the basis of events placed in a chronological order. These overviews 
demonstrate that practically every firm investigated, whatever its spatial setting, has 
derived definite growth stimuli from its local business environment (Vaessen 1989). 
In sum, using various types of questions is a useful, albeit rough, method for 
estimating the extent to which the nature of the inquiries affect the answers given by 
the respondents. 
A second measure for controlling the reliability of the interviews is to hold 
member checks. This entails sending provisional research reports to all entrepreneurs 
interviewed, we requested them to verify the content by writing their remarks in the 
margin. They restricted their comments almost exclusively to the passages about their 
own firms, and they ignored the (tentative) conclusions. Thus, while insight has been 
gained about the extent of the entrepreneurs' approval of the empirical accounts of 
the interviews, this measure did not throw any light on their judgement of the 
researcher's interpretation of the empirical material. Of course, the entrepreneurs' 
approval of the research conclusions is a very weak measure of reliability (Swanborn 
1990), simply because the researcher's point of reference may be unfamiliar to the 
respondents. 
Reliability of the context Would the research outcomes be the same if the interviews 
had been conducted under different circumstances or at a different point in time? In 
response to this question we would like to address two issues which might have been 
of influence. These are the characteristics of the interviewees and the profitability 
situation of the firms at the moment the interviews took place. 
Eighteen interviews were conducted at 13 firms. It should be noted, however, 
that the interview scene differs from case to case. The number of respondents 
participating in an interview, the interviewees' involvement with the foundation of 
the firm, and the respondents' position and tasks in the firm are combined to form 
ten different interview situations. During the field work, we conducted: 
five interviews with an entrepreneur who started the business on his own; 
one interview with two directors who founded the firm; 
three interviews with a technical director, one of two head-starters; 
one interview with a one-man starter in the presence of the manager of a 
foreign subsidiary of the company; 
88 
one interview with a financial director who is not a head-starter but who is 
nevertheless narrowly involved in the formation process; 
one interview with a two managers who did not found the business; 
one interview with a general director who was not involved in the foundation 
of the firm; 
three interviews with a general manager who acted under the supervision of a 
general director at arm's length; 
one interview with a staff member who is responsible for the firm's public 
relations and who has been instructed by the general director (founder) after a 
list with questions had been sent; 
one interview with the son of the founder in a father and son-managed firm. 
Undoubtedly, it will influence the answers obtained whether one is seated across two 
respondents or only one: whether one talks to the general, the commercial or the 
technical director or whether one interviews the founder himself or (one of) his 
associate(s). On the other hand, however, this is likely to affect mainly expressions of 
opinions. Information about such matters as the previous work experience of the 
(other) head-starter, major breaking points or important occurrences in a firm's life 
history, the geographical extent of input and output linkages and the like seem to be 
accessible to all respondents interviewed, at least in broad outlines. Of course, it must 
be noted that the accuracy on some items may vary widely across the interviews. 
In addition to the characteristics of the interviewees, a second aspect of the 
reliability of the interview context is the firms' fortunes at the moment the conversa-
tions take place. It should be kept in mind that the first interview round took place 
when all sample businesses were experiencing high growth rates. Would the answers 
given have differed if the firms had been in decline? Though the text repeatedly 
refers to successful firms, it is actually about the good times at the date of the first 
interview. Thus, the question ought to run: will entrepreneurs give different answers 
about their relation with the environment and the reasons for their success when they 
are in trouble and looking back at their hey day? This might be true for their opinions 
about the causes and sources of the firms' success. However, there is no reason to 
believe that current prospects would have affected the answers to the informative 
questions. 
In sum, let us conclude this section about the survey's reliability with three 
remarks. First, qualitative research does not present such neat, exact figures and 
standards on reliability as quantitative research does. In qualitative research, it is not 
always possible to present the research process and the research outcomes in a way 
which makes it possible for other persons to check, to verify and to actually repro-
duce them. Secondly, this does not imply that qualitative research is completely 
inadequate and that anything goes. Smaling and Maso (1990, 21) propose a more 
realistic alternative standard for qualitative research, namely debatability and virtual 
reproducibility. This means that the researcher should give precise information about 
the methods and procedures used. In this context, Swanbom (1990, 69) refers to the 
criterion of explicitness. This is what we have tried to do in the present section and will 
attempt to continue in the remainder of this text. Thirdly, the factors which I feel 
detract from reliability, in the sense of reproducibility, are the idiosyncrasies of the 
researcher (both interview experience and personal views and interests) and of the 
interview situation. 
Validity 
Even if the research were to yield the same results on repeated trials, and the 
outcomes were perfectly reliable, this does not necessarily mean that they adequately 
reflect what is going on in reality. Imagine a thermometer with a deviant scale, which 
consistently and faithfully indicates the wrong temperature. This illustrates the 
problem of validity of the research findings; i.e., to what extent do the research 
outcomes adequately reflect real-world processes? However, there is more to it. 
According to Campbell and Stanley (1963) and in their footsteps Denzin (1978, 199), it 
is useful to distinguish whether this correspondence between research outcomes and 
reality focuses on the extent to which the outcomes and conclusions reflect upon the 
real nature of a process or its representativeness (or both). This distinction is often 
referred to in the methodological literature as internal versus external validity of 
research findings (Swanborn 1990). Internal validity refers to the adequacy and accu-
racy of results. External validity, on the other hand, refers to the problem of general-
izing the outcomes. 
Internal validity The assessment of internal validity is concerned with the quality of 
the scientific, causal or logical inferences. Mitchell (1983) defines this as the process of 
drawing conclusions about the essential linkage between two or more characteristics 
in terms of some systematic explanatory schemes. The long and the short of it is to 
eliminate alternative interpretations (Swanborn 1990). In quantitative research, this 
occurs through reasoning and empirical manipulation (i.e. controlling for or standardiz-
ing) in order to avoid spurious correlations. However, no firm criteria exist with 
which to judge when a relationship between variables has been demonstrated 
adequately. This value judgement has to be left to the scientific forum, i.e. to collea-
gues' opinions. 
The difficulty with much statistical research is that indicators are rarely specific 
enough to rule out ambiguity. Adequate explanation derives from an understanding 
of a process. In this regard, the fact that a relationship is statistically established does 
not speak for itself. Now, take quantitative explanatory models of regional differences 
in new firm formation rates. The interpretation of virtually every statistical association 
observed between a dependent and independent variable can proceed along different 
lines. For example, according to Storey (1982), home ownership may be directly 
relevant to new firm formation, because houses can be used as collateral in borrowing 
to finance new ventures. However, Ashcroft, Love and Malloy (1991) rightly remark 
that house ownership may also be serving as a general wealth proxy which could 
influence firm formation from the demand side (through more wealthy local markets) 
and/or through the supply side, since wealthy individuals would be more likely to 
have access to the funds required to set up a new firm. Similarly, a managerial back-
ground is considered to be important for new firm formation, because managers 
consider themselves to be more competent to start and run a new firm than blue-
collar workers (e.g. Cross 1981; Storey 1982; Ashcroft, Love and Malloy 1991). 
However, the present research suggests that managers are more likely to start a firm 
of their own because they maintain the bulk of the firm's contacts with the external 
environment. Therefore, they are in a much better position to observe market 
opportunities compared with manufacturing personnel (see also Chapter Seven). 
Many more instances of this lack of specificity in understanding the causes about the 
concomitant variation of two variables could be mentioned, which must be disconcert-
ing to policy-makers. And then we do not even raise the issue of whether the 
variables are measured appropriately. To this day, explanatory models in regional 
science explicate little more than positively established associations between regional 
differences in firm formation and performance characteristics of the environment. 
From that observation, these models, of which the centre-periphery approach is the 
clearest example, proceed to the simplest theoretical solution. And that is that 
environmental factors determine regional differences in economic performance and 
structure. A British economist once compared statistics to a bikini: exciting to look at, 
but the crucial issues are concealed. 
Qualitative research is assumed to have greater potential for buttressing the 
internal validity of its findings. Because of the researcher's extensive direct contacts 
with the subjects under investigation, he is in a position to lay bare the causal 
mechanisms of the relation between different characteristics. He is able to do so in 
greater detail than is possible in a quantitative research design. Two measures are 
particularly important in this context. These are thick description and the search for 
counterfactiial cases. A third measure, which is of equal importance in quantitative 
research, is the comparison of the findings with the outcomes of other investigations. 
By thick description, we mean a careful justification of the reasoning which links 
the data with the conclusions. The data gathered are depicted so as to retain the 
individuality of the answers given by the respondents. This means that the entrepre-
neurs' responses, including additional motivations, comments and clarifications, will 
be expressed either in their own words or will be briefly summarized. An important 
advantage of thick description is that the inevitable interpretation of the respondents' 
replies by the researcher remains open to external control. This contrasts with the 
preceded categories in standardized interviews or postal questionnaires, where the 
transformation of the respondents' disordered 'natural language' into the strongly 
regulated 'artificial language' of the researcher remains concealed from view. After 
all, the 'yes' of one entrepreneur need not to be the same as the 'yes' of another. 
A second procedure to validate the research outcomes is to take particular 
notice of the data which do not fit the assumed version of the events. Analysing 
disconfirming evidence and the search for counterfactual arguments can specify under 
what conditions a relationship between events may hold and under what conditions it 
does not. Eyles (1988) emphasizes repeatedly that in the process of validation it is 
important not to suppress evidence that does not fit. Within this context, the present 
study will pay particular attention to 'deviant' cases and data. 
However, it must be emphasized that internal validity is not sufficient. Present-
ing a full picture of one or a few cases is not interesting from a theoretical or from a 
policy point of view until attempts are made to place the cases studied in a wider 
context. Therefore, the researcher must make sure that he does not lose himself in the 
individuality of each case. The problem is how to live up to this; it is easier said than 
done. 
External validity The problem at issue under this heading is to what extent the 
research findings can be generalized across other cases which have not been studied. 
Undoubtedly, this is a strong point in favour of quantitative research methods. In a 
qualitative case study design, on the other hand, estimating the representativeness of 
the research outcomes is a precarious activity. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made 
to design a model of small-firm growth in contrasting regions, against which other 
cases might be checked. These claims for representativeness of the research findings 
rest on two pillars. The first is the coherence and logic of the arguments. Mitchell 
(1983, 198-200) argues that the process of inference to general propositions is always 
logical rather than statistical. Whether one is conducting quantitative or qualitative 
research, when analysing the results, one has to go beyond the sample and resort to 
theoretical thinking to link different characteristics together. According to Mitchell, 
case studies are just as good a basis for such inference as other kinds of study. The 
present study attempts to demonstrate that the findings might also apply in other 
cases by virtue of the logic of the inferences. 
A second measure gives some insight into the external validity of the outcomes. 
This involves comparing the results with the outcomes of other investigations, both 
confirming and disconfirming external evidence. 
Notwithstanding these measures, estimating the representativeness of qualitative 
research results remains precarious. Therefore, we must stress that generalization 
cannot be the objective of the present research. We can only present a possible solution 
to the research question, albeit one directly grounded in empirical observations. Only 
future research of a quantitative nature will be able to measure the actual representa-
tiveness or external validity of the research findings. Nevertheless, a qualitative 
research design has great potential for identifying and understanding causal mechan-
isms, due to the researcher's extensive direct contacts with the subjects under 
investigation. And that is what this thesis seeks, as expressed in the research objec-
tive; namely, to develop hypotheses about small-firm growth in contrasting envi-
ronments by obtaining in-depth knowledge about firm-environment interaction. In 
other words, a qualitative methodology has been chosen because of its internal 
validity, not its external validity. 
All in all, qualitative and quantitative research complement each other. Qualitat-
ive research is more appropriate for theory building and quantitative research is 
better equipped for theory testing. The methodologies are complementary rather than 
competitive. 
4.3 The sample 
Which businesses have been selected for the research and how was this selection 
made? First we will address the procedure used to select the firms investigated. Then 
We will present the output in the form of a brief description of the firms selected. 
4.3.1 Selection method 
Two main sources were used to track the successful small and medium-sized firms 
that were investigated within the scope of this PhD project. One is a 'hit parade' of 
the 25 fastest-growing small companies in the Netherlands. The other is a file of firms 
which once won business awards. The 'hit parade' was published annually between 
1986 and 1988 in the periodical 'Intermagazine'. The file of prize winners was 
compiled by the Department of Geography of the University of Nijmegen (Horvers 
and Wever 1987, 1989). These sources yielded ten enterprises. Additionally, three 
firms were traced via the business journal 'Het Financieele Dagblad'. So, in sum 13 
firms were selected for in-depth investigation2. 
The following criteria were used in making the actual selection: 
a. The firms had to be at least five years old. (This criterion was applied to make 
sure that no 'flash in the pan' was included.); 
b. The companies should have fewer than 500 employees; 
с There must have been a relative increase in turnover which is above average for 
the respective industrial category over the four years preceding the (first) inter­
view3; 
d. During the same period, the firm had to achieve an average net profit as a 
percentage of total sales (or alternatively of total assets) above the average in the 
same industrial category4; 
e. There must have been an annual increase in number of employees over the four 
years preceding the first interview. 
Furthermore, the resulting sample had to include both centrally and peripherally 
situated firms, so that quite different environments would be represented. Which 
firms appeared in the footlights after the selection procedure had been applied? 
4.3.2 Overview of the resulting sample 
This subsection gives a general overview of the sample. For a closer look at the firms 
selected, we refer the reader to the Appendix. Of the firms selected, all but one are 
high-technology companies. The sample included enterprises engaged in micro-elec­
tronics, metal components, synthetics, transport equipment, services related to 
computer software and hardware, telecommunication consultancy, and rental of 
temporary business accommodation. Most employees had enjoyed (technical) 
education at secondary level or higher. 
Four of the firms are located in the polycentric metropolis in the western part of 
the country, known as the Randstad Holland, which constitutes the national economic 
heartland. The other nine firms are located in the eccentrically situated and more 
rural northern, eastern and southern parts of the country (Figure 4.1). 
With regard to the age of the firms, one can distinguish between nine younger 
and four older enterprises. Of the younger companies, I was able to interview the 
founders. The age of these firms, at the date of the first meeting, varied between nine 
and 19 years. The other four enterprises were all established before 1950. Since the 
beginning of the research, ten of the firms have continued to operate independently, 
while two have been taken over by large multinational corporations and one by a 
private investment group. 
Whereas all 13 firms could be considered fast-growing companies at the 
beginning of 1988, by the end of 1991 five of them were in serious trouble and 
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running at a loss. One even went bankrupt and was out of business in the meantime. 
In the course of 1992, two more would follow. We will return to these latter firms in 
Chapter Seven. Without exception, they were engaged in computer-related activities. 
However, this sectoral bias does not justify any hasty conclusions (cf Section 7.4). 
4.3.3 The quality of the sample 
Before starting the selection procedure, I did not formulate any particular ideas about 
the sectoral composition of the sample (except that no agrigultural or retail trade 
firms should be selected), nor were any demands placed on the maximum age of the 
firms. Looking back, the sample comprises mainly medium and high-technology 
companies. Within that category, it covers a considerable range of different activities, 
including both manufacturing and service businesses. Moreover, the sample allowed 
mutual comparison of high-growth business service firms located in and outside the 
urbanized core area of the Netherlands. The influence of the quality of the production 
environment is assumed to emerge most clearly with these kind of activities, while at 
the same time the relatively wide variation in type of activities reduces the risk of 
intrusion of sectoral biases in the research findings. Another fortunate feature of the 
sample is that it contains relatively young firms, i.e. firms of which the founder could 
be interviewed. This is important, because certain elements of the entrepreneurs' 
career record preceding the start of their own firm turned out to be important in 
explaining the growth potential of a number of firms. 
However, also in retrospect, the composition of the sample has some shortco-
mings as well. First, only four Randstad firms have been investigated, whereas nine 
non-Randstad firms were included. No manufacturing firms in the Randstad were 
selected. Actually, in order optimally to measure the impact of the regional produc-
tion environment on small-firm growth, the two groups of firms - Randstad and non-
Randstad - should have been matched carefully. This should have occurred on the 
basis of type of activity, age and ownership. Yet even if I had been aware of this at 
the beginning of the project, I think that the search for appropriate firms would have 
been too time-consuming. Let me illustrate this. In order to find 13 firms that were 
willing to participate, I had to approach about six times as many companies. Those 
companies refused to cooperate for one of three reasons: they found the research too 
time-consuming; they considered the topic too confidential; or they did not comply 
with the selection requirements, on further consideration. 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings mentioned, close analysis of the firms 
selected yields valuable insights about firm-environment interaction in different 
production environments. On this basis, it was possible to formulate some interesting 
hypotheses concerning the role of the production milieu for individual business 
development. 
The next chapter, Chapter Five, pays close attention to how the nature of the 
production milieu affects the companies' environmental or external behaviour. 
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Figure 4.1 The Netherlands; the location of the firms investigated. 
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Notes 
1 In defining the boundaries of the business region, I stick to a circle of about 50 km 
around the firm. Some entrepreneurs use a slightly different measure for defining the 
home region, namely the administrative province they are located in. 
2 Ideally, it would have been more appropriate to investigate more than 13 businesses; 
about 25. However, the processes of selecting appropriate firms, writing letters to and 
making appointments with directors, and writing out the interviews conducted took so 
much time that this probably would not have been a viable proposition. Moreover, a 
large portion of the time available had to be reserved for developing a theoretical and 
conceptual framework. 
3 Sources: 
Annual reports provided individual sales figures; 
ERBO 1984-1987 (VVK) provided average sales figures for the respective industrial 
categories. 
4 Sources: 
Annual reports provide individual net profit figures; 
Statistiek famnaën onderitemingen (CBS 1990). This CBS publication supplies 
statistical information about balance sheets, income statements and distribution of 
income of the major enterprises with economic activities in industry, trade, 
transport and services. It should be noted that this inquiry excludes firms with a 
balance sheet total below 10.0 million guilders. Furthermore, for statistical data 
concerning the year 1991, the CBS periodical Statistisch Bulletin no. 15, 16-4-1992 
was used. 
Cìmpter Five 
Environmental responsiveness of small firms (I): 
its forms 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of the present chapter is to counterbalance the rejection of the individual 
small firm as a legitimate focus of attention in conventional regional science, includ-
ing the geography of enterprise. The bulk of economic geographic and regional 
economic research makes it appear as if small firms can only passively accept the 
conditions of the environment in which they are located. However, this picture is 
mainly the by-product of deductively derived and quantitatively tested theories about 
regional inequality and not the result of positive empirical research. This chapter 
serves to demonstrate that this perception of small firms is inadequate; at least that it 
is not a hard and fast rule. It intends to make visible what has been unjustly ignored 
hitherto in spatial research, namely, direct measuring of small-firm conduct towards 
environmental conditions, both opportunities and obstacles. More precisely formula-
ted, it attempts to characterize the interaction between small to medium-sized 
companies and their relevant environments. This formulation includes not only 
conscious but also unconscious actions which affect the position of the firm in relation 
to its production environment. This should be kept in mind every time the word 
strategy is used in this text. 
In describing organizational actions, this chapter makes use of the classification 
scheme developed in Chapter Three. In that chapter, external organizational behav-
iour was categorized according to its impact on the ties and mutual influences be-
tween organization and environment. Four basic 'strategies' have been mentioned, i.e. 
manipulation, immunization, adaptation, and utilization. It is valuable to point out 
that this classification was 'developed' (i.e. partly borrowed from Prakken 1987) after 
the interviews were conducted. So, to be perfectly clear, the interviews were not 
deliberately designed in advance to find particular classes of organizational responses 
towards the environment, and certainly not to test the validity of this particular 
classification. What I endeavoured when I had gathered the empirical material was to 
grasp and report as adequately as possible from the directors' accounts what was 
basically going on with respect to the relationship between firm and environment. 
The present chapter is organized around the factors of production, i.e. labour, 
financial means, material supplies, services, and customers. The process of acquisition 
of these resources will be described and interpreted in terms of the strategies 
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mentioned above. 
5.2 Coping with the labour market 
It is widely assumed that local labour markets of metropolitan and large industrial 
centres are often a source of important economies of agglomeration in production. It 
is anticipated that the proximity of many firms facilitates the fluid deployment of 
labour among firms, allowing the firms to meet their labour requirements easily and 
at low costs from within the local labour market. Angel (1989; 1991), Oakey and 
Cooper (1989) and others have found indications that firms in dense agglomerations 
can meet the majority of their labour demands by hiring workers with considerable 
occupation-specific experience. This pattern holds for professionals and highly skilled 
technicians as well as for low-skilled production workers. Businesses in remote 
locations, by contrast, either have to make do with workers at the entry level, 
generating requisite skills and experience in-house, or they must attract suitable 
workers from beyond the local labour market (Angel 1991; 1989; Oakey and Cooper 
1989). Malecki and Bradbury (1992) note, however, that employers have found it 
difficult to recruit, transfer and relocate highly skilled and experienced workers to 
peripheral locations. In sum, such labour market inefficiencies are considered to be 
significantly detrimental to the competitiveness of high-technology firms, and 
especially to the competitiveness of small start-up Arms (Angel 1991; Oakey 1984; 
1985). 
On the other hand, Angel notes that the pattern of labour-market activity in dense 
production complexes, such as Silicon Valley, is not without its disadvantages. The 
rapid labour turnover in these agglomerations makes producers lose key personnel, 
who accept job offers from competing firms (Angel 1991, 1509). However, for the 
majority of (small) producers in Silicon Valley, this loss of personnel to other busi-
nesses is apparently counterbalanced by the ability to recruit skilled and experienced 
workers from the local labour market (ibid, 1511). 
Against this background we place the anecdotes of the labour recruitment 
behaviour and human resource management of the firms in the survey. Since the 
sample contains centrally as well peripherally located successful young high-technol-
ogy businesses, the question is, how do these firms deal with the advantages and 
disadvantages of the local labour market? 
5.2.1 Manipulation 
Investigation of the directors' accounts reveals at once a considerable divergence 
between reality and the basic image provided by location theory of small firms unable 
to counteract against their surroundings. This subsection shows the tactics by which 
the sample firms exert influence on the labour market. These include modifying the 
external labour supply, enticing the labour force with attractive terms of employment, 
using intermediate agents as a leverage towards the labour market, and wielding the 
firm's prestige and reputation. 
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Modifying 
In 1979, J. Weishaupt and J. Bijsterbosch started their testhouse for electronic circuits 
in Heerde, i.e. Rood Testhouse. Heerde is a rural nucleus in the far north of the 
province of Gelderland. Shortly after founding the business the founders were 
confronted with a lack of 'testing skills' in the labour market. Weishaupt: "Few people 
could be found who had prior work experience with 'testing'. This means that education had to 
take place on the job. We established relations with the HTS (Technical College) in Zwolle 
[20 km] and we began to attract students on work placements. We broke these people in while 
doing their work placements and we could take advantage of the opportunity to select the most 
eligible ones. At present obtaining suitable workers is not much of a problem anymore." In 
this way Bijsterbosch and Weishaupt to some extent created the requisite labour 
supply which they could not find. 
Nedap (detection systems) takes a similar route. Although director Westendorp is 
not dissatisfied with local labour supply, he made some critical comments regarding 
the degree of motivation. This criticism was aimed at the educational institutes from 
which Nedap recruits new personnel. "I would like the teachers to make the students more 
eagerly. We make extensive use of students on work placements, on average 30 students a 
year. While tliey are doing their teaching practice here, we try to make them enthusiastic for 
working in our firm, and meanwhile we select the best ones. " Also Bronkhorst High Tech 
(gas flowmeters) regularly recruits new employees from students on work place-
ments, both on a secondary and a tertiary level of education. Engaging students on 
work placements, breaking them in in the firm, and trying to recruit them when they 
finish their study and enter the labour market is an example of how small firms may 
organize (local) labour supply. 
A related method of how firms may modify (selected) segments of the local 
labour force before actually trying to enlist particular workers is displayed by several 
businesses in the sample which are engaged in information technology. These are 
System House Comdes, Waterland Automation (both computer software engineering), 
Intercai (telematics consultancy), and Infotheek (computer trade). As System House 
Comdes was growing rapidly in the early and mid-1980s, the founders Quekel and 
Kragtwijk were increasingly confronted with a shortage of automation experts within 
the labour market. At one point they decided to hire unemployed academics and 
people who had enjoyed higher vocational education. By means of additional in-
service training, they then tried to impart the requisite automation skills to the newly 
hired workers. As a by-product the company gained know-how about training and 
schooling of personnel. When sufficient experience had accumulated, the Comdes 
management decided to commercialize this know-how by providing educational 
services in the field of computer sciences to other organizations. One of Comdes's 
clients is the Local Employment Exchange (GAB). Now, a situation has developed 
whereby the company takes highly educated though unemployed people and makes 
them suitable for work in its own kind of business at the expense of the GAB. A great 
advantage to Comdes is that the firm has first choice and ample opportunity in 
selecting the most appropriate students and offering them a job. Comdes is able to 
hire a substantial number of new workers via its Elementary Course in Automation 
(BOA). 
Similarly, Waterland Automation, in its heyday, made use of unemployed, highly 
educated people who were registered with the local GAB. In those days, a shortage of 
eligible employees was the most significant factor curbing the growth of the firm. 
Schoneveld, in 1988: "If you ask me wluit dampens our growth, then the answer is shortage 
of suitable manpower. " According to Schoneveld, the firm had to refuse jobs offered 
because it lacked sufficient manpower. Cooperation with the local Employment 
Exchange was one of several endeavours to tackle this problem. Schoneveld: "In 
cooperation with the Local Employment Exclumge we retrain people who have enjoyed higher 
education in directions whicli offer no future prospects for employment. These persons have to 
be trained from scratch. We used to start with a group of 15 persons. It is the aim of the 
project that Waterland will engage one-third of those who complete the course. Actually, we 
employ all persons who have finished the course; about one-third drop out during the training. 
By the way, we are talking about lower-order functiotis of the firm, tlie programmers. We Іш е 
been doing this now for three years and I am satisfied with the project. " 
In 1986 director Kivits of Intercai was requested by the GAB for Maastricht and 
its surrounding area to provide a one-year telematics consultancy course for unem­
ployed academics and people with a higher vocational training. While the Local 
Employment Exchange financed the course, Intercai took care of the subject matter 
and the organization of the training. According to Donders, by 1990 Intercai itself 
already attracted about ten people from the course out of the 100 persons who had 
taken it. 
A final example of modifying skills on the local labour market is provided by 
Infotheek. In 1989 the company together with four other leading Dutch automation 
companies announced the foundation of a new sectoral interest group which will be 
aimed at monitoring the quality of automation courses and trainings in the Nether­
lands. This initiative has been taken in order to combat the morbid growth and 
bungling in the field of automation education and their adverse influence on the 
quality of the labour market (Het Financieele Dagblad, 25-1-1989). 
Terms of employment 
The businesses studied do not only affect the labour supply through providing 
education and training courses for the external labour force. They also exert their 
influence more directly by offering attractive conditions of employment to potential 
workers, either financial or fringe benefits or both. When Intercai reached a size of 
about 50 employees, director Kivits wanted to strengthen the managing staff with a 
second director. He succeeded in attracting Mr. H. Waalboer - "tlie best one can find in 
the Netherlands in the field of telecommunication consultancy", according to Kivits - away 
from Alcatel-Holland. He attracted him not by paying premium wages but merely by 
offering better fringe benefits. Kivits: "At Intercai, Waalboer earns exactly the same salary 
as he did at Alcatel. With us he is no better off, not even a single guilder. Wlmt does count is 
tint he has acquired more freedom and responsibility by joining Intercai. And that is what we 
intend to give our employees in general, freedom and responsibility. Furthermore, they have 
the opportunity to buy Intercai shares, and we offer other benefits in order to make employees 
feel comfortable. " 
Director Vissers of System House Comdes also pointed out the role of fringe 
benefits in obtaining access to the external labour market. In response to complaints 
by director Vissers about the constrained capacity of the regional labour market, I 
asked him whether this situation is harmful to the performance of System House 
Comdes. Vissers: "This is only a modest problem for us since we are situated on the right 
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side of 's-Hertogenbosch, with good road connections with the Randstad, and on the other 
hand we work out of a magnificent office building with many conveniences. People can do 
their job here very comfortably; parking is no problem, we have ample parking space, and our 
office is very accessible. " 
By the way, offering good fringe benefits in itself may not be adequate to attract 
the entire staff, and additional means may prove necessary. For example, though 
Intercai did succeed in hiring Waalboer because of favourable fringe benefits, this 
does not mean that other top personnel has been captured in this way too. The 
remark of staff member Donders that "as the company grows, it can catch tlie bigger fish " 
is indicative of a different way to induce professionals to move from their previous 
employer to Intercai, i.e. the wage lever. This occurred in the case of Mr. F.M. van der 
Voort; this third holding director, who is responsible for the internationalization of 
the firm, was drawn away from Ericsson-Holland Oocated in Rijen, at a distance of 
129 km from Geleen). Another instance was the case of Mr. C.H. Kouwenhoven, who 
is responsible for the development of the Dutch subsidiaries commercially, and also 
for public relations and advertising domestically as well as internationally. 
Kouwenhoven was previously director of a software company in Rotterdam (Het 
Financieele Dagblad 8-8-1992), which is at a distance of about 180 km from Geleen1. 
The financial 'crowbar7 has also been wielded by director Vissers of the Comdes 
Group. Under the regime of Quekel and Kragtwijk, Comdes hired its workers mainly 
(about 90 percent) from the local business region, i.e. the province of Brabant2. In 1989 
Comdes was taken over by the investment group Modalfa, and a new managing 
director, Mr. Vissers, came to the helm. At that point, the course changed rather 
drastically. Vissers was not impressed by the abilities and skills of a number of staff 
members of the Old Guard. Through a major reorganization, he wanted to raise the 
quality of the firm's services and lift the company's functioning to a more pro-
fessional level. Director Vissers: "I have tried to remove the weak core of employees. I 
replaced the entire management of the [six] business units, except one, and 75 per cent of the 
middle management [project managers] by hiring new people from outside." In concrete 
terms, Vissers is talking about ten executives who have been supplanted. Apart from 
that the new Comdes director acquired 44 new employees for lower positions (after 
reducing the original number of employees from about 160 to 116). To acquire new 
management staff, Vissers called in headhunter agencies. Vissers: "I gave them a profile 
of which type of workers i wanted and I told them also which companies I would prefer the 
new managers to come from. " It stands to reason that to achieve this, Vissers had to 
manipulate the labour market by offering additional financial inducements. These 
were amply supplied by the new owner, i.e. the substantial investment group 
Modalfa/Mobeta Ltd. Applicants for lower positions were enlisted via advertise-
ments. 
Leverage 
Yet another strategy in operating on the local labour market to acquire suitable staff is 
by using intermediate agents as a lever for gaining better access to the labour market. 
Hulo International (transport equipment), for example, maintains good relations with 
relevant local training and education institutes. Director Meeus: "if one has good 
connections with the director of the Technical College in Arnhem [15 km], or with the 
director of the Intermediate Technical School in Doetinchem [25 km], ¿Í is always possible to 
get, on request, some suitable people [i.e. students] in one's office for an interview." One 
step further is the incorporation of people from the field of education into the Super-
visory Board or even into the Executive Board of Directors, as is the case with part-
time professors, for example. They might be motivated to bend and influence the 
stream of graduates in the direction of the enterprise. Infotheek, Rood Testhouse and 
Elephant Industries have professors in their Supervisory Board. Director Brouwers of 
Elephant Industries indicates that he has acquired scientists via this channel. 
Brouwers: "Graduates from universities iiave joined our company because of such contacts 
with universities." These examples illustrate that organizations need not resign 
themselves passively to local labour force constraints. They may play an active role 
within the labour market and try to influence its disposition in favour of the firm's 
requirements. 
Prestige and reputation 
Apart from purposeful actions, such as supplying external training or providing 
tempting employment conditions, an organization can influence the external labour 
force in its favour in yet another way. This alternative may be less direct or purposi-
ve, but not necessarily less effective. I am referring to the way an organization wields 
its prestige. This point arises most clearly in the interview with director K. 
Groenendijk of Groenendijk pic (letting of makeshift accommodation). When asked 
whether his business experiences difficulty in attracting new employees, Groe-
nendijk's answer was: "I know tliat there are complaints in our line of business about this 
matter. However, it hardly gives us any problems. It is said tlmt títere is a shortage of drivers, 
but we do not notice it in our firm... the reason for this is the business's reputation." 
Likewise director Meeus of Hulo International (transport equipment) brought up 
the point of the firm's image in acquiring new employees. It appears that Hulo 
International is regularly approached by people who would like to join the company 
as an employee. Meeus: "They simply find it fascinating to work for us." A major reason 
for this attraction of the firm to the (local) labour force is, according to Meeus, the 
captivating product it makes. Meeus: "one can choose to be engaged in the production of 
dull hose-pipes for vacuum cleaners or of more risky [challenging] machines." Hulo's 
transport and logistic systems, special handling equipment, robot manipulators and 
related appliances are custom-built and Meeus regularly calls them 'solutions' to 
customers' logistic problems. 
Director Van Leenen brought the image of his firm, Infotheek, to the fore in 
response to a question concerning labour turnover. Van Leenen: "Sometimes staff 
members are bought away from us, though at present less frequently than formerly. I think 
tltat the prominence of our company due to its quotation on tlie Stock Exclmnge gives us 
greater possibilities to retain our personnel." Also Schoneveld and Haakmeester (both of 
Waterland Automation) noted that people find it interesting to work for Waterland, 
although they do not always possess the right qualities. 
The role of prestige is also underscored in the literature. Thompson (1967) states 
that: "Acquiring prestige is the 'cheapest' way of acquiring power. To the extent that 
an environmental element finds it prestigeful to exchange with an organization, the 
organization has gained a measure of power over that element without making any 
commitments; i.e. it has gained power without yielding power" (Thompson 1967, 33). 
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He refers to Perrow (1961) who concludes that if an organization and its products are 
well regarded, it may more easily attract personnel, influence relevant legislation, 
wield informal power in the community, and ensure adequate numbers of clients, 
customers, donors, or investors. Perrow sees the creation and maintenance of a 
"favourable image of the [hospital] organization in its salient publics" as an important 
way of controlling dependency (see Thompson 1967, 33). 
The foregoing shows (some of) the tools that small and medium-sized enterprises 
may have at their disposal to influence the disposition of the external labour market 
in favour of the organization. At the same time it suggests that one has to be cautious 
when interpreting complaints by directors of small and medium-sized enterprises 
about labour shortages. At first sight these might be recorded and understood merely 
as constraints of the production environment. However, upon closer scrutiny, these 
complaints may reveal important organizational weaknesses as well. Rather than real 
external inadequacies they might reflect the firms' weak competitive position within 
the labour market and their inability to generate sufficient applicants on their own. 
And it is this internal dimension which tends to be overlooked in the quantitative 
research tradition of regional science. 
5.2.2 Immunization 
Although the businesses investigated demonstrated some ability to manipulate 
(sections of) the external labour market to benefit their own requirements, this often 
proved to be insufficient. In the first place, it may not be practicable to influence all 
workers before they enter the firm. It may be too expensive, for example, to lure 
away from competitors or other enterprises every single worker needed who is not 
ready available in the labour market by dangling the purse in front of him. In the 
second place, even if an entrepreneur has succeeded in inducing the (type of) workers 
which, given the situation in the labour market and the financial capacity of the firm, he had 
in mind to join the firm, he is not there yet. After all, these new employees may not 
all be brought into action at once. Consequently, entrepreneurs, if they want to retain 
or improve their current market position, often have to take additional measures 
which make their firms relatively insensitive to inadequacies or deficiencies of the 
external labour supply. Two forms of immunization could be observed from the 
interviews: namely, what has been labelled (internal) integration and rationing in 
Chapter Three. 
Integration 
One measure is to compensate for a certain lack of skills or know-how by internal 
education and training. And indeed, from the interviews it becomes abundantly clear 
that the firms studied are or were heavily engaged in training and education of new 
and existing personnel, although not every firm gives exact figures on investments in 
human resources. Director Vissers of System House Comdes assessed that the costs of 
training programmes would amount to somewhere between 3000 and 4000 guilders 
per employee annually from 1992 onwards. This is 2100 to 3100 guilders in excess of 
average costs of training programme in medium-sized commercial businesses in 1990 
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in the Netherlands (CBS 1992, Table 2). For programmers, this training consists of 
technical courses in new programming techniques, whereas sales staff take courses on 
new sales methods. For the management staff, structural schooling expenditures are 
even higher, from 8000 to 10,000 guilders per manager. This is mainly because Vissers 
includes the expenditures for visiting symposia and seminars among training costs. 
The bulk of training costs consist of indirect costs, i.e. the costs of lost working hours. 
For internal company training programmes, Comdes uses its own training unit, which 
also operates on the commercial market. Direct training costs, on the other hand, 
consist of payments for courses which Comdes contracts out to external agents. 
Vissers mainly farms out external training programmes to computer firms like IBM 
and DEC, or to software firms like Progress and Uniface. By the way, in 1990 and 
1991 schooling costs for the Comdes Group were even higher. Vissers estimated that 
he was going to spend about 1.2 million guilders per year in this two-year period. Per 
employee this would mean education expenditures of about 6000 to 8000 guilders, 
according to Vissers. These huge expenditures for education in the years 1990 and 
1991 were mainly because of a major reorganization the firm went through in this 
period. Vissers: "In 1989 we decided to drop developing software for Wang computers, which 
was until then our sole hardware base. This means tlmt we have to retrain our personnel to be 
capable of working in the IBM/AS 400 environment, in the DEC environment and in a Unix 
environment. This training takes place partly Ітеге at our office and partly at the sites of the 
hardware firms." 
Similarly, under the regime of Vissers's predecessors, Quekel and Kragtwijk, who 
founded the Comdes Group, the firm spent much money on training their human 
resources, not only on teaching programming techniques and principles, but also on 
developing the communication skills of the workers. Kragtwijk: "We are particularly in 
need of employees who are communicative and who are good at dealing with people. For that 
we have developed separate courses." Kragtwijk and Quekel did train their workers in 
holding conversations, in chairing meetings, in giving lectures and so on. Kragtwijk: 
"Doing business is a matter of confidence, which one must be able to radiate". 
Also director Schoneveld of Waterland Automation declares that inadequate 
know-how of programming techniques is not the main deficiency of new personnel. 
In the first interview - April 1988 - Schoneveld said: "The most important problem we 
have is education. I mean the whole course which is needed to clarify the function a software 
package fulfils in a business compa?iy, and how people in client firms make use of it. One lias 
to realize that every new staff member costs us 80,000 to 100,000 guilders before he is fruitful. 
I find that the subjed of administrative science and how to apply it in practice should become 
obligatory in a whole range of fields of study." Schoneveld was convinced that such a 
measure would considerably diminish Waterland's expenditures on additional on-the-
job training of new personnel, and would make them more useful, more quickly. 
Furthermore, Schoneveld found that new employees' knowledge of automation is not 
up-to-date. 
In addition to these structural education costs, Waterland, just like Comdes, 
occasionally has even still higher training costs. In 1985 director Schoneveld started a 
reorganization of Waterland Automation. Schoneveld intended to evolve greater 
specialization in developing software packages for computerized control of logistic 
processes in manufacturing production. This is supposed to improve, according to 
Schoneveld, "Waterland's visibility in the market". By 1988, when Waterland Automa-
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tion was suffering losses, the specialization strategy was intensified. The core 
business, i.e. developing software packages in the field of logistics automation, was 
strengthened and extended vertically, both upstream (i.e. automation consultancy) 
and downstream (after-sales services). Another reorganization measure was to achieve 
better standardization of workers' programming practices. To implement these and 
other measures, the whole organization had to be retrained, partially in-house and 
partially elsewere. In 1988 and in 1989, employees of Waterland Automation spent on 
average no less then 10 per cent of their working hours on education. Schoneveld 
explicitly wanted to carry out the reorganization through retraining existing workers 
instead of acquiring new personnel. The organization's management even received 
additional schooling in how to initiate and guide the reorganization process. Schone­
veld: "Омг polio/ is to realize tlie entire reorganization with our own employees. Of course in 
a number of cases this will be more expensive tMn attracting new people from outside who 
have more appropriate know-how. However, knowledge is not the whole point, settling into an 
organization is an equally important aspect. It requires in some cases much time before new 
people are productive. This also applies to workers with appropriate expertise; they come from 
a different organization characterized by a divergent business culture. Before they have 
adopted our culture, valuable time is lost." This decision was also inspired by bad 
experiences with acquiring new personnel in the past. Existing staff members felt 
their position in the firm was threatened and decided to leave. Schoneveld: "For a type 
of business like ours, it is very important tluit labour turnover is as low as possible" (see 
box). 
Intercai (telematics consultancy) also has to supplement the skills of newly 
acquired and existing personnel with additional internal education in order to avoid 
becoming negatively affected by conditions on the labour market. Though the firm 
mainly requires highly experienced consultants (Director Kivits: "Shell or the Amster­
dam Stock Exchange do not pay us to be advised by people who have just graduated. These 
organizations require top consultants, the best tliey can get in this field. "), it is not able to 
select exclusively this kind of workers. Intercai also hires junior staff at the entry 
level. Kivits: "Otherwise salaries are prohibitive. " Furthermore, Kivits says: "I could use 
20 or 30 workers who are specialized in some subsectors of telematics consultancy, but 
unfortunately they cannot be found in the Netlierlands. So we have to brgely create them by 
ourselves, through giving them the opportunity to build up expertise". Fellow worker 
Donders estimates that two-thirds of all new personnel has already gained substantial 
experience in the field of consultancy during their previous work experience. Inexpe­
rienced, newly appointed junior employees are exempted from any productive task 
during the first two months on their new job. However, it takes two years before they 
have become full consultants. In the 1988 interview, Kivits indicated that in-house 
education consists "partially of on-the-job training, and partially of courses which we give 
them ourselves. " To shorten the breaking in period of new personnel, Intercai started a 
new experiment in the field of education of human resources in 1989. Some six newly 
appointed, highly educated employees at the entry stage were offered the opportunity 
to take a six-month, full-time training programme. This course was developed by the 
education unit of Intercai. Donders has the impression that the learning process is 
more efficient in a structured education programme than by means of training and 
supervision on the job. While he is not able to present evidence, Donders feels that 
employees who have followed the full-time training course can more easily tackle 
Box: Costs of rapid labour turnover 
These observations of director Schonevcld indicate that David Angel in his previously 
mentioned article on High-technology agglomeration and the local labour market did not fully cover 
the disadvantages of rapid labour turnover. Angel refers only to the damaging effect of the 
loss of expertise of frequent interfirm mobility of personnel, which, by the way, would be 
counterbalanced by the easy influx of skilled and experienced workers in dense production 
complexes (Angel 1991, 1511). Director Schoneveld, however, adds to this other harmful 
influences of intensive labour turnover. He mentions the costly break-in period of new 
personnel, which is all the more difficult because these workers have often previously worked 
in a different corporate culture. According to director Westendorp of Nedap (electronic 
detection systems), Westendorp: "changing people and unlearning them things is more difficult for 
us than teaching them something new." 
Furthermore, Schoneveld points to the negative and threatening effects newly hired, highly 
qualified employees may exert on existing employees, especially when the former occupy 
higher-order functions, which the latter feel passed over for. Schoneveld also complains about 
the loss of customers that occurs because of high labour turnover. Employees who leave the 
firm to start a business of their own often tend to take customers with them. The case of 
Casolith Sheets (acrylics products) shows that customers not only stick to employees who leave 
their supplier (of computer software) to start a new business, but also to employees who only 
move from one employer to another. 
And it is director Jouwsma of Bronkhorst High Tech (electronic flowmeters) who mentions 
yet another destructive effect of rapid labour turnover, namely, poor and disruptive customer 
service. Bronkhorst High Tech uses IBMcomputer hardware. For software development, IBM 
refers clients to a company in Diemen, which lies a stone's throw from Amsterdam. While the 
Diemen company should have completed its task for Bronkhorst by July 1987, at the dates 
interviews took place, i.e. early 1988 and early 1990, this had still not occurred. An important 
reason for this delay is the disruption of the software services related to Bronkhorst, because 
the executive computer scientists did not stick to the Diemen company. In the 1988 conversa­
tion, Jouwsma said: "Νσιυ we are dealing with the third executive of that firm. We have to keep 
explaining over and over exactly what we want than to do. " Two years later, the project was still 
not ready; again, another computer scientist was engaged with it. According to Jouwsma it 
took three months before the new executive picked up the thread where his predecessor was. 
Jouwsma was furious at the Diemen company: "Й is little less than scandalous .... It is a menace, I 
can tell you that." If other clients of the firm in Dicmen have complaints similar to those of 
Bronkhorst, the damaging effect of rapid labour turnover may be fatal to the automation 
company. 
A final disadvantage of high labour to be mentioned here, is that it adversely affects 
companies' training and education efforts. Reich (1989, 24) writes: "The restlessness of U.S. 
workers creates centres of technology like Route 128 around Boston and Silicon Valley in 
California, but it intends to discourage investment in human capital." 
On the basis of these and other examples, one may wonder if Angel is underestimating the 
disadvantages of rapid labour turnover in dense production complexes when he states that the 
loss of personnel to other businesses is apparmtly counterbalanced by the agglomeration 
advantage of easy influx of new skilled and experienced workers from the local labour market. 
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tasks by themselves. 
So it appears that by means of in-service training, Intercai seeks to secure the 
quality of its work in spite of some shortcomings of the external labour supply. For 
the recruitment of the eight division managers that Intercai needed, the firm relied on 
the external labour market for only three. The other five division managers were re-
cruited from its own ranks. Intercai has established internal job ladders, up which 
selected workers can advance and gain management experience. 
Bronkhorst High Tech, manufacturer of electronic flowmeters, provides another 
telling example of how internal education prevents businesses from becoming 
adversely affected by deficiencies of external labour supply. Director Jouwsma: 
"Newly graduated electronic engineers cannot be used immediately, because, for example, they 
don't know anything about flowmeters. Or if I would ask them to make a 'print', they would 
not know how to do it. They are simply not practically educated. We actually have to educate 
them ourselves. After six months' in-service training they are able to work in our firm." 
When asked whether this situation dampens the growth of the firm, Jouwsma 
answered: "In the beginning it did, because while one staff worker was teaching the other, 
together they produced too little output. Yes, at the outset this situation did cause a problem. 
Wlien the firm became bigger, however, we could afford a separate education official. Now, it 
does not cause problems anymore. " Furthermore, Jouwsma indicated that apart from the 
education official, he himself teaches courses to employees, every Thursday afternoon. 
By the way, the education official was recruited internally. Jouwsma: "He is the very 
first employee we engaged. He bwws everything, and he enjoys working here. " 
Similarly, the other firms investigated are or were heavily engaged in internal 
education of human resources. Casolith Sheets (acrylics products), for example, 
spends about 100,000 guilders per year on training its staff. This amounts to about 
690 guilders per employee. For medium-sized firms (size class 100 to 500 employees) 
in manufacturing industry as a whole, the average equivalent figure would be only 
about 350 guilders (calculated on the basis of figures from CBS 1992). And director 
Spoelstra even excludes an amount of 300,000 guilders, which is invested in auality 
circles, because this is an incidental expenditure. Nedap (electronic detection systems) 
spends two per cent of direct labour costs on education and training of employees 
(Nedap 1988, 23). For industrial firms within the size class of 100 to 500 employees, 
this figure amounts to a mere 0.8 per cent (CBS 1992, Table 3). At Bronkhorst High 
Tech in 1990, 32 staffmembers followed an external course in addition to the extensive 
internal training programme. These 32 employees represent at least 0.7 participants in 
(external) training programmes per employee. This figure in itself is far in excess of a 
mere 0.09 participants in (internal and external) training programmes per employee in 
small manufacturing firms (size class five to 100 employees) as a whole (Statistisch 
Bulletin 13-2-1992, 6). Just for the record, training efforts of firms cannot always be 
interpreted as compensation for deficiencies of the external labour force. Director 
Groenendijk of Groenendijk pic (transport and letting of makeshift accommodation), 
as well as director Brouwers of Elephant Industries (precious metal dental products), 
also have to provide additional in-service training; nevertheless, they are content with 
the local external labour supply and acquisition of new employees. Director Aalberts 
of Aalberts Industries (supplier of tailor-made metal products) says: "We prefer new 
Junior Technical School graduates at C-level, who are prepared to undergo additional in-house 
training. " According to director Westendorp of Nedap, it is impossible for an educa-
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tional institute to turn out ready-made workers, because every firm has its own 
peculiarities, which it has to impart to employees by itself. Westendorp even takes the 
argument a step further: '7 would not advise educational colleges to try to do so. Probably 
they would do things a little different from our own method. Well, changing people and 
unlearning them things is more difficult for us than teaching them something new. " So, for 
several reasons and within certain limits, firms might prefer training staff in-house to 
hiring highly experienced workers from outside, irrespective of their availability on 
the labour market (see box). 
Anyway, the firms studied do not resign themselves to mismatches between 
qualities offered by the labour force on the one hand and requirements of the 
business on the other hand. As such, in-service education and on-the-job training are 
tactics which can be applied to compensate for inadequacies of the external labour 
market. 
Rationing 
From a strictly spatial or regional point of view, firms can make themselves immune 
to inadequacies or shortcomings of the local labour market in another way. They can, 
to a certain extent, retreat from or bypass the local labour market and try to get access 
to extra-regional labour markets. From the experiences of the businesses examined, 
two methods can be inferred. One is that attempts are made to attract people from 
outside the local business area to the firm. Director Vissers (System House Cotndes) 
provides the clearest example of this tactic. When he cannot find sufficiently pro-
fessional computer programmers and managers within the local business environ-
ment, which is 's-Hertogenbosch and its surrounding area (50 km radius), he succeeds 
in attracting them from the Randstad. Vissers: "I have tried to find, tiiem in the local 
environment, within a radius of 50 km. I did not succeed. Ultimately I think 30 per cent of 
the new personnel comes from within this radius of 50 km and 70 per cent from outside this 
circle." This holds for both higher and lower-level personnel. Vissers: "The problem 
with the present local business region is tlmt too few professional, highly qualified software 
system houses are located in this area. There are four or five good enterprises in Eindhoven 
[32 km], but that's the end of it." Most new employees appear to come from cities in 
the Randstad: Utrecht (55 km), Rotterdam (80 km) and other places. 
Staff worker Donders observes that the local response to recent employment advertise-
ments of Intercut Geleen in national papers has diminished. Nonetheless, this does 
not affect the firm, since this trend has been balanced by a growing response from 
outside the province of Limburg. From the two interviews conducted at Intercai 
Geleen, it can be inferred that the number of workers who come from within the 
province of Limburg decreased between 1988 and 1990 from about 85 per cent to 
about 60 per cent. And though this is not a conscious strategy, its effect remains the 
same; namely, reducing the firm's vulnerability to the situation within the local labour 
market. 
Nearly the entire top and middle management of Elephant Industries, about 20 
persons, come from places within the Randstad (35 km distance and over). They have 
been acquired in several ways. Some have been found by directly phoning educa-
tional institutes to request suitable applicants; some have been acquired via advertise-
ments; some academics approached Elephant Industries via existing contacts between 
their university and Brouwer's firm; others asked director Brouwers for a slot in his 
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firm after they had attended a lecture by Elphant Industries. Recently the firm called 
in an acquisition and selection bureau in Rotterdam (100 km) to track down suitable 
staff members for Elephant Industries. Furthermore, Brouwers says: "But many of those 
people coming pom Amsterdam, Zaanstad, and the Randstad, after a while, decide tltey are 
going to live here too, and then they move to Hoorn. " 
As an alternative to bringing distant workers to the firm, extra-regional labour 
markets may be addressed by bringing the firm to the workers. This is a strategy 
frequently described in articles on the location of high-tech activities (see for example 
Keeble 1986; 1988; Perry, Dean and Brown 1986). Complete relocation of a firm for 
reasons of labour market considerations has not been observed among the sample 
firms. However, a related method has, which will be dealt with in the following. 
Scattering 
Intercai and Database Consultancy International happen to have adopted a locati-
onal pattern of small plants scattered throughout the southern and western part of the 
country. In 1990, Intercai comprised eight subsidiaries, spread across five different 
provinces. In 1988, Database Consultancy International consisted of four establish-
ments located in three different provinces, all of them within the western part of the 
Netherlands. This dispersal enables these firms to tap the labour markets of almost 
the whole western and southern parts of the country. Although this was not the main 
reason behind the strategy - it was mainly pursued to avoid becoming large bureau-
cratic organizations - this pattern offers important advantages within the labour 
market. As a result, the firms have become far less susceptible to labour force con-
straints within their original local region. Intercai again provides a clear example of 
this. In 1989 the firm established a specific subsidiary which collects specialist 
knowledge. This subsidiary, 'Special Know-How', employs six researchers who are 
highly experienced in the field of computer science and telecommunications. Special 
Know-How is accommodated in the Intercai office in the city of Utrecht, which is part 
of the Randstad and at the centre of the country. Since all researchers at 'Special 
Know-How' come from organizations sited in or near the Randstad (Siemens, Alcatel, 
PTT, Ericsson, universities), one might doubt whether the company would also have 
succeeded in recruiting them if they all had to move to the head office in Geleen. And 
it is out of the question that similar expertise could also have been found in the 
province of Limburg. So, by applying a multilocation strategy, firms scatter their 
labour market relations across space and thereby lessen dependency on the conditions 
in one particular area. 
5.2.3 Adaptation 
The sample provides few examples of active adaptation (McDermott and Taylor 1982) 
to the labour market, through which firms do not try to modify the dimensions of the 
labour force or seek to hedge against it, but, instead, constructively adjust to them. 
However, without any doubt active adaptation will have occurred. After all, for most 
of the 1980s, the labour market was characterized by shortages of skilled and expe-
rienced technicians and computer scientists. Furthermore, there is an ever-present 
shortage of professional managers. These types of workers are in a position to place 
high demands on potential employers. At least some of the sample firms must have 
been confronted with this and will have adapted to the demands and desires of these 
workers, either in the sphere of payments or in the sphere of fringe benefits. This sub-
ject, however, was not raised during the conversations with the directors. 
On the other hand, a case emerged of a more passive form of adaptation, whereby 
a firm's products were adapted to the type of skills and expertise available in the 
labour market. In 1985, Schoneveld decided to narrow down Waterland Automation's 
activities and specialize in automation of intra-firm logistics. When asked which acti-
vities the firm pursued in the years before, Schoneveld gave the following answer: 
"During the years before, we set about automation projects which were determined by the 
know-how and prior work experience of the staff workers who were in our service at that 
moment rather than by the aims and intentions of the company, a situation which one could 
find in most system houses." And then Schoneveld continued: "Now, we more empimti-
cally search for new employees who Imve a background in manufacturing automation. " 
5.2.4 Utilization 
When all is said about the companies' abilities and endeavours to deal with discrep-
ancies between firmneeds and the local labour market, it remains true that all busi-
nesses in the sample, both Randstad and non-Randstad firms, are able to take 
advantage of the local labour force as well. This is most clearly demonstrated by four 
industrial companies and one service company from the sample, which are located in 
the eastern and northern periphery of the Netherlands. These firms are Casolith 
Sheets (synthetics), Bronkhorst High Tech (electronic flowmeters), Nedap (electronic 
detection systems), Hulo International (robotized transport equipment) and Rood 
Testhouse (testing electronic circuits). All five firms obtained over 90 per cent of their 
employees from the local business region, and none of them was particularly 
dissatisfied with the regional labour supply (this does not mean, however, that no 
mismatches between firm and labour market occurred). The education infrastructure 
in the Dutch periphery may be largely sufficient for a high-tech company, as shown 
by Bronkhorst High Tech (BHT). Bronkorst High Tech is located in Ruurlo, a rural 
village of less than 4000 inhabitants. Ruurlo lies in the centre of a peripheral region 
on the eastern border of the Netherlands, a region known as the Achterhoek. The 
main education institutes from which the employees of Bronkhorst High Tech gradua-
ted are located at a distance of 35 km to the northeast (Intermediate Technical School 
and Technical College in Enschede), 33 km to the northwest (Intermediate Technical 
School in Deventer), 20 km to the south (Intermediate Technical School in Doetin-
chem), and 40 km to the southwest (Technical College in Arnhem). Director Jouwsma 
perceives Bronkhorst as being centrally located at the intersections of the market areas 
of these institutions. The employees themselves all live within a radius of 30 km from 
the firm. 
Some 13 km eastward from Ruurlo, via a scenic route, lies another rural nucleus 
in the Achterhoek, called Groenlo (8186 inhabitants). This is the location of Nedap, 
another high-tech firm in the sample. Both directors of Nedap whom I interviewed, 
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Mr. Paijens and Mr. Westendorp, are content with the local labour supply. No less 
than 99 per cent of the firm's employees come from within a radius of 40 km. Nedap 
makes use of largely the same educational institutes as Bronkhorst does, though it 
takes on more scientists. Paijens: "Most of tliem have studied at the Technical University of 
Twente [in Enschede, 37 km]." 
Continuing through the rural landscape of the Achterhoek, travelling from 
Groenlo in the direction of Nijmegen over back roads, after some 53 km one might 
pass through a small village of about 2000 inhabitants. This is Pannerden, home base 
of Hulo International a third high-tech company in the sample. Although this firm 
got into trouble in 1990, it was successful at the time the interviews took place. 
Anyway, in early 1988 I was on my way to visit Hulo International, and 1 eventually 
found the firm on the outskirts of the village, in the open fields. The lowest level of 
education which Hulo requires of its employees is intermediate administrative or 
technical education. "Otherwise"', according to director Meeus, "one would just not be 
able to fulfil one's task in our firm. " Furthermore, about 30 per cent of Hulo's employees 
have a higher vocational or scientific education. Out of the 85 people which Hulo 
employed at the date of the interview, only five (six per cent) came from outside of 
the local business area (> 20 km). These are highly skilled workers. Director Meeus 
was very content with the skills and the work ethic of the regional labour force. 
Meeus: "Skilled workmanship is very good in this area, and also loyalty to the company and 
willingness to work overtime." However, he severely criticized education institutions for 
going overboard in teaching abstract theoretical knowledge, which is virtually useless 
in practice. Meeus blamed educational institutes for the fact that: "It takes an incubation 
period of at least five years before an employee who has just finished a Technical College is 
able to master his tasks in our firm completely." Two educational institutes from which 
Hulo International obtains its employees are the Intermediate Technical School in 
Doetinchem (22 km) and the Technical College in Arnhem (20 km). 
Some 75 km northward from Pannerden, at the northern border of the spacious 
nature reserve of the Veluwe lies another rural nucleus called Heerde (8162 inhabit-
ants). This is the place where Rood Testhouse is located. At the date of the interview 
in 1988, when the firm was operating very successfully, it was able to recruit all of its 
lower-level employees (junior technical school level) as well as medium-qualified 
personnel from the local business area. The same was true for 95 per cent of its highly 
qualified workers, who had received a higher vocational education. Furthermore, 
director Weishaupt praised the work ethic of his employees, which he calls "formi-
dable". 
Proceeding even further, to the 'barren north' of the Netherlands, one will 
ultimately cross the boundaries of the province of Friesland, which traditionally has 
been a peripheral policy region. Its capital, Leeuwarden, which lies only a few miles 
from the Wadden Sea, hosts another sample firm, the successful synthetics company 
Casolith Sheets. Despite the status of Friesland as a peripheral problem area, Casolith 
Sheets is able to find sufficiently suitable personnel within the local business region. 
The company seeks all its employees mainly by means of employment advertisements 
in local papers. Spoelstra: "We are perfectly able to acquire our personnel locally. We have 
not the slightest problem in finding new employees. Why then should we put adveriisements 
in national papers?" Casolith Sheets obtains practically all personnel from within a 
radius of 40 km. Director Spoelstra: "In 1989 we needed 12 extra employees at once. Over 
100 applicants responded to our employment advertisements, of which 50 per cent were 
eligible. So, we had a wide choice. We enlisted six people at junior technical school level and 
six who had enjoyed intermediate technical school education. Wluit more could one ask fori" 
Furthermore, for highly educated staff members, such as production and project 
managers, Casolith Sheets takes advantage of the Technical College, which is located 
in Leeuwarden. 
Two other peripherally situated manufacturing firms in the sample, i.e. Aalberts 
Industries (supplier of tailor-made metal products) and Elephant Industries (precious 
metal dental products) cannot satisfy their labour requirements from the local labour 
market to the same extent as the businesses mentioned above. Certainly, Aalberts 
Industries in Venlo is able to attract over 90 per cent of its production-line operatives 
and intermediate-level personnel (junior technical and intermediate technical school 
level) from the local business area. But for top workers, this percentage is much 
lower, viz. 40 per cent (about 20 out of 50 high-quality staff workers). Furthermore, 
director Aalberts indicates that finding sufficient workers in accordance with the 
company's potential for growth is becoming a serious problem (Algemeen Dagblad 
25-2-1989). 
Elephant Industries in Hoorn, which lies in the north of the province of North 
Holland, not only has to attract all its top personnel (about 10 persons) but also its 
middle management (also about 10 persons) from outside the local business area. 
However, director Brouwers does not see this as a major problem. This is mainly 
because Brouwers perceives the pleasant environment as well as the more favourable 
housing market in and round Hoorn compared to the Randstad to be of great help in 
attracting and retaining skilled workers from outside the area. 
Roughly speaking, the firms mentioned so far give the impression that, concerning 
the level of education, the labour market in the Dutch periphery is suitable. Also 
regions outside of the Randstad seem to be sufficiently covered by appropriate 
educational institutes for (growing) firms to be satisfactorily provided with skilled 
employees. And although some entrepreneurs find some shortcomings in the 
curricula of these institutes (not focussed on practice, ignoring communicative and 
commercial skills etc.), the basic infrastructure seems adequate. However, when it 
comes to other aspects of the labour market, such as prior work experience, for 
example, the situation is less clear. On the one hand, a number of firms in peripheral 
areas, such as Rood Testhouse, Bronkhorst High Tech, Casolith Sheets, Hulo Interna-
tional, and Nedap, can satisfy the vast majority of labour requirements within the 
local business region, ranging from low to high-level workers. According to director 
Paijens of Nedap, this need not come as a surprise, since in the Netherlands manufac-
turing industry is concentrated in the eastern half of the country. About the western 
Netherlands he says: "All that is, is trade. " 
On the other hand, the cases of Elephant Industries and Aalberts Industries show 
that the capacity of the local business region to provide enough senior staff members 
and skilled personnel may not be sufficient everywhere in the Dutch periphery to 
sustain small-firm growth. This impression is reinforced when considering two non-
Randstad service firms in the sample which require very highly qualified staff 
workers. These firms are Intercai (telematics consultancy) in Geleen and System 
House Comdes in 's-Hertogenbosch. As far as Intercai is concerned, it is unthinkable 
that the enterprise would have succeeded in finding all its current employees within 
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the local business region (i.e. the province of Limburg) if the entire company had 
remained concentrated under one roof in its original business location. This is all the 
more true since the percentage of locally derived employees at the Geleen office fell 
from about 85 per cent to about 66 per cent between 1988 and 1990. This suggests 
that the capacity of the regional labour market to sustain further company growth 
rapidly becomes depleted. 
With respect to System House Comdes, let us refer to an event already mentioned. 
Director Vissers of Comdes was able to find only 30 per cent of the 44 newly acquired 
employees with extensive prior work experience from within a radius of 50 km, in an 
endeavour to upgrade the organization's activities within the scope of a major 
reorganization. Contrary to plan, he had to attract the right people from outside this 
circle, mainly from the Randstad; this amounted to no less than 70 per cent of this 
type of workers. It goes without saying that this forced reorganization costs upward. 
In contrast to the above example of System House Comdes, consider the situation 
at a Randstad firm like Infotheek. In the 1980s, Infotheek was a very successful, 
rapidly growing computer trade organization. It was located in Leiden, a city in the 
western wing of the Randstad. Initially, director Van Leenen, via the Bureau for 
Academics, recruited extensively unemployed people who had enjoyed either a higher 
vocational or an academic education. Via additional in-house training, Van Leenen 
made these people fit to occupy sales functions in his organization. However, after 
some years, like System House Comdes under the regime of Vissers, Van Leenen cut 
back on hiring unemployed people at the entry level. "We have turned away from 
unemployed people. Now, we search more intensively for people who already have several years 
of prior work experience. Then we don't have all the bother of extra training". However, this 
type of workers does not grow on trees. Nevertheless, unlike Comdes, Infotheek 
succeeds in finding more qualified employees within the business region, that is to 
say within a radius of 30 km. Van Leenen: "We don't want people who have to travel long 
distances from home to work. We want our workers to Imve a lot of time at their disposal for 
tlie company, more tluin eight hours a day. If they liad to spend four hours a day travelling, 
they would not be able to do so." Infotheek intensified the search for more experienced 
employees. Headhunters were called in, more 'aggressive' advertisements were run in 
the papers, employee recruitment fairs were visited and mailings were conducted. 
Furthermore, Infotheek's annual report of 1987 mentioned that the company was able 
to take advantage of the fact that some automation businesses were cutting back on 
staff. The company found out about these business contractions via the local contact 
network of some of its employees. Van Leenen: "Some of our employees were informed 
that something was happening in these organizations. " 
Two out of the other three Randstad businesses, i.e. Groenendijk and Waterland 
Automation, just like Infotheek, are able to derive all the employees they need from 
within the Randstad. Database Consultancy International in Amsterdam, on the 
other hand, also hires many employees from outside the local business area, although 
(financial) director De Zoete is not able to present figures on the region of origin of 
workers. De Zoete: "Our employees live dispersed, because we have an office in Breda 
[province of North Brabant], in Utrecht and in Amsterdam. Furthermore, many of our 
employees do most of their tasks at the client's site." In other words, many of DCI's 
employees are not required to live near one of the firm's offices. 
Anyhow, the above examples qualify somewhat the initial conclusion of only very 
moderate quality differences in the labour market between the Randstad on the one 
hand and non-Randstad regions on the other. It appears that for particular kinds of 
activities (business service firms) and occupations (senior level), regional labour 
market conditions really may be more adverse for peripherally located businesses 
than for centrally located ones. It should be realized, however, that insofar as some 
peripheral firms in the sample run up against local labour market constraints relative 
to centrally located businesses, these constraints have emerged only rather recently. 
So, it remains that regional labour markets in the Dutch periphery are as able as 
central ones to sustain both the start-up and early rapid growth stages of the survey 
firms. 
5.2.5 Summary 
The above explanation evolves around two observations: 
(1) First, the businesses studied, both those in the Randstad and those in the periph-
ery, are or were able to make use of the local labour force to a significant extent. 
This suggests that in the Netherlands inter-regional labour market differences are 
minor and must not be exaggerated. However, this statement should be qualified 
in two respects. First, labour market conditions in the periphery seem to be more 
appropriate for the manufacturing businesses than for the (knowledge-intensive) 
business services in the sample in their current stage of development. Secondly, 
the convergence across space of appropriate labour supply for the development of 
promising high-technology companies applies more to the degree of education 
than to the extent of prior work experience This observation seems more sound 
for service activities than for production firms. All in all, highly skilled junior 
workers are more widely available inter-regionally compared with experienced 
senior workers. This does not detract from the fact that the businesses in the 
sample are strongly rooted in the local labour market during their start-up and 
early growth stages. So, it appears that labour market conditions are sufficiently 
adequate to allow the launch and take-off of promising businesses in almost every 
region in the country. Only after these stages of infancy does the more limited 
capacity of labour markets to sustain further business growth in the periphery, as 
opposed to the Randstad, become manifest for some firms. 
(2) However, the businesses investigated do not resign themselves to the constraints 
or inadequacies of the labour market. On the contrary, they actively counteract 
these mismatches in many ways. In this respect, it is revealing that the company 
which hires the smallest number of workers from the original local business 
region - i.e. Intercai in Geleen - is one of the best-performing businesses in the 
sample. 
The subsequent sections of this chapter will deal with interactions between firm and 
environment with respect to resources other than labour. However, these sections will 
be less extensive than the present one. 
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5.3 Dealing with the financial environment 
Access to financial capital in general and venture capital in particular is considered by 
some workers to be of vital importance. It can be conceived of as the linchpin for the 
transfer and commercialization of new technology and a vital precursor for future 
economic growth (Thompson 1989). From a spatial point of view, it is commonly 
accepted that the markets for capital in most developed countries have been success-
fully integrated into a unified national system. This has occurred because of a number 
of developments. These include the establishment of many-branched distribution 
systems of national banks, consisting of numerous small subsidiaries at the local level. 
But the integration is also the result of progress in communication technology, which 
has enhanced nationwide access to all major public capital markets. It is believed that 
as a result of integration, investment capital is equally available everywhere and its 
price (for a given type of credit) is more or less invariant in space (Gertler 1984). On 
the other hand, a particular segment of the financial capital industry, i.e. venture 
capital, is unevenly distributed across space and highly concentrated at existing 
centres of economic activity (Gibbs 1991). Furthermore, it should be added that the 
know-how and competence at local offices of large financial organizations are limited. 
According to Martin (1989, 397), the spatial bias in the sources of venture finances is 
almost certain to exert an independent supply-side effect. This is because venture 
capital firms based in the core areas are not sufficiently aware of investment oppor-
tunities in peripheral areas, and the need to monitor investments restricts funds to a 
local focus. However, these latter arguments will hardly pertain to the Netherlands, 
because of its small size. Consequently, it may be safely assumed that firms outside 
the Randstad have access to appropriate finance equal to that of Randstad-based 
businesses. In any case, the sample firms did not give any indication of the reverse. 
Therefore, we pay somewhat less attention to obtaining financial capital compared to 
the acquisition of other resources. 
5.3.1 Manipulation 
Manipulation mechanisms vis-à-vis the financial environment can be divided into 
three categories. These are the exertion of pressure on financial agents in the environ-
ment, the leverage functions of intermediate agents, and prestige. 
Pressure 
The second oil crisis of the late 1970s caused the most serious worldwide economic 
recession since the 1930s. The Netherlands was particularly hard hit, harder than 
surrounding countries. By 1981, thousands of businesses were in deep trouble, and 
the number of jeopardized jobs ran into six figures. Casolith Sheets, a medium-sized 
company with sales of about 10 million guilders, was no exception. The company was 
running a loss of two million guilders and bankruptcy was imminent. The new 
director, Emst Jansen, undertook the arduous task of trying to save the company. 
Together with three staff members he drew up a far-reaching restructuring plan; this 
required investments amounted to four million guilders. The compelling question was 
how to come by this money. Jansen had previously worked for the regional develop-
ment organization for the northern problem regions (the NOM). He decided to appeal 
for help to his former employer as well as to the bank. And although the NOM is the 
sole shareholder of the company, the development organization was not keen to put 
more money into the operation, especially since earlier endeavours to get the 
company back on its feet had failed. Nevertheless, Jansen succeeded in acquiring the 
money; he got three million guilders from the NOM and one million from the bank. 
When asked how he managed this, Jansen answered: "Because of my prior work 
experience, I knew how banL· reason, how such a development corporation argues. I knew the 
best way to talk about financial reconstruction measures; plans must open up new perspec-
tives, however, without falling into the error of being too optimistic. " And then he added: 
"In talking to the NOM, at the same time we told them, 'If you do not come up with the 
money, we will part as friends. We widerstand tlmt it is a big risk, as far as you are con-
cerned. But in that case, I would propose closing down the company right now.'" By 
threatening the NOM with firm closure, Jansen exploited the political situation 
prevailing in those days, whereby the government tried anything to preserve existing 
employment, particularly in problem areas. Jansen: "It is quite clear that the NOM was 
pressured to invest in Casolith Sheets for purely political reasons. It is unthinkable that a loss-
making business, as Casolith Sheets was at the beginning of the 1980s, would ever be taken 
over by any regional development corporation at the present time. These organizations have 
now become far more reserved about putting money into poorly performing businesses. " 
Jansen is not the only director in the sample who has exerted pressure on 
financiers by means of threats. Director Van Leenen of the Infotheek Group has also 
done so. 
Leverage 
The term leverage is used to mean that firms indirectly exert influence on the 
behaviour of environmental elements through intermediate agents. An example with 
regard to obtaining financial capital is provided by the directors of Rood Testhouse. 
In the early years of self-employment, Bijsterbosch and Weishaupt found it very 
difficult to scrape together enough money to sustain the growth of their business. 
Director Weishaupt: "We looked everywhere for sufficient financial means. The problem was 
that our company had no track record to inspire the confidence of financiers. " After operat-
ing in financial straits for four years, an important breakthrough occurred. On the 
advice of the local chamber of commerce in Zutphen, Bijsterbosch and Weishaupt let 
the National Bureau of Manufacturing (Rijksnijverheidsdienst, RND) investigate the 
the viability of their company. The report of the RND served as a crowbar to pry 
their way into the graces of the (Rabo) bank. With the report of the RND in hand, 
Bijsterbosch and Weishaupt induced the local subsidiary of the Rabo bank to be much 
more liberal in lending money than before. 
Prestige 
In September 1986, the term of a 20 per cent share of the Brabant Development 
Corporation (BOM) in equity capital of System House Cotndes expired. Comdes 
bought back the BOM shares, but immediately made a proposal to let the BOM 
participate anew in the company. The BOM agreed with this, albeit with reservations. 
Because the BOM is owned by the national government, the approval of the Ministry 
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of Economic Affairs was required for this transaction. Sometime between Christmas 
and New Year, the then Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr. R. de Korte, suddenly 
decided to cancel the transaction. The reason was that, since Comdes no longer can be 
considered a risk-bearing venture, the company falls beyond the scope of the BOM, 
which is expected to invest in promising risk-bearing investments. Because of 
repercussions for the annual financial report Quekel and Kragtwijk did not want 
Comdes itself to buy back the BOM shares. Instead, they wanted new share-holders to 
take over the participation of the BOM before the end of the year. However, the 
company proved to be very saleable in financial circles, and within three days 
everything was fixed. Kragtwijk: "They approached us of their own accord. " 
Similar experiences were recounted by director Jansen of Casolith Sheets. After 
the reorganization of the firm in the early 1980s was complete, the profitability of the 
company increased rapidly. And although the confidence of the financiers was 
difficult to obtain initially, financing problems eventually vanished into thin air. 
Jansen: "Financiers are now standing in line to talk to us. It's very funny to see this 
occurring. " 
5.3.2 Immunization 
Firms may not only gain some protection against the inadequacies of the labour 
market but also against the deficiencies of the financial market. One way is for 
entrepreneurs to fall back on their own financial resources. 
Integration 
At the date of the interviews, financial capital was easy to come by for Casolith 
Sheets, as indicated at the end of the foregoing subsection. But this was very different 
in the first half of the 1980s, ever after recovery. Consider the following anecdote. By 
1984, Casolith Sheets had recovered and the company was operating at a profit again. 
Then the NOM indicated to Jansen that the development corporation no longer 
wanted to be the sole shareholder of Casolith Sheets. The Regional Development 
Corporation intended to sell its shares. At that point, director Jansen, together with 
the NOM, set off trying to find other shareholders. They failed, however, m their 
endeavour. It turned out that its past came back to haunt Casolith Sheets. Jansen: "Wie 
were full of a sense of victory, because we had got Casolith back on its feet again. However, 
potential shareholders did not slmre these feelings. They mainly looked back to the troublesome 
past of the company, to all those years it had been operating at a loss. This was very frustrat­
ing for us to discover. We reached a stage when we said: all right, then we will take care of it 
by ourselves. I went to tlie NOM and told them that we would like to buy Casolith ourselves." 
The NOM was taken aback by this proposal to let Casolith Sheets be taken over by its 
own employees. Initially, the Development Corporation considered it a hare-brained 
idea. After prolonged negotiations it was decided in 1986 that both management and 
employees of Casolith Sheets would buy 49 per cent of the capital stock from the 
ΝΟΜ. Jansen offered every employee the opportunity to buy shares. In the end it 
turned out that 23 daredevils among the personnel were prepared to put 50,000 
guilders each into the enterprise. By the way, later on that year Casolith Sheets also 
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applied for quotation on the stock market in Amsterdam. This occured mainly 
because the NOM insisted on getting rid of its majority participation. Staff members 
of Casolith meanwhile refrained from acquiring a majority participation. At the same 
time, Casolith was in need of more investment capital in order to realize its plans to 
expand the factory. Other firms in the sample, such as Bronkhorst High Tech and 
Hulo International, rely almost exclusively, apart from government grants, on 
retained profits to finance the firm. 
Considering the degree of (in)vulnerability to the (un)availability of external 
financial resources, it is also worth noting that out of the nine younger businesses, the 
start-up of at least four has been either solely or mainly funded by the founders 
themselves. These sources comprise either personal savings (Comdes, Infotheek) or 
house mortgages (Intercai, Waterland). Of these, only director Kivits of Intercai 
indicates that he decided to take out a house mortgage after attempts to obtain money 
from a bank (NMB bank) and a regional development corporation (LIOF) had failed. 
The directors of the other three businesses resorted to personal financing from the 
outset. It is a well-documented fact that over 50 per cent of new entrepreneurs get 
started with entirely self-generated financial means. The percentage of new businesses 
which start without any help from banks or venture funds is even higher, since many 
entrepreneurs receive informal start-up capital in the form of gifts and loans from 
friends or relations (see for example Storey 1982 and Donckels 1990). Formal investors 
appear on the stage only after the new enterprise has survived the start-up phase, 
which takes two or three years (Donckels 1990). This allows them to expand more 
rapidly. The other side of the picture is, however, that the new entrepreneurs have to 
accept and deal with external interference. 
Rationing 
Apart from internalizing activities, firms may immunize themselves against certain 
elements in the financial task environment by means of rationing relations with them 
and switching to other elements. An example of this is provided by director Kivits of 
Intercai. Kivits considers it very important that he always has had 'good' share-
holders, who renounce dividend payments. This makes it possible to pump profits 
back into the enterprise, particularly into investments in human resources. Kivits 
considers this of vital importance. Nevertheless, when Intercai was about five years 
old and had become a rapidly growing company, director Kivits felt that he could not 
expect the current shareholders, who at that time were local private investors, to keep 
on deferring payment of current dividends. In 1984 Kivits suddenly found a solution 
to this problem. In that year Intercai conducted a research project for the Dutch 
national aviation company, KLM. During the meeting at which the research results 
were presented, KLM unexpectedly showed interest in taking part in Intercai's stock 
capital. KLM took this step not for financial but merely for strategic or network 
reasons. Telecommunications is an extremely relevant activity for an aviation com-
pany. In 1985, KLM bought out some of Intercai's current shareholders and acquired 
47 per cent of the capital stock. Furthermore, 29 per cent of the capital stock was 
taken over by members of Intercai's own staff. In the course of the second half of the 
1980s, Kivits succeeded in acquiring two more so-called strategic shareholders, who 
have no interest in receiving dividend payments from Intercai. These two new partici-
pants are PTT Telecom and BSO (a very successful young automation company). So, 
on April 1 1989, Interrai had the following shareholders- KLM, owning 35 per cent of 
the stock capital, BSO, with 20 per cent, PTT Telecom, with 20 per cent, and Intercai 
staff, with 25 per cent. It is of vital importance that Kivits was able to arrange that 
none of these shareholders would make any claims on dividend payments for at least 
the next five years. In this way, Kivits insulated his firm from the threat of profits 
draining away beyond the walls of the company, that would have made Intercai all 
the more dependent upon bank loans and other external sources for financing growth. 
In a strictly spatial sense, firms may become independent of the local supply of 
financial resources by rationing the home region and switching to extra-regional 
financiers. For example, after the first five years of operation, Intercai began to 
change its stockholders, at which time the company replaced local shareholders by 
national ones. When the local financial backing of the BOM was suddenly cut off 
from System House Comdes, the company had to find new shareholders. At that 
point, it too turned mainly to non-local investors. One of the new shareholders was 
Modalfa, a big private investment group from Amsterdam (85 km), which took over 
the Comdes Group two years later. Also Elephant Industries has two major share-
holders outside of the business region, i.e. the APPM in Amsterdam and the MIP in 
The Hague. Since Casolith Sheets has been taken over by the Société Nationale Elf 
Aquitaine, its equity capital comes from France. 
5.3.3 Adaptation 
A particularly good example of how a company adapts to mandates of banks is the 
case of Elephant Industries, manufacturer of precious metal dental products. As 
mentioned above in 1969 director Brouwers started Elephant Industries as a trading 
business. However, from the beginning it was his intention not only to sell but also to 
produce precious metal products. So, trade profits were invested in building and 
expanding the manufacturing capacity. However, the retained profits were inad-
equate, much more money was required Consequently, Brouwers also appealed to 
the bank (ABN) for loans. And although the bank is generally not unwillingly to lend 
money, the demands of Elephant Industries were far in excess of what the ABN was 
ready to provide Brouwers "Financing could not keep pace with the growth potential of 
the company There is always the attachment of ban capital to stock capital. You cannot 
borrow 100 million guilders if you only have one million, at most you can borrow four or five 
million That was our problem in those days Furthermore, venture capital funds did not exist 
yet in the 1970s In those days investments had to come from the sphere of credits " To 
increase equity capital more rapidly in order to obtain larger loans from the bank, 
Brouwers had to raise profits. To achieve this, he employed the following trade 
strategy. Brouwers· "I tried to borrow as much money as possible from suppliers who gave 
me a longer term of payment tlian usual If tlie common term of payment was 30 days, I tried 
to agree on 60 or 90 days. Once, I succeeded in extracting a term of payment of 180 days. 
From my customers, on the other hand, 1 strove to receive payments within either a standard 
or shorter time interval. In this way I liad money at my disposal for two or three months to 
conduct two or three additional business transactions. The resulting profits were completely 
recycled into the company [thereby buttressing the firm's assets]. Well, this helped a lot. In 
this manner, bit by bit I was able to receive increasingly larger loans from the bank. This was 
the way things were going in those days. " By the way, this does not detract from the fact 
that when in 1981 the ABN established a venture capital fund, i.e. АРМ Ltd. in 
Amsterdam, Brouwers was there in a flash to request risk capital. 
5.3.4 Utilization 
It is beyond dispute that the businesses in the sample not only have to counteract but 
are able to benefit from elements of the local financial task environment. Casolith 
Sheets, for example, would have been doomed to die in the late 1970s and the early 
1980s without the financial backing of the NOM and the local bank. And one might 
doubt whether Jansen would have succeeded in getting sufficient money for restruc­
turing the company if he had been completely dependent on non-local resources in 
those days. 
For a number of younger companies in the survey the importance of local 
financial resources appears to apply particularly to the early life of a firm. This holds 
for both Randstad and non-Randstad companies. Insofar as the founders in the 
sample do not rely on their own resources for start-up capital, they make use of local 
financiers, either for equity capital or for loan capital or both3. And also local sources 
remain important some time thereafter. 
However, ultimately the non-Randstad companies in the sample have to shift to 
extra-regional sources, and they do so more intensively than the Randstad companies. 
A comparison between Aalberts Industries in Venlo and the Infotheek Group in 
Leiden makes this point clear. When their requests for loans go beyond the compet­
ence of local subsidiaries of their bankers, the directors have to turn to the headquar­
ters for new bank loans. For the Infotheek Group, this means that new monetary 
loans come from Amsterdam, which is at a distance of about 38 km from Leiden. 
Aalberts Industries had to switch to Utrecht, which is at a distance of about 148 km 
from his company in Venlo. Peripheral area firms like Intercai, Comdes and Rood 
Testhouse started to retreat from the region for new (stock) resources after four to six 
years of operation, although there is no indication that the firms consider this to be of 
any importance. Anyway, Randstad firms, in contrast, remain much longer and much 
more intensively committed to capital sources from within the business region than 
their counterparts in the periphery. 
5.4 Managing the material input environment 
Much geographical literature has concentrated on flexibilization and the concomitant 
need for disintegration and subcontracting of production. The resulting deepening of 
interrimi transactions and the attendant transaction costs have attracted much 
attention in regional science. It is assumed that these transaction costs may be 
spatially determinated to a high degree. Scott (1983, 1988a) contends that where 
connections between firms are small in scale and rapidly changing, the spatial 
convergence of interconnected firms is essential if economic efficiency is to be 
maintained. Therefore, it is assumed that dense agglomerations offer important cost 
advantages to many modem companies in the sphere of subcontracting and input 
deliveries. On the other hand, isolated companies are confronted with serious 
disadvantages regarding intensive subcontracting relations. They either have to incur 
higher transaction costs than firms in the centre or they must adhere to an inflexible, 
and therefore inferior, vertically integrated organization structure. Theoretically, there 
seems to be no other way out of this dilemma but relocation of the firm. In spite of 
this theoretical impossibility of achieving competitiveness in the periphery, successful 
high-technology businesses in outlying areas actually do exist. This section devotes 
attention to them and shows how they deal with external material supply conditions. 
5.4.1 Manipulation 
The sample firms have been observed to exert influence on material supplier firms by 
exerting pressure, as well by means of their reputation. 
Pushing and adjusting 
As the gas flowmeters of Bronkhorst High Tech get technologically more sophisti-
cated, they are equipped with an increasing number of electronic components. At the 
same time, the company strives to further reduce the size of its instruments. To 
decrease the size while incorporating more components, in the mid-1980s Jouwsma 
and Bruggeman decided to introduce the Surface Mounted Device (SMD)technique. 
With this technique, electronic components become fixed to printboards in a different 
way, which makes it possible to use even smaller components. In addition, the 
SMDtechnique is able to equip printboards double-sidedly instead of onesidedly with 
components. However, in those days no firm existed in the Netherlands with a 
thorough command of the SMDtechnique. Jouwsma: "We were the very first producer of 
instruments in the Netherlands to apply this new technique, which has become very popular 
nowadays." Subsequently, the technical director explained how the problem has been 
resolved. Jouwsma: "So, we said to our component supplier, LM Electronics in Neede [13 
km]: 'We want to move in the direction of SDMtechnique too.' They answered tlint they were 
not able to do it. Then 1 said: 'Just make sure you figure out how to do it. It lias to be done.' 
Then we went to Germany together, visiting firms which already luid started making them-
selves familiar with the technique. " Apperently it was not an easy task; it implied quite a 
revolution for LM. New apparatus had to be purchased to realize the job. LM 
hesitated whether it should proceed. Jouwsma: "Well, in the end they did pick it up, 
bemuse we simply said: You have to. We need the back of those printboards for fixing more 
components; the front is fully covered already. So we cannot proceed any furíher, technologi-
cally we have reached a ceiling." By the end of 1986, LM had done the job and Bronkorst 
introduced the SMDtechnique into its instruments. 
In 1988, a similar situation occured. The electronic flowmeters which Bronkorst 
produces are endowed with temperature and pressure sensors for measuring mass 
flows. When the company took up the development of a new type of flowmeter, it 
also decided to build in a new, cheaper, type of sensor. This new sensor would be 
developed on the basis of a 'thin membrane technique' instead of the conventional 
winding technique. In the Netherlands, Jouwsma could not find a supplier with the 
know-how to produce the new sensor. Finally, Jouwsma found a small company in 
Germany, in the Black Forest, that was able to develop the new sensor desired by 
Bronkhorst. Jouwsma: "The German company was able to construct the sensor exactly as we 
would like to have it." Nevertheless, Jouwsma decided not to take a chance with the 
Germans. Jouwsma: "It is too far away from us after all. We want to imve it closer by our 
firm, that really worL· better. " Jouwsma decided to have the required sensor developed 
by a current supplier located in Doetinchem (22 km). Together with a staff member of 
the Doetinchem company, Jouwsma paid the German firm several visits in order to 
copy their production technique. Jouwsma on the Doetinchem producer: "At any rate 
tltey have mastered the basic principle. The only snag is tliat they still have to leant how to 
apply it exactly. But that will turn out alright, it's only a matter of time. " 
Furthermore, Jouwsma sees to it that when suppliers invest in new equipment 
they take into account the demands of Bronkhorst High Tech. Jouwsma: "The supplier, 
a metal-working company in Worden (12 km), ¡ms a numerically controlled maclune in house, 
with which everything can be done. It is able to manufacture a complete product in a single 
run. These are impressive investments. Such machines cost from 500,000 to one million 
guilders. But we have made sure that he meets our requirements in his apparatus as well. We 
told him: mind tliat you take into account such-and-such..., the machine luis to meet this-and-
tliat condition. Not tint he buys just for me, he uses it for others too. " These examples 
show that the relations between Bronkhorst and its suppliers are characterized by 
intensive interaction and a concomitant mutual influence. This results from the firm's 
hollowization strategy. This implies farming out actual production, not on spec but 
rather in cooperation with suppliers. 
Reputation 
The computer dealer Infotheek and the software engineering firm Waterland Automa-
tion also influence the domain of potential (hardware) suppliers. But they do so in a 
different, less direct manner; namely, through their reputation. After being in 
operation for respectively three and five years, both Infotheek and Waterland were 
approached by the Dutch branches of reputable international hardware manufacturers 
with an offer to market and develop software for their machines. Infotheek was 
approached by IBM located in Amsterdam (38 km), and Waterland was contacted by 
Digital in Utrecht (52 km). For both companies, this was an important breakthrough, 
as it gave them access to large markets. Director Schoneveld of Waterland Automa-
tion discloses how this came about. "We started Waterland Automation as a system house 
for Data General computers. And now we still purchase Data General computers, we develop 
software for them and produce turn-key systems for the end-user." By the way, Schone-
veld's connections with Data General date from his previous job at Stork in Amster-
dam (metal products). Stork used Data General computers. Schoneveld: "We have been 
approaclted by Digital on the basis of our success with developing software for and implemen-
tation of Data General hardware. By that time, as a system house, we had become the largest 




When elements of the external environment cannot be brought in line with a firm's 
requirements, the company may choose to integrate these elements in some way. 
Consider, for example, the remarkable step taken by Casolith Sheets in this respect. 
After the company was drastically restructured in the early 1980s, it entered into a 
stage of steady growth. Casolith performed even better than its rivals. Consequently, 
the Leeuwarden firm occupied an ever-increasing portion of the European market for 
acrylics products, from two per cent in 1980 to seven per cent in 1986. However, the 
synthetics company has one weak point. Unlike its main rivals, such as Röhm in 
Germany, ICI in England and, to a lesser extent, CdF in France, which have polymer 
acrylics products in their assortment too, Casolith does not have its raw material 
supplies in its own hands. This makes the company vulnerable in comparison with its 
competitors. There is a threat that competitors will eventually conspire to cut Casolith 
off from raw materials, such as 'monomer', which is a liquid. In order to ensure his 
supply of raw materials, Jansen intended to sell to a supplier of raw materials the 25 
per cent of equity capital which the NOM still owned after the introduction of the 
company on the stock market. However, things did not take place the way Jansen had 
in mind. In Spring 1987, a mere seven months after Casolith was first quoted on the 
stock market, the French state company Chemie de France S.A. (CdF) got in touch 
with the Frisian producer. It appeared that the French company, which is an import-
ant supplier of Casolith Sheets, wanted to buy up the entire firm. If Casolith did not 
agree with this offer, CdF would set up a factory similar to Casolith. After consulta-
tion with his commissioners, Jansen decided to agree with the proposal of CdF. His 
main reason was to guarantee the supply of raw materials, which is the company's 
achules heel, as Jansen puts it. 
Another example of how a company may immunize itself against the contin-
gencies of suppliers in the environmental domain or task environment is provided by 
director Jouwsma of Bronkhorst High Tech. Surprisingly, in the second interview, 
conducted in 1990, Jouwsma indicated that the idea of subcontracting its entire 
production, which the company has adhered to since its establishment, is losing 
ground somewhat. Jouwsma intended to internalize the production of certain 
components and the performance of some tooling techniques typical of Bronkhorst 
High Tech in the future. The reason is that suppliers do not apply new techniques as 
rapidly as Jouwsma would like them to. Jouwsma: 'This is because they Іш е to look 
after other interests as well. They not only deliver to lis, but also to other firms. " For certain 
orders, subcontractors take too much time, or these assignments are not done very 
well. Jouwsma provides two examples of activities which he considers internalizing in 
the future. The first is 'electro polishing'. Jouwsma: "This is a very spedai technique, 
characteristic of our firm." The subcontractor does not provide the same high quality 
unremittingly, and Jouwsma expends much energy to get him to do so. The second 
example is the production of 'prints'. Jouwsma would like the subcontractor to 
change the arrangement of SMDcomponents on the printboards. Jouwsma: "He does do 
it for this draft, but not for the next one. So, I have to start all over again. One is too 
dependent. Our philosophy for the future is tliat we will retain specific knowledge in-house. 
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And perhaps we will go so far that we do it for others as well. " 
The fortunes of Elephant Industries, producer of precious metal dental products, 
are vulnerable. Obviously, they are dependent on the price of precious raw materials 
such as gold, palladium, platinum, and silver on the international market. But since 
the prices of precious metals are expressed in U.S. dollars per troy ounce (31,1035 
gram), they also fluctuate with the exchange rate of the American dollar. In order to 
lessen this dependency, Elephant Industries has invested in a unique method of 
refining their waste of precious metal alloys with the help of an ultramodern 
refininginstallation. This waste material is produced during the processing of precious 
metal alloys. The refuse consists of snips, scales, filings, grindings and residuals. In 
this way the company is able to achieve a greater degree of self-sufficiency regarding 
raw materials (Annual report 1986). 
Director Bijsterbosch of Rood Testhouse provides us with the last example of 
immunization against environmental barriers with respect to material supplies by 
means of internalization of activities. Initially Bijsterbosch and Weishaupt did not 
have enough money to buy all the test devices they required. Bijsterbosch: "In the 
beginning, test apparatus was sometimes too expensive for us. Tlwn we liad to look for other 
options and we developed parts of our equipment in-house. " 
Buffering and scattering 
The Infotheek Group faces serious difficulties with irregular and late supply of 
computer hardware (particularly IBM computers), which the firm sells and installs. 
One of the measures taken to buffer against these irregularities is to keep hardware in 
reserve in order to put at a client's disposal temporarily. 
Yet another strategy by which businesses in the survey immunize against the 
material supply task environment is by scattering relations. After the take-over of 
Casolith Sheets by CdF Chemie, the Leeuwarden company was no longer in a 
position to buy its most important raw material, monomer, independently. However, 
other supplies such as glass, pigments, PVC and the like are still bought autonomous-
ly. With respect to these products, Casolith diminishes its susceptibility to suppliers 
through multiple sourcing. The company sees to it that every type of material is 
provided by two or three suppliers. 
Rationing 
When Bruggeman and Jouwsma started Bronkhorst High Tech, they decided not to 
undertake the actual production of the various components of the flowmeters by 
themselves but to subcontract these activities instead. The two men confined them-
selves to research and development as well as the assembly of the instruments. The 
reason for this 'strategy' is that when the founders decided to start their own 
company, they did not envisage it raising sufficient money to set up an adequate 
production capacity. Jouwsma: "Even just a modern lathe, which is a very advanced 
machine nowadays, costs half a million guilders. To this, tools running at 300,000 guilders 
have to be added as well. For a new enterprise, it is impossible to cope with this. So, we 
decided to invest not in means of production but in human resources and in research and 
development." In this way Bruggeman and Jouwsma avoided entry barriers in their 
line of business. 
Although director Brouwers prefers managing a manufacturing firm, he set up 
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Elephant Industries as a company trading in precious metal products. Brouwers: "A 
trade business did not really appeal to me much." The reason for starting Elephant 
Industries as a trade enterprise was to avoid the huge capital investments required to 
set up a manufacturing company. However, Brouwers did not abandon his intention 
to operate a production firm. Using the profits from his trade activities, Brouwers 
succeeded in the course of time to develop Elephant Industries into a full production 
company. 
From a spatial point of view, with respect to acquisition of material inputs, most 
firms in the sample operate rather independently of the local environment. 
Groenendijk in Ridderkerk buys its cabins from firms in Coevorden (198 km), 
Raamsdonkveer (48 km) and Nijkerk (97 km). Aalberts Industries obtains only two 
per cent of its input materials locally; 50 per cent comes from the rest of the Nether-
lands, and the remainder from abroad. Director Aalberts: "We don't do any business in 
the region." This is also true for the apparatus manufacturer Nedap in Groenlo. This 
firm buys about two-thirds of its input materials from abroad and one-third within 
the Netherlands. The domestic portion comes entirely from outside the local business 
region. An important domestic supplier for the company is Philips in Eindhoven (120 
km). Casolith Sheets buys its raw materials, which constitute up to 60 per cent of total 
purchase costs, abroad. Machinery and equipment, however, are purchased domesti-
cally from all over the country, although there is a particular emphasis on the 
business region. Similarly Elephant Industries and Rood Testhouse obtain their input 
materials mainly abroad. 
In sum, many firms in the survey acquire their input materials outside the 
business area. This is surprising, because some of them are engaged in custom-made 
production, such as Hulo International, Aalberts Industries and Casolith Sheets. The 
comments of some of these entrepreneurs on this situation are revealing. When 
director Westendorp was asked where the main suppliers of Nedap are located, he 
answered: "Don't ask me where it all comes from. To be honest, 1 don't really care. As long 
as everything we need gets here." Director Meeus of Hulo International responded in a 
similar way: "Oh, 1 don't know. Suppliers are heated all over the country and in Germany." 
I asked director Groenendijk whether transport costs of make-shift cabins from so far 
away affect profits adversely, and he said: "Oh, it isn't so bad." Director Bijsterbosch of 
Rood Testhouse admits that if he could obtain test equipment - which now has to 
come from all over the United States and increasingly from Japan - closer by, this 
would be lucrative to his firm; "For us that would be very nice. " However, he stipulates 
one hard and fast condition: "This enterprise would then Imve to cover the world market. 
After all, test equipment must be above all suspicion and doubt of customers." These 
remarks put into perspective the significance of the distance factor for subcontracting 
practices. In any case, they show that spatial propinquity is not a prerequisite for 
achieving flexibility. This contrasts with the theory of the geography of flexible 
specialization, which emphasizes the role of the distance factor in this respect. The 
remarks, especially that of Bijsterbosch, indicate that other forces, such as product 
quality and product differentiation, may thwart the supposedly important role of 
spatially related transaction costs in subcontracting practices. 
5.4.3 Adaptation 
In order for Bronkhorst High Tech to achieve sufficient flexibility in the market place 
through custom-made production and just-in-time delivery, its supplier firms must be 
able to produce and deliver products and components on demand within a week. 
Director Jouwsma: "We order today wJtat we will need in a week from now." To enable the 
suppliers to meet this requirement, Bronkhorst's purchasing policy was adapted to 
include an integrated planning system. This means that subcontracting takes place in 
two moves. The first step is when Bronkhorst places orders with its suppliers for 
'basic supplies' one year in advance. The second step is when orders are placed for 
specific components and subassemblies in the short term. These have become 
relatively quick for the subcontractor to produce, since basic supplies are on hand. 
Jouwsma: "So, we always take care tliat the subcontractor has a basic stock of su]jplies for 
our instruments." For Bronkhorst it is crucial to plan carefully in advance which 
components are needed by the subcontractor. Therefore, the firm makes huge invest-
ments in automating material resource planning, to which we will return in the next 
section. Jouwsma: "You can't just tell them, 'sorry, I forgot to pass something on to you. " 
Rood Testhouse is forced carefully to plan the supply of test apparatus in advance 
for a different reason. The company obtains these tools mainly from producers in the 
United States, i.e. Terradine and ALX. Weishaupt: "Because these instruments are not 
available from stock, sometimes very long delivery times occur; half a year is not unusual. 
This is quite a long time, considering tliat the economic life of this apparatus is no longer tlian 
four years". In order to secure maximal return on the machines, Bijsterbosch and 
Weishaupt plan their input requirements at least six months in advance. 
5.4.4 Utilization 
The foregoing might have suggested that all the firms in the sample are indifferent to 
the location of their suppliers, but this is not the case. Bronkhorst High Tech obtains 
input materials, worth over 80 per cent of purchase costs, from two major suppliers, 
which are located at a distance of eight and 15 km respectively. If one of these two 
firms were to relocate at a distance in excess of 30 km from Bronkhorst, Jouwsma 
would drop it as a supplier. After all, "within the local region sufficient alternative 
potential suppliers are located", according to the technical director. The location of supp-
liers other than the two major ones is less sensitive to distance. Furthermore, 
Bronkhorst exploits the local environment in a more insular way. Initially he farmed 
out manufacturing activities. But in the near future, Bronkhorst intends to internalize 
the production of firm-specific components. Jouwsma: "we conduct initial development 
externally; then, at a certain moment, when we have heard enough, we make things pan of 
our company. " 
Whereas Casolith Sheets obtains many pieces of machinery, installations and 
other operating inputs from outside of the business area, an important input comes 
from within the local region: stainless steel machinery. Casolith can extract that 
equipment from the local dairy industry. On the other hand, both director Jansen and 
director Spoelstra give us the impression that they would not care a bit if they had to 
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purchase machinery from elsewhere in the country. 
All in all, it appears that Scott's model of the geography of flexible specialization 
is not brushed aside by every firm studied. Particularly the spatial subcontracting 
relations of Bronkhorst High Tech run counter to the above conclusion (under the 
heading 'adaptation' in this section), which undercuts the role of spatial propinquity 
for transaction costs. And the reason is clear; Bronkhorst is perfectly suited to the 
flexible specialization and industrial district model. The firm subcontracts the actual 
manufacturing of its entire flexible product range. (Recall that the company under-
takes only development and final assembling activities). Other manufacturing firms in 
the survey engaged in tailor-made production are either completely (Hulo Interna-
tional) or partially (Casolith Sheets, Aalberts Industries) more vertically integrated 
than Bronkhorst High Tech. So, the tatter's subcontracting relations are much more 
intensive and varied than those of the former two. Anyway, director Jouwsma gives 
the impression that Bronkhorst attaches great value to spatial proximity (i.e. less than 
30 km) of his main suppliers, although no proof is given that Bronkhorst High Tech 
would have performed less well if subcontractors had not been found within the local 
area. 
What is striking is that Bronkhorst and, to a lesser extent, Casolith Sheets, both 
located in the most peripheral and rural areas of the Netherlands, can obtain so many 
input materials from the local business region. This illustrates that the subcontracting 
conditions in the Dutch periphery need not be unfavourable, not even for a hollow, 
high-tech corporation. This finding confirms the contention of Horvers and Wever 
that interregional differences in economic conditions in the Netherlands are relatively 
small (Horvers and Wever 1989). Praat (1992) even concludes that for manufacturing 
industry, subcontracting conditions are actually better in some peripheral areas, such 
as the southeastern part of the country, than in the Randstad. 
5.5 Handling the business service environment 
The phenomenal growth of business service functions in the past two decades has 
been accompanied by increasing attention and research from the field of economic 
and regional sciences. It is believed that many producer services in general make a 
vital contribution to the efficiency and performance of economic life. Their importance 
is all the more stressed in this time of continuous transformation of markets, rapid 
and ever more complex technological change, and the trend towards greater product 
differentiation. Producer services assist enterprises in coping with the dynamics of the 
macro-economic turbulence. They help to adapt skills, products, processes, and even 
attitudes to changes in the environment, or to reduce the organizational, managerial, 
and informational barriers to adjustment (Marshall et al 1987). 
Producer service activities thus play an important role in promoting the develop-
ment and adjustment of regional (and national) economies to structural changes in 
society. Accordingly, regions in which these functions are poorly represented, i.e 
peripheral regions, are likely to become constrained in their economic growth. 
According to Goddard (1978), the ability of regional industry to adapt to market 
changes and to develop new products and production techniques is partly determined 
by the availability and quality of local service information and advice. Therefore, 
independent companies in peripheral regions may be disadvantaged if their local area 
has a poorly developed service sector (Marshall 1982,1523; Daniels 1987). 
O'Farrell and Hitchens (1990) suggest that firms in peripheral regions with a 
poorly developed producer service sector may react in four ways. They may simply 
decide to carry on without the benefit of the service input, thereby creating a latent 
demand; they may search outside the region; they may try to provide services in-
house; and they may invest in areas with a high-quality service environment (service-
led regional development). Furthermore, O'Farrell and Hitchens suggest that in 
addition to forsaking services, the most frequently occurring response of small and 
medium sized enterprises is buying in from outside of the local region. Internalization 
of service functions is only possible for larger firms. 
O'Farrell and Hitchens refer to Marshall's (1982) finding that in the British case, a 
high proportion of a firm's demands (i.e. 80 per cent of external service inputs) are 
met locally; if not available there, firms tend to purchase from London. Similarly 
O'Farrell and O'Loughlin (1981) demonstrated that in Ireland, peripheral firms at 
greater distance from regional centres tended to skip the regional centre and place 
their orders in Dublin. However, according to O'Farrell and Hitchens, high extra costs 
are attached to the provision of services over large distances, which hampers such 
behaviour. They quote Daniels (1987, 5), who states that "unless these [i.e. producer 
services] are available locally the cost of obtaining them ... may be a sufficient deterrent to 
limit utilisation or, more seriously, to prevent use altogether and so cause firms to grow more 
slowly or even to cease production because of their inability to compete with those firms 
located in cities with more immediate access to a comprehensive pool of intermediate services. " 
The extra costs peripheral area firms have to incur in obtaining eligible business 
services, which Daniels has in mind, concern travel time to meetings, frequency of 
contact, telecommunication charges, the possibility of delays caused by the inability of 
the client and supplier to meet as often as required, or simply lack of knowledge. 
Similarly, O'Farrell and Hitchens (ibid, 1147) themselves establish that when periphe-
ral Irish firms use Dublin-based producer service companies because of local gaps in 
service supply, the extra costs consist primarily of managerial time and management 
costs. 
All in all, it is perceived that the small firm sector remains very dependent upon 
the location and local availability of external service inputs. Therefore, it is suggested 
that firms which are located in remote areas with an inadequate service sector have 
an insurmountable competitive disadvantage, whether or not they try to resist their 
environment. When they react against this inadequate supply infrastructure, they 
incur extra costs, and when they defer counteraction, they incur differential disadvan-
tages. 
Against this theoretical background, in the following section we will make an 
inventory of the reactions of the firms in the survey vis-à-vis both the opportunities 
and deficiencies of their business services production environment. 
128 
5.5.1 Manipulation 
Leverage and pressure 
Modern production methods, such as just-in-time production and integrated planning 
systems, call for careful material resource and time planning in organizations. 
Bronkhorst High Tech resoundingly confirms this. Director Jouwsma: "It is of vital 
importance to us that we have the flow of materials and sclieduling under control". To that 
end, Bronkhorst purchased an IBM 36 mini-computer system at a price of about 
200,000 guilders. Furthermore, Bronkhorst requires suitable software, both for 
bookkeeping and for production control. Furthermore, Jouwsma wants these two 
systems to be linked. Jouwsma: "For example, as soon as an instrument luis been sold, 
stock registration and time planning should be adapted automatically." For that purpose, 
IBM refered the firm to a software company in Diemen that is supposed to have 
developed the appropriate software package for this problem. Bronkhorst approached 
the Diemen company and, according to Jouwsma: "all our desires and wishes were 
thoroughly discussed. They assured us that their computer program was able to deal with all 
our needs." However, when installing the system, which had to be adapted at some 
points to the specific context of Bronkhorst High Tech, problems arose and things did 
not work out as expected. Jouwsma: "Wliereas tlxe system should have been working since 
last July, now, on the first of March 1988, it is still not functioning adequately. We Irnve not 
bought the system in its current condition. It does not work as we would like it to work. At 
the demonstration, which was organized for us before we bought the system, it all went 
without a hitch, and all our wishes could be met, it was said. But afterwards it turned out 
that time planning, as we would like to have it, cannot be dealt with." At the date of the 
first interview with Jouwsma, the project was in an impasse. However, Jouwsma was 
not inclined to leave it at that. "They will have to improve it." Via calling for IBM, he 
intended to put the Diemen company under pressure. "Let IBM come sit right here at 
my desk and tell me what we should do." Furthermore, Jouwsma has another card in his 
hand which he can play to try to force the software firm into compliance: "I have paid 
only two-thirds of the total price; one-third still 1ms to be paid, and tlmt is quite a lot of 
money". 
A second type of producer service which Jouwsma is not content with is adver-
tising, although the problems in this sphere are by no means as serious as those with 
software engineering. About advertising agencies Jouwsma says: "Advertising services 
are also such empty words. There is much to be improved in the performance of these agencies. 
We have to bok after the design of our brochures carefully. Otherwise they make very 
beautiful pamphlets, it is true, but they are useless for selling flowmeters. All that matters to 
those advertising guys are nice pictures. But first of all, flowmeters have to be sold, and that's 
what they tend to forget. Once they designed a folder of which everybody was wondering wlmt 
it was about. We told them that it was no use to us. Look at this one, you can hardly see tlmt 
it is about flowmeters. The type of letters used has to be clmnged. Above all, it 1ms to be clear 
that it is about flowmeters. Those advertising boys are difficult to keep in line." 
In a similar way, the Rood Testhouse management seeks to keep a tight rein on 
their advertising. Director Weishaupt: "We do not leave things completely to this kind of 
business. We regularly Imve to check their products against our own basic idea. It is a matter 
of visiting them regularly and working on them to keep them in line with our own view. " 
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The interviews provide few further examples of influencing supporting service 
firms in response to insufficient deliveries. However, this does not imply that 
everything is clear sailing. Directors mainly mention two other reactions in answer to 
inadequate external service deliveries: integration and changing external suppliers. 
5.5.2 Immunization 
Integration 
On 9 January 1990, two years after the first interview with director Jouwsma had 
taken place, I returned to Bronkhorst High Tech for a second interview. It appeared 
that problems with tailoring the standard software package to the desires of 
Bronkhorst High Tech had still not come to an end. Director Jouwsma indicated that 
he was fed up and that he intended to change his tack. Jouwsma: "Now we are going to 
see whether we can find new eligible software on the market. Subsequently, we will make 
specific adaptations to our flexible production system ourselves. If we can find such a system, 
we will throw out the present one. One must take into account that in those days, when the 
present company [i.e. the software engineering company from Diemen] started this 
project, no good computer program in this field existed yet. Since then, developments have 
occurred very rapidly in that line of business. Perhaps a new computer program has mean-
while come onto the open market which would suit our firm. Then, we would buy the basic 
program and subsequently develop firm-specific adaptations by ourselves. By the way, we 
insist that the Diemen firm finish the project. But it remains to be seen whether we are 
actually going to use it. " 
When I asked the Nedap managers whether they farm out or undertake software 
engineering by themselves, director Westendorp answered: "We produce all our software 
ourselves. In the past we have tried to delegate software engineering to external firms several 
times. However, we found that the packages delivered did not always fit in with our require-
ments, nor were they always easy to use." Actually, Nedap had tried out three software 
companies, two from the Randstad and one from within the local business region, 
before the management decided to design software internally. 
Director Brouwers of Elephant Industries decided to design advertising pamphlets 
in-house after having had negative experiences with external advertising agencies. 
Brouwers: "In the past we had a bureau that looked after tliese things for us. I must tell you 
that we had to very carefully check the quality of the work which these people were able to 
provide. We fairly often felt disappointed. It mostly proved that our assignments were too 
demanding. Now we have a department ourselves which takes care of the design of advertising 
pamphlets. " 
Rationing (and integration) 
Some firms show how they, by virtue of their smallness, maintain limited relations 
with (elements of) the service environment and therefore are (temporarily) shielded 
from possible contingencies in these markets. This has been observed with respect to 
advertising agencies. Director Schoneveld of Waterland Automation indicated in the 
first interview, in April 1988, that he felt it was not necessary to advertise intensively. 
Schoneveld: "I have already indicated that the growth of the firm is dampened because of 
problems in finding suitable personnel, not because of difficulties in finding clients. We are 
approached by more clients than we can serve. " Furthermore, Schoneveld thinks that: "It is 
very difficult for advertising agencies to transmit one's own ideas to the market." In the 
second interview, in 1990, the situation with respect to marketing efforts had changed. 
Schoneveld: "We have paid quite a bit of attention to the marketing of our products." These 
activities are performed by the marketing communications department of the firm. 
When asked why these services are provided internally instead of externally, 
Schoneveld answered: "Because we are not engaged in mass production, we do not sell 
standard products. " 
Also Intercai, at least for the first nine years of its existence, did not undertake 
extensive marketing and advertising activities. This seems not due to inadequate 
external support, but rather to weak external competition. Donders: "It is still the case 
that Intercai does not have a professional marketing system. This is still the responsibility of 
our consultants in the field." By this statement, Donders suggests that Intercai as yet 
does not need professional marketing assistance, be it either an internal or an external 
service. Donders refers to the monopoly position which Intercai still holds in the 
Dutch market for telecommunication consultancy. So, marketing and public relations 
are allowed to operate on a less professional level. However, when the threat of 
increasing competition eventually picks up, then the company will have to reach out 
for more professional marketing services. This can be built up internally or called in 
externally. By expanding the current management team to include a commercial 
director in 1991, Intercai seems to have chosen the first option. However, it must be 
noted that Intercai is still not experiencing serious rivalry from its competitors. 
A similar situation is found at Database Consultancy International in Amster-
dam. Database Consultancy International does not call in an external marketing 
bureau. Director De Zoete: "Until recently we had never produced a folder. There was no 
use for this. This is changing, however, since the firm is growing bigger and bigger." 
From a sheer spatial point of view, firms can immunize themselves against con-
straints in the local business service environment by withdrawing from the region and 
switching to the extra-regional domain. For example, initially System House Comdes 
was out for maximal self-financing. The local accountant, who is located in 
Zaltbommel, supported this view. However, when the company began to grow 
consistently rapidly, Comdes was recurrently confronted with liquidity problems. In 
order to solve this problem, according to Kragtwijk, Comdes had to introduce a new 
business philosophy. This new philosophy abandons the view of maximal self-
financing. Kragtwijk: "So, we needed a good accountant who agreed with this new growth 
ideology and who would be able to convince external financiers. Our own accountant at that 
time accorded only reluctantly, which was not in proportion to the investments we made. 
Then, we decided to switch to a nationally operating accountant, TRN in Rotterdam" [80 
km]. 
Casolith Sheets contracts out supporting services mainly to the local region. For 
example, public relations services are ordinarily fanned out to a bureau in Drachten 
(26 km). However, when Casolith applied for quotation on the stock market, adverti-
sing activities were farmed out to a firm in Amsterdam (138 km), which possesses 
experience in the financial press. Director Jansen: "Look, this is typically a world in 
which no experienced people can be found in this part of the country." Similarly, whereas 
ordinary legal advice is put out to consultants in Leeuwarden, for special, important 
events these activities are contracted out to an enterprise in Rotterdam (205 km). 
Jansen: "For daily business we Іш е our house lawyer here in Leeuwarden. Wlien considering 
quotation on the stock excliange and for the take-over of our firm by the French, we consulted 
a well-known legal consul in Rotterdam, because I think that for such kind of specialities one 
has to got to the highest place. One can safely have an operation on a finger in a hospital here 
in Dokkum. However, as soon as they are going to pry into my brains, I would prefer to go to 
an academic hospital." 
Nedap in Groenlo regularly farms out advertising activities, although many 
activities in this sphere are provided inside the firm by the PR department. 
Westendorp: "Now and then marketing bureaus do something for us. Printing and the like is 
performed by businesses here in the neighbourhood. Brainpower activities, on the other hand, 
are located in the western part of the country." 
Director Aalberts of Aalberts Industries gives a similar evaluation of local 
business services. Aalberts: "Supporting services are not only located in the vicinity of the 
firm, but also outside of the local business area. It depends purely on which type of services 
one needs. If one seeks important legal counsel or fiscal advice, one cannot find these services 
here in this area but ¡ms to go to the Randstad. Over there one has much wider choice of 
businesses and agencies. It depends very much on the size of the firm. Look, a small firm of 
ten employees will Imve much less need for important professional services than, for example, 
our own group of firms Ims." 
Bronkhorst High Tech switched to an advertising agency in Voorburg (182 km) 
after it had unsatisfactory experiences with an agency in the immediate vicinity, 
located at a distance of only 200 m from the firm. 
It is clear that mainly non-Randstad firms (have to) farm out certain supporting 
business services to firms outside of the local business area. The opposite, whereby a 
Randstad firm uses extra-regional business services, occurs only incidentally in the 
sample. An example is Groenendijk pic, which farms out software engineering to a 
software firm in Eindhoven (98 km). Director Groenendijk: "Tin's occurred purely by 
accident. In a trade journal, an article was written about automation in a competing firm. The 
software company which implemented this project was located in the Eindhoven area. And via 
this firm we ended up at Philips computers for computer hardware equipment." Furthermore, 
another Randstad firm in the sample, i.e. Waterland Automation in Purmerend, 
contracts out international marketing services to IDC in Brussels. 
All in all, it appears that the firms studied deal with perceived or actual inad-
equacies in the local service task environment by means of hedging against these 
deficiencies rather than by influencing and changing the elements of the environment. 
Furthermore, it appears that information about these strategies mainly has to be 
gathered from the interviews with the directors of non-Randstad firms in the sample. 
The difference between Randstad and non-Randstad firms is particularly notable with 
respect to extra-regional service linkages. The latter obtain business services from a 
much wider area than the former. 
Examples of adaptation behaviour in response to barriers in the service environ-
ment could hardly be found. Therefore, the next section proceeds with opportunities 
for utilizing the local pool of business services. 
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5.5.3 Utilization 
Examples of resistance strategies in response to inadequacies in the local business 
service environment are mainly found among the non-Randstad firms in the survey. 
Nonetheless, these firms, sometimes quite unexpectedly, can take advantage of the 
local environment as well. This is clearly illustrated by the case of System House 
Comdes. Though the company has to look to the Randstad or other areas for the 
provision of certain services (accountancy, international marketing), many activities 
can be conducted locally. Consider the following example. When Vissers took charge 
of the enterprise in 1989, he broke off relations with almost every one of the firm's 
prior service businesses. Vissers started calling in more professional business service 
firms. Unlike the acquisition of more qualified staff workers (see Section 5.2.4), he was 
able to find eligible service firms within a 50 km radius. Bookkeeping, legal advice, 
advertising, public relations, headhunters; all these activities were found within a 
radius of 50 km. For accountancy services, Vissers switched from the TRN Group (at 
present TRN Bakker en Versteegh) in Rotterdam to Coopers & Lijbrand Dijker van 
Dien in Arnhem (62 km). Vissers himself appeared to be surprised that he succeeded 
in finding suitable service bureaus in the business region so easily. About farming out 
supporting advertising activities, for instance, he said: "It would have been obvious if I 
would have turned to an agency in Amsterdam, since the majority of these activities are 
concentrated there." 
Non-Randstad areas in the Netherlands sometimes have an unexpected capacity 
to provide business service functions. This is also shown by Casolith Sheets. Just like 
Bronkhorst High Tech, Casolith Sheets was confronted with problems in regard to 
software engineering and services in the middle of 1980s. Jansen: "We did try out many 
software firms. We have had bad luck in selecting tliese firms. They always went bankrupt 
or.... Among other things we have been with a bureau from Amsterdam. They are the worst 
scoundrels I have ever met, awful." Casolith dropped the Amsterdam company and 
called on a northern subsidiary of the software activities of the travel agency Holland 
International. When the automation activities of Holland International were taken 
over by Ormer, an English group, Casolith went along to Ormer, which operates in 
the Netherlands from The Hague (182 km). Ormer, however, also went bankrupt. 
Then, the computer scientists of Ormer, who actually developed the computer 
software for Casolith, moved to a firm that does not use Philips computers. For this 
reason Casolith Sheets did not go along with them. Via coincidental informal 
relations, Casolith ended up at the computer office of the Dairy Federation in its place 
of location, i.e. Leeuwarden. Decline in the dairy industry forced the Federation to 
orient itself towards alternative opportunities outside of this line of industry. To 
Casolith it was important that the Dairy Federation used Philips computers. Jansen is 
very content with this situation. "Everything is going excellently." 
Similarly Bijsterbosch and Weishaupt of Rood Testhouse returned to the local 
business region after having tried out several advertising agencies in the Randstad. 
Weishaupt: "We have liad quite a few advertising agencies, and ultimately we ended up at an 
agency in Apeldoorn [20 km]. After all, there is a need to have one's satellites in the close 
vicinity of the firm, particularly advertising agencies. We regularly have to check their 
products against our own basic idea. It is a matter of visiting them regularly .... Well, and 
Just like the advertising agency, the firm's accountants, Moret Emst & Young, are also 
located in Apeldoorn. About accountancy services Bijsterbosch says: "At present, since 
we are in smooth waters, it lias become less important that the accountant is located in the 
vicinity of tlie firm than in the beginning. It depends on the growth stage the firm is in. In 
the starting period it is more important to luive the accountant close by than now. Further-
more, it was also handy that the accountant was located nearby when we applied for quotation 
on the stock market, because everything had to be verified, and hence contacts occurred very 
frequently." Rood Testhouse can also get legal advice in the local region, i.e. from a 
local notary office in Heerde. 
Aalberts Industries had its accountant and notary initially in Eindhoven (55 km). 
Later on, in 1985, the company switched to a national register accountancy firm, 
Moret Emst & Young, in Maastricht (71 km), which in 1989 also established a 
subsidiary in Venlo. Up to 1980, notary services were provided from just outside the 
business region. Thereafter, Aalberts switched to a national notary office in Amster-
dam (181 km), i.e. Stibbe, Blaisse & de Jong. 
Intercai is a real do-it-yourself firm with respect to supporting business services. 
Nevertheless, those activities which the company does contract out lie within its 
business region. For example, accountancy is provided by TRN Bakker & Versteegh in 
Maastricht (15 km) and incidental consultancy activities by a firm in Heerlen (15 km). 
The same applies to Hulo International. The company performs its software 
engineering, advertising and public relations activities internally. The few services 
which it does farm out are found in the local business area. Accountancy was 
provided initially by Moret, Ernst & Young from Nijmegen (18 km), and later by the 
TRN Group from Arnhem (20 km); legal advice is also found within the business 
area. Also Bronkhorst High Tech is able to find some important business services 
within the production environment. This is the case for accountancy (Zutphen 19 km) 
and notary activities (Vorden 12 km, and Zutphen). 
The above examples of opportunities for peripherally situated firms to employ 
business services from the local area do not change the fact that their counterparts in 
the Randstad can make more extensive use of their immediate surroundings in this 
respect. The service activities these firms farm out can almost entirely be bought in 
from the regional production environment, if not from the place of business itself. As 
an illustration, consider the answer of director De Zoete of Database Consultancy 
International in Amsterdam when asked if he thinks that opportunities for small-firm 
growth are better in the Randstad than elsewhere in the country. De Zoete: "If we need 
a good tax consultancy business, well, we can find it upstairs in this same building. Wlien I 
want to talk to my lawyer I can find him right around the comer. And this is what we always 
consider carefully; to make sure that we call in good consultants, the best one can get in the 
Netherlands. Well, and they are located here in these very neighbourhoods [i.e. the Amster-
dam canal district]. If they would be located outside of Amsterdam that would be very 
difficult, because these kinds of activities are time-consuming and we want tliem to have been 
carried out as soon as possible, if not sooner." 
Infotheek in Leiden and Groenendijk in Ridderkerk also illustrate the opportun-
ities of the Randstad production environment with respect to producer services. When 
director Van Leenen of the Infotheek Group cannot find an eligible marketing bureau 
in Leiden itself - "No good advertising agencies are located in Leiden" - he turns to a firm 
in Rotterdam, which is only 36 km from Leiden, and to a firm in Amsterdam (38 km). 
Furthermore, Van Leenen says: "If I could get an advertising agency from Leiden, I would 
prefer that, because now we have to incur a loss of travelling time. These are inefficiencies 
which I want to have as low as possible." Other supporting service firms also are 
provided from within the business area, such as accountancy (Arthur Andersen & 
Co., The Hague, 15 km), notary services (Amsterdam), and headhunters (Leiden). 
Groenendijk pic in Ridderkerk initially made use of accountancy and notary 
services from Amsterdam (73 km). Groenendijk: "This occurred because of personal 
relationships. Some years ago, we reversed that for practical reasons. We have switched to 
businesses in Rotterdam [which is adjacent to Ridderkerk]. Wlien one has to visit the 
notary or the accountant [Coopers & Lijbrand Dijker van Dien] it is easier to travel to 
Rotterdam than to Amsterdam. For example, when we applied for a WIRpremium, we called 
in the advice of the notary per order. It was very pleasant that it was possible for him to come 
around to our office every time again. " 
Waterland Automation also obtains the majority of the external business services 
the firm needs from the regional production environment. Director Schoneveld: "As 
far as services are concerned we rely on Amsterdam [15 km]." However, some services do 
not come from Amsterdam, although still from within the regional production 
environment. Auditing is performed by a chartered accountant, Paardekoper & 
Hofman, in Zaandam (13 km), for example. Furthermore, Waterland has called in the 
help of Digital Holland in Utrecht (52 km) for the implementation of an office 
automation system in order to be able to do its administration in-house. Two impor-
tant services are located outside of the business region. These are Pandata in Rijswijk 
(72 km), for training of employees, and IDC in Brussels (225 km), for international 
market research. 
5.5.4 Summary 
These case studies allow us to draw two major conclusions with respect to the 
interaction between the firm and its (service) environment. First, it appears that nearly 
all firms in the survey, both Randstad and non-Randstad (perhaps with the exception 
of Elephant Industries in Hoorn), are able to make fairly intensive use of the local 
region for external service functions. Secondly, this does not detract from the fact that 
peripheral area firms in the sample, as they develop, increasingly have to take a 
proactive stance toward the local services infrastructure. Of the businesses investi-
gated, this expresses itself most clearly in non-Randstad firms purchasing service 
inputs from outside the local area, particularly from the Randstad. Randstad firms, in 
contrast, can continue to rely on their business region, if not their place of location, as 
they grow. 
About internalization or non-use of service functions, as other types of responses 
to inadequate external supply, no definite statements can be made on basis of the 
firms investigated, since such behaviour is often not directly related to conditions in 
the local environment. On the other hand, particularly because of inadequate external 
supply, self-service unmistakably occurs. It has been recorded thoroughly, albeit not 
in response to ineligible local supply, but instead of inconvenient non-local, i.e. extra-
regional, support. On the face of it, this suggests that decision-makers first seek to 
satisfy external service functions within the business region. If this fails (or actors 
think it will), they try to find the services outside of the business region. Only after 
this also proves unsatisfactory (or actors think it will) might they start internalizing 
(or keep on switching and searching, of course). 
Anyhow, the sample firms reveal a major flaw in the prevailing theories about the 
role of service functions in the environment. It is maintained that spatial differences 
in the availability of specialized and high-quality services are an important factor in 
creating inter-regional differences in business competitiveness, and furthermore it is 
implied that this relation is a rigid one. This line of reasoning fails to take into 
account the fact that relations between firm and service environment work out in a 
more dynamic way, along with the growth stage of the firm. From the directors' 
accounts it can be inferred that a number of service functions - headhunters, market 
research bureaus, and all sorts of advice which accompany events such as quotation 
on the stock exchange, take-over and acquisition activities, restructuring measures 
and the like - are used only after the firm has been in operation for several years and 
when it has achieved considerable size. Furthermore, in their early growth stages, 
firms not only use a smaller number of service functions, but they also call in less 
prominent and less professional supplier firms than later on. For example, it is very 
unlikely that the reputable nationally and internationally operating accountancy 
bureaus which provide their services to the sample firms have been called in from the 
outset. In their early growth stages, businesses simply cannot afford such a luxury. 
The same phenomenon has been observed with respect to hiring labour (cf Section 
5.2). Calling in McKinsey to consult a small firm of ten, 20 or 30 employees is like 
cracking a nut with a sledgehammer. In sum, firms that are young and small are far 
less demanding with respect to the local supporting service infrastructure than larger 
ones. This implies that for their early development they need not be located in a 
region that is optimally endowed with all sorts of specialized, high-quality services. 
By the time they do require this kind of service input, the firms have grown larger 
and their capacity to deal with local deficiencies has increased. This is more or less 
admitted by O'Farrell and Hitchens, when they write that "Insofar as larger enter-
prises are able to internalize many service inputs, the location and local availability of 
external suppliers may not be important" (O'Farrell and Hitchens 1990, 1147). The 
impact of the extra costs attached to resistance strategies in response to local inad-
equacies gradually diminishes as the firm increases in size. So the interviews point 
towards a mutually reinforcing, dynamic interaction between on the one hand 
organizational size and adaptability, and, on the other hand environmental pressures, 
as has been outlined in Chapter three, Section 3.4. and Figure 3.5. 
5.6 Meeting the market environment 
Up to now, this chapter has devoted attention to input resources; the present section 
focusses on output resources. It is widely assumed that the growth of enterprises will 
be accompanied by a progressive expansion of the geographical range of its activities, 
like ripples spreading in a pond. This means that firms' activities develop from local 
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or regional to national or international spheres of operation. In the early life of a firm, 
sales are heavily concentrated within the local market. When the local market is 
saturated, the firm expands to the regional scale by setting up sales offices. In the 
subsequent stage, activities are extended to the national and eventually to the 
international scale, either by acquisition of other establishments or by setting up 
capacity of its own. Models of corporate growth have been developed by Taylor 
(1975), Watts (1980) and Hákanson (1979). In all these models a firm's access to a 
large and growing urban market by virtue of its location is of vital importance for 
triggering growth of the firm. According to Hákanson (1979, 132), "During the early 
life of a firm, its ties with the immediate surrounding environment are likely to be 
very close. Personal contacts with financiers, suppliers, and customers are often 
decisive factors for early survival and growth." Small, new firms in peripheral areas, 
in contrast, fall into a vicious circle of constraint. Because the local and regional 
markets prove too small to sustain production at the levels required for profitable 
operations, the need to break out of the local area and to operate on a supraregional 
market emerges soon after start-up. However, McDermott and Taylor (1982, 62) assert 
that it is no sinecure for small firms to achieve this. According to them, only larger 
firms would be able to extend their action space beyond the regional level. It is 
assumed that small firms face formidable marketing problems, because they lack both 
the expertise and sufficient financial means to sell their products on wider geo-
graphical markets (cf for example Hall 1985, 53). According to McDermott (1974), 
entrepreneurs find it easier to monopolize the local market than to compete in 
supraregional ones (spatial monopoly hypothesis). 
The dependence of new firms on the local market as a launch-pad for start-up is 
recognized in many new business surveys. For example, Dutch research conducted 
among very young companies of at most three to four years old shows that sales of 
72.6 per cent of these businesses do not go beyond the regional scale (VNO/AMRO 
1988, Table 14). De Jong (1987) investigated firms which were somewhat older, i.e. at 
most ten years. This research, which was conducted among businesses in the northern 
wing of the Randstad (i.e. the cities of Haarlem, Amsterdam and Utrecht and the 
surrounding areas) suggests that slightly more older businesses are still very strongly 
attached to the regional market. No less than 83 per cent of the surveyed firms 
booked over 50 per cent of their sales in the western part of the country. Similar 
results are found by Lloyd and Dicken (1982) in the British conurbations of Manches-
ter and Merseyside. More than half of all the sampled new firms, which were less 
than five years old, contracted in excess of 50 percent of their business in the local 
conurbation, and one quarter found 90 percent of their sales within the immediate 
urban area. This market context differs minimally for firms between five and ten 
years old. Indeed, the latter category reveals an even closer attachment to the 
immediate conurbation market, with one-third depending on local sources for more 
than 90 per cent of their business. 
Well, how do the survey firms encounter the market. Particularly, how do they 
respond to hindrances and opportunities? 
5.6.1 Manipulation 
Enticing and leverage 
To begin with, I will demonstrate that a firm's clientele is not unilaterally dependent 
on the presence of that firm in the local business area. This subsection highlights the 
influence which the sample firms exert on the market. The businesses investigated 
employ several methods to influence the disposition of the market in favour of their 
own survival. Many incentives can be detected which either deliberately or inadver-
tently entice potential customers to buy a company's goods or services. Working the 
market occurs deliberately by employing such well-known measures as advertising in 
trade journals, conducting direct mailings, preparing prestigious annual reports, 
taking part in trade fairs, dispatching internal salesmen and/or external sales reps. 
But also utilising in reputable material and service input suppliers is meant to foster 
goodwill in the market. Three sample firms have undertaken some more unusual 
initiatives in this respect. System House Comdes, for example, under the regime of 
Quekel and Kragtwijk, organized road shows and also an annual tennis tournament in 
's-Hertogenbosch (in cooperation with Nashua Holland). When Comdes was in 
serious trouble and was taken over by the Modalfa/Mobeta investment group, the 
new director, Mr. Vissers, worked hard to restore the image of the company in the 
market. So, Vissers organized symposia and meetings in which well-known people 
take part. Vissers gave an example: "Yesterday evening I held a conversation with 
Professor Nieuwenburg, who seems willing to present a lecture at a symposium we are 
organizing. This symposium is meant for corporate investors, financial organizations and 
insurance companies. The organization of this symposium occurs against the background of a 
software package called 'Rendement', which we designed for controlling investment portfolios. 
Nieuwenburg is prepared to discuss our product and to talk about the market for corporate 
investments. The director of Bogamij, Mister Blaisius, will act as a discussant for the paper of 
Nieuwenburg. In this way, by inviting and establishing relations with important players on 
the market for investments and by subsequently attempting to give follow-up to these 
connections afterwards, we try to restore our image." 
Furthermore, in its heyday Comdes published an irregularly appearing news 
magazine about its advances in the sphere of software engineering, to which one can 
subscribe. Database Consultancy International does the same. Intercai's sponsorship of 
a well-known ice hockey team in the Netherlands, the Smoke Eaters, is yet another 
example of working the market. 
A medium which is becoming increasingly important for small and medium-sized 
manufacturing firms as a marketing instrument is the successful introduction of the 
so-called ISO 9001 Quality Management System into the firm. An ISO 9001 certificate 
represents the official quality approval, not only of the firm's products but of the 
entire organization. To obtain such certification, firms have to meet rigorous quality 
standards and to carry out radical adaptations. Such a certificate is seen as an 
important credential by (potential) customers. Several of the sample firms have either 
already obtained an ISO certificate or are working on it: Elephant Industries, 
Bronkhorst High Tech, Casolith Sheets Nedap and several Aalberls subsidiairies. 
Enticing potential customers to buy the business's goods and services occurs not 
only by deliberate marketing. It also takes place, and maybe even more importantly, 
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in an indirect, informal and less conscious way. A number of directors in the sample 
indicate that by far the most effective way to advertise the firm is through satisfied 
clients. Contented customers work as gateways to new ones. The directors of System 
House Comdes, Intercai, Waterland Automation, Hulo International, and Database 
Consultancy International indicate that word-of-mouth advertising is a major method 
for bringing in customers, if not the most important one. Some entrepreneurs actively 
exploit this fact by presenting contented customers in an eyecatching way in their 
annual report or advertising brochures and printing their praise of the goods or 
services delivered. In a similar vein, other beneficial occurrences in a firm's life cycle 
are exploited as a lever to influence the market. For example, prizes awarded, visits to 
the firm by well-known people such as leading politicians and members of the Royal 
Family, or quotation on the stock exchange are deliberately used as marketing 
instruments. 
In their heyday, the automation companies Infotheek, System House Comdes, and 
Waterland Automation 'used' a very strong lever to gain access to the market, namely 
their primary computer hardware suppliers, respectively IBM, Wang, and Digital. The 
three automation firms were able to take significant advantage of their relations and 
exploit the sales outlets and brand names of the latter. 
It must be added, however, that many of such marketing activities are more likely 
to follow firm growth than cause it. They come into existence only when the company 
is experiencing substantial growth; they vanish into thin air as soon as hard times are 
coming. They fall into the category of what Storper and Walker (1989, 44-45) call 




Apart from attempting to influence the behaviour of actual and potential customers, 
the surveyed businesses also take measures to defend themselves against certain 
market barriers or deficiencies. One such group of measures can be subsumed under 
the heading of integration. For example, in order to improve its grip on the market, 
Aalberts Industries has moved increasingly from producing input supplies towards 
manufacturing final products. To that end, Aalberts Industries has taken over 
medium-sized customer firms (200 - 300 employees) which produce final products on 
the basis of non-ferrous input materials, such as water and gas pipes, and beer 
appendages. Director Aalberts: "We increasingly realized that we had no good hold on our 
markets. As an industrial supplier firm, one's fortunes are very dependent on the success of 
one's customers." This changes when a firm produces the end products itself (Het 
Financieele Dagblad 4-9-1991). 
In the Netherlands and Belgium, Groenendijk pic has extended its geographical 
market outreach by establishing its own subsidiary plants, while in Germany the firm 
has expanded by taking over a German plant in the same branch. The main reason 
for pursuing a different geographical expansion strategy in Germany than Nether-
lands and Belgium is to hedge against restraints imposed by custom barriers or by 
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unfamiliar market conditions in Germany. Director Groenendijk: "In Belgium people are 
familiar with Dutch products. In Germany this is different; over there one has to see to a 
strong domestic identity of the goods or services delivered. I think in Germany it is more 
difficult to establish subsidiaries from the ground up tlmn it was in Belgium." This very 
same internationalization strategy is applied by Intercai. Whereas in Belgium the 
company has established a subsidiary by itself, expansion in Germany, Switzerland 
and Italy has occured through taking over foreign telecommunication consultancy 
firms. 
Scattering 
A second group of measures which shield the firms from the contingencies of 
separate segments of the market environment includes the scattering of market 
relations by means of diversification strategies. So, no single company in the sample 
has its fortunes tied to one or a few large customers or market segments. For 
example, the most important market segment of Aalberts Industries, aircraft construc-
tion (e.g. flight recorders for Fokker and Airbus), accounts for only eight per cent of 
total sales, and no other customer is worth over three per cent of its trade. These are 
iron laws within the company (FEM 25-2-1989). 
Nedap develops electronic identification systems for the retail trade (anti-
shoplifting systems), for premises (hands-free access control systems), for cattle-
breeding (automatic cattle management systems), manufacturing industry (e.g. 
automatic material handling systems, tool identification systems), and for many more 
markets. 
Casolith Sheets adapts its synthetic sheets for use as an input material in the 
illuminated advertising industry, in the construction sector (noise barriers, balcony 
fences etc.), and in the sanitary industry. System House Comdes develops software 
packages for hospital automation, corporate investors, and the printing industry. 
Intercai has attuned its telematics consultancy services to the requirements of several 
different market segments, such as national government, health care, agro-business, 
tourism, transport, industry, manufacturing industry and the financial and insurance 
sector. 
Director Brouwers of Elephant Industries explicitly pursues a diversification policy 
with respect to geographical markets (geographical market development). Brouwers: 
"Intentionally, we do not want to develop a large market sliare in one particular country. 
Instead we prefer a small portion in many nations. This is our philosophy. In this way we are 
not dependent on one, two or three markets." Many more examples of diversification by 
means of market development could be added here if we could spare the space. 
Diversification occurs not only with respect to markets but also with respect to 
products. So, Intercai's initial consultancy activities consist of supervising and 
managing the technical installation of new communication systems (cable television 
mains, computer networks, air networks, company switchboards). However, in the 
course of time, Intercai has also become involved in other parts of the whole process 
of introducing new communication systems to organizations fanning out from its 
niche of consulting about the technical installation. The firm has also started commis-
sioning consultancy activities concerning basic policy lines in organizations with 
respect to new communication systems (these activities occur prior to the actual 
technical implementation of the installation of these systems), their organizational 
implications, and the education of staff workers to handle the new systems, as well as 
their maintenance. Staff worker Donders: "Wlien initial consultancy about one fragment of 
the entire process is good, organizations call you in for consultancy on other parts as well." 
These so-called turn-key services, which constitute an incidence of a vertical differenti­
ation strategy, are not unique to lntercai. They are typical for several other service 
firms in the sample, such as Rood Testhouse, Waterland Automation, System House 
Comdes, and Infotheek. Vertical differentiation is mainly presented as a growth 
strategy (Ansoff 1987), but at the same time it hedges businesses against drawbacks in 
separate products or types of business activity. The Dutch consultancy market for 
building local cable television mains is rapidly becoming saturated since the majority 
of the local communities in the Netherlands has already been provided with cable 
television. Nonetheless, Intercai's consultancy activities regarding cable television 
mains are not diminishing. Donders: "This is because at the level of local governments 
reorganizations are taking place which require linking of distinct cable television mains. There 
is also a rising need to replace or modernize obsolete mains." 
Rationing 
A third cluster of measures which immunize against segments of the market environ­
ment involves rationing market relations. Rationing strategies are used, for example, 
by start-up companies to by-pass entry barriers. Remarkable instances of this strategy 
can be found in the start-up phases of Aalberts Industries and Bronkhorst High Tech. 
Recently Aalberts Industries, which predominantly produces supplies for niche 
markets, is increasingly producing for final markets. Director Aalberts admits that he 
projected this already at the start-up of the company. Aalberts: "When I started in 1975 
I thought: I want to produce final products using my own tecltnology. But I did not realize 
then tlmt selling them would cost so mudi money. Production I would be able to afford, 
marketing definitely not" (FEM 13-6-1992). After a difficult start-up period, Aalberts 
decided (for the time being) to avoid the barrier of addressing final markets and to 
start as a supplier company. 
When Bruggeman and Jouwsma started their firm for electronic gas flowmeters 
(Bronkhorst High Tech), they initially targetted the very big OEM market, i.e. Original 
Equipment Manufacturers, which encompasses the semiconductor industry, among 
others. OEM firms use gas flowmeters as components in their own machines. How­
ever, two major problems arise when addressing this market. In the first place OEM 
manufacturers are strongly inclined to use only well-established and familiar input 
materials in their (sub)assemblies. This is because the quality of their machines is 
directly related to the quality of their input devices. So, they are aversive to risk-
taking in this respect. A second problem attached to the OEM market, which director 
Jouwsma mentions, is that Bronkhorst's gas flowmeters are built into appliances 
which themselves are still being made. Jouwsma: "So their development period is added 
to the time lag. In practice you are not able to produce until one-and-a half to two years after 
Die instrument has been offered for evaluation. So as a company, you need a long lead time. 
We didn't іш е that when we were starting out." For these reasons, Bruggeman and 
jouwsma decided to avoid the OEM market and to start their activities in a different 
market. True, that market is much more limited but at the same time it is also more 
accessible to a new firm. This is the chemical laboratory market. Because labs use the 
gas flowmeters of Bronkhorst High Tech as separate instruments they are more 
inclined to experiment with them and to evaluate their performance instantly. When 
Bronkhorst High Tech had established sufficient credibility and a reputation in the 
labs market the company was able to address the OEM market successfully. At the 
date of the interview, Bronkhorst was following this very same strategy to introduce 
electronic liquid flowmeters onto the market. 
Rationing against elements of the market environment occurs not only in the 
initial but also in more mature stages of a firm's development, such as with restruc-
turing processes and operations. For example, director Vissers of System House 
Cotndes hived off computer trade activities when he reorganized the company. He 
wanted to be able to concentrate totally on software engineering and to make the 
company less directly susceptible to developments in the hardware trade. Similar 
measures have been taken by director Schoneveld of Waterland Automation when he 
restructured, rationalized and specialized Waterland Automation. When director 
Jansen started reorganizing Casolith Sheets in the early 1980s, he abandoned the 
production of casein, which is a synthetic material made from milk proteins. Manufac-
turing casein was the company's original core activity. Jansen: "That nearly broke my 
hart, because we had 50 per cent of the European market for that product. However, we needed 
100 per cent to be able to gain something by it." 
From the above instances of immunization strategies against either actual or per-
ceived market hindrances, no difference between Randstad and non-Randstad busi-
nesses was discovered in the sample. However, one sharp difference between these 
two groups of firms did emerge. The more limited local market conditions in the 
periphery relative to conditions in the Randstad provoke non-Randstad businesses to 
skip the home region as a sales area and to develop an extra-regional market outreach 
very early in their life cycle, if not from the very beginning. At the time the inter-
views took place, out of the nine peripheral area firms in the sample, eight sold negli-
gible amounts or nothing at all to the regional home base (Table 5.1), whereas 
Intercai's regional content was about 20 to 30 per cent of total sales. 
So, at the time of the interviews, the non-Randstad businesses sold their goods 
and services on a national or an international scale, to a much larger extent than the 
Randstad firms in the sample. What is more, all but one of the (younger) peripheral 
area firms in the sample have to do without local customers from the very start of 
their businesses, as revealed by the directors' accounts. Take, for instance, the 
comment of director Bijsterbosch of Rood Testhouse: "Our starting point was the rise of 
micro-electronics. It was very difficult for user firms to come by test software, test programs, 
and everything that entails. Thus, we thought we had a good chance to perform a service 
function in that area. This was especially the case in Germany; there the clients demand 
quality. So actually, we started out on the German market." Or take the statement of 
Director Brouwers of Elephant Industries: "To us Germany lias been a large market from 
the outset, larger than we would like it to be." Director Jouwsma of Bronkhorst High Tech: 
"We started with three sales reps; one in the Netherlands and two in Germany. At the same 
time this represented the geographical distribution of sales: one-third in the Netherlands and 
two-thirds in Germany. This was how we started." Aalberts Industries had its major 
customers in the early development period mainly outside the local business region; 
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these were Philips (Eindhoven, 55 km), IBM (Amsterdam, 181 km), Siemens (The 
Hague 189 km). One important early customer - Осе van der Grinten - is located in 
the vicinity of the firm, namely in Venlo. System House Comdes also found its initial 
customers mainly outside of the home region - in Amsterdam (Lukas Hospital, Bank 

































































Mees & Hope), and in Rotterdam - although two clients were located within the 
province of Brabant. Anyhow, director Kragtwijk complains about the local market 
domain: "The region of Brabant prefers being served by firms from the Randstad. Now and 
then I have a feeling that this is because Brabant people consider tliemselves [and by 
extension Brabant-grown products] a bit inferior to people from the Randstad. " It is clear 
that none of the enterprises mentioned above could ever had got off the ground if 
they had been dependent on the local market as a launch pad. 
There is, however, one peripheral area company in the sample which forms an 
exception to this picture. This is Intercai, which could take advantage of local 
customers as a launching site for a quite successful growth. However, very soon after 
start-up, the company broke through the boundaries of its home region And after 
being m existence for about four years, the majority of sales were made in the 
Randstad 
5 6 3 Adaptation 
The above subsections give an impression of how firms attempt to work the market 
in their favour or to protect themselves against certain threatening elements of the 
market environment Yet it is beyond dispute that the growth of the surveyed firms 
has occurred essentially because they have been able to discover and to adapt to the 
needs and desires of the market Their adaptiveness to the market is the reason for 
the firms' basic competitive edge on competitors The only viable way for small firms 
to influence the customers' behaviour is by fulfilling their needs This does not mean 
that the sample firms fit in with the customers' requirements in a perfect way Rather, 
they provide, over a certain period, a more satisfactory solution to customers' needs 
than a whole range of alternative opportunities 
The businesses investigated demonstrated that the adaptation process occurs on 
two levels, ι e a supplementary and a basic level. These two levels can be viewed in 
the context of distinction made by Storper and Walker between strong and weak 
competition respectively (Storper and Walker 1989). Sticking to the sample firms, it 
appears that supplementary adaptation occurs roughly according to the following 
pattern Entrepreneurs or firms master a basic technology or skill, which they are able 
to adapt to the requirements of different users This may occur in the form of 
standardized production in smaller or larger senes for separate industries or types of 
functions Otherwise, or at the same time, it may occur in the form of tailor-made 
production for individual customers By the way, standardized series of goods or 
services for particular lines of business may be further adapted to the requirements of 
individual users 
Without doubt, the fine tuning of technologies or products to (groups of) cus­
tomers is a market-led phenomenon However, what about basic skills or technology 
which constitute the basic strength of the business (1 e strong competition), are they 
market or technology-dnven7 Well, as far as I could gather, most firms in the survey 
also gleaned their central ideas from the market So, according to Jouwsma 
(Bronkhorst High Tech) his companion Bruggeman contacted him in March 1981 with 
a proposal to start a business of their own, saying "I have an idea to develop a product 
for which a good market exists " Director Groenendijk recounted the gist idea which lies 
at the bottom of the important letting division of makeshift accommodation of 
Groenendijk pic "The firm was founded as a transport undertaking One of the activities 
was the transportation of construction sheds used by road crews, painters, construction 
workers and the like From the contacts with these people, at some point the idea emerged not 
only to transport but also to let out these construction slieds This actually meant tlie start of 
our letting activities, some 15 years ago " At the end of the 1970s, Mr Lightbody, director 
of an electronic and instruments engineering company, was toying with the idea of 
expandmg his firm by adding a third division, which should undertake telecommuni­
cation consultancy activities Henk Kivits was willing to pick up the idea and work it 
out, though not as a part of Lightbody's business, but as an independent firm, called 
Intercai. Lightbody agreed with this. On the origin of Lightbody's idea for developing 
telecommunication consultancy activities, staff worker Donders says: "Some ten years 
ago Lightbody saw that electronic engineering and instrumentation activities would increas-
ingly be dealing with developments on the telecommunication market, and that the information 
technology market would come along in its wake." 
Director Schoneveld's {Warterland Automation) idea to establish his own business 
in the sphere of administrative automation in 1978 was equally inspired by market 
opportunities. Schoneveld: "I was previously head of an automation department in the field 
of process automation in a manufacturing firm, VMF Stork in Amsterdam. From our basis in 
process automation, we in&easingly had to deal with complete business automation. Against 
this background we conducted a fair amount of research on mini-computer systems. They were 
picking up in those days and made it in principle possible for firms to undertake automation 
by themselves. Growing conflicts between firms and central computer centres, and the 
possibility to decentralize automation activities to individual firms, inspired me to start a 
business of my own to further develop administrative business automation. " 
Here it is useful to repeat Bijsterbosch's account of the start-up of Rood Testhouse: 
"Our starting point was the rise of micro-electronics. It was very difficult for user firms to 
come by test software, test programs, and everything that entails. Thus, we thought we had a 
good chance to perform a service function in that area." Also the foundation of other 
sampled businesses, such as System House Comdes and Elephant Industries, was 
inspired by market considerations. Small wonder, since the initiative to set up 
independent firms was taken by entrepreneurs, respectively Quekel and Brouwers, 
with a commercial background, i.e. people with previous work experience in commer-
cial functions. 
Nedap, however, constitutes a clear exception to the above pattern of market-led 
innovations, since the company's basic technology, electronic identification systems, is 
strongly technology-driven (cf, for example, Paijens 1989). Anyhow, irrespective of 
whether the firm's know-how or skills have been pushed by technology or pulled by 
demand, their success in the market reflects primarily their adaptiveness to 
customers' needs and desires. It is out of the question that the businesses studied 
have either the power or the means to impose their products on the market. 
5.6.4 Utilization 
With respect to input resources, all sampled businesses, i.e. both those within and 
outside of the Randstad, are able to make significant use of local conditions. Yet with 
respect to output resources, things are quite different. Unlike their counterparts 
outside of the Randstad, Randstad firms, from the very beginning of their business 
activity up to the moment of the interviews, have been able to sell the bulk of their 
products and services to local customers (Table 5.1). The Randstad entrepreneurs 
consider it of great importance to be located in the vicinity of their customers in order 
to gain access to them. This is most clearly revealed in the directors' answers to the 
question whether they think their businesses would have achieved the same rate of 
growth had they been located elsewhere in the country. Spontaneously, the respon-
dents name the proximity of customers as the decisive factor. Director Groenendijk of 
Groenendijk pic "I think tlmt here in Rotterdam the market is bigger than elsewhere. Even a 
location in the northern part of the Randstad would have made our growth rate less rapid, 
because quite a lot of makeshift sheds are let to industries here in the Rotterdam area, such as 
tlie petrochemical industry in the Europoort area." 
The other Randstad directors think that location elasticity is slightly higher. 
Director Van Leenen (Infotheek): "Within the Randstad I would have achieved the current 
growth of the company in any location; outside of the Randstad not, however. In that case, 
'distance' would emerge as the limiting factor. The majority of our clients are located in tlie 
Randstad. Since personal visits are important to our firm, one has to take travelling distance 
and travelling time into account. Well, in the case of a location outside of the Randstad, traffic 
jams would play an enormous, negative role. We establish sales outlets in the big cities; we 
have an outlet in Amsterdam [38 km] in order to be sited near our customers." Others 
express similar viewpoints. According to director De Zoete of Database Consultancy 
International: "A location in the North of the Netherlands, for example, would be very 
unfortunate, because our clients are big companies, of which the vast majority is located in the 
Randstad." And in the words of director Schoneveld of Waterland Automation: "I 
think that it is all the same whether we approach larger internationally operating companies 
from Purmerend or from elsewhere. But then I am referring specifically to the Randstad. " 
The only non-Randstad business in the sample to which local customers have 
been important is Intercai. The company was launched by two important orders for 
consultancy services concerning the installation of cable television mains. A third 
order from the provincial authority of the Province of Limburg in Maastricht (15 km) 
in 1983 was the break through for Intercai as far as director Kivits is concerned. To 
the question whether he thinks that Intercai would have achieved the same success in 
other places in the Netherlands, Kivits answers: "If local and provincial authorities in 
other places would have been as cooperative as those here in Limburg, I think that it would 
have occurred in Groningen, Leeuwarden, Appingendam, Delfzijl, or wherever, in the same 
way as it lias at the present location. But local authorities have been very valuable to us, since 
they did give us the ofiportunity to do our first projects. I am very grateful to them." 
However, now about half of the company's clients are located in the Randstad, at a 
distance of over 170 km from Geleen. Kivits thinks that this disadvantage is compen-
sated for by the image of the Province of Limburg as a relatively small-scale commun-
ity and as a region centrally placed in Europe. For these reasons, Kivits thinks that 
"Intercai as a consultancy bureau is better able to proliferate itself from Limburg than from 
the Randstad." Anyhow, it is salient that Intercai did not establish sales outlets in the 
Randstad nor in any other region of the country. Staff worker Donders emphasizes 
that the subsidiaries which Intercai did found in the Randstad and in other parts of 
the country do not function as sales outlets. Intercai's affiliates are functionally 
separated, and every single subsidiary covers the national market for its particular 
function(s). So, the Geleen office is specialized in the market segments of health care, 
media and regional policy. The Rotterdam office, on the other hand, is specialized in 
the segments of finance, insurance, and water transportation. In the Utrecht office, the 
unit of air, road and rail transport has been concentrated, as well as the units of 
tourism, agro-business, and national government. And Intercai Veldhoven, near 
Eindhoven, concentrates on manufacturing industry. 
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5.6.5 Summary 
It appears that the firms investigated here deal with inadequacies in the market in 
many different ways, of which adaptation is the most significant. In encountering the 
market, there is one notable difference between Randstad firms and non-Randstad 
firms in the sample, which also has been observed with respect to input linkages. This 
is that limited sales opportunities in the home region have induced the non-Randstad 
firms to pursue more intensively the adoption of a wider geographical action space 
than the Randstad-based companies. However, local market conditions in the 
periphery are nevertheless distinctive from local input conditions. The former 
(markets) are restricted to a much greater extent than the latter (inputs). Hence, local 
market conditions call forth more drastic counteraction than local input conditions. 
So, the more restricted availability of input supplies in peripheral areas does not 
become manifest to non-Randstad firms until they have reached a certain size and 
have been in existence for several years. In contrast, peripheral demand conditions are 
such that firms often have to make do without regional customers from the very 
beginning. Chapter Seven will elaborate on how these firms have succeeded in getting 
started while lacking any local output resources. Chapter Six attempts to explain why 
this situation has never undermined or hampered their growth. 
5.7 Coping with the environment; summary and conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to give some insight from a shop-floor perspective into 
the extent to which small and medium-sized businesses can take advantage of 
external resources. It also examined how these firms respond to actual and/or 
potential inconveniences in utilizing these resources. The recapitulation of this will 
take place in two steps. First, small-firm conduct towards external conditions will be 
summarized from a spatial point of view. Secondly, some concluding remarks will be 
made concerning the framework used to categorize firms' attempts to cope with 
external resource contingencies in general. 
5.7.1 The spatial dimension 
From a spatial perspective, three observations on small-firm behaviour towards the 
environment can be made on the basis of the empirical material presented in this 
chapter. One is that both Randstad and non-Randstad firms are able to take consider-
able advantage of local conditions. Centre-periphery contrasts seem to be moderate in 
the Netherlands. Secondly, the foregoing contention should be immediately qualified. 
On the one hand, convergence of economic conditions across space is related to the 
growth stage of a firm. As firms mature and professionalize, they raise their expecta-
tions of the quantity as well as the quality of external inputs and deliveries. Ultimate-
ly, greater resource capacities of central areas may become manifest. On the other 
hand, inter-regional convergence of economic conditions is different with respect to 
type of resources. Centre-periphery contrasts are greater and more discriminating in 
regard to local sales opportunities than to input resources. The third observation is 
that these comparative disadvantages did not prevent the peripheral firms from being 
successful. They are in principle able to overcome the constraints of the production 
environment by manipulating external resource conditions, by immunizing against 
them, or by adapting to them. In practice, coping with centre-periphery contrasts 
concerning the availability of resources manifests itself most clearly in non-Randstad 
businesses that had adopted a much wider geographical action radius earlier in their 
development than Randstad firms. I have interpreted this as a form of immunizing 
against local resource scarcities. With respect to manipulation, internalization, or 
adaptation strategies, no clear spatial dimension can be determined from the sample 
firms. It did not prove that non-Randstad firms took recourse to such strategies more 
frequently and intensively than Randstad firms. It is possible however, that a larger 
research sample would have revealed this as well, though perhaps somewhat less 
markedly. 
5.7.2 A general picture 
In the present chapter, attention has been focussed on action and counteraction. It 
must be noted that firms do not or are not able to react to every environmental threat 
or barrier they encounter. It also occurs that entrepreneurs go into action too late, not 
rigorously enough, or otherwise act in an inadequate way. This chapter is not meant 
to depict the survey firms as being able to resolve all the problems they run into, 
certainly not. The intention is to highlight the point that small firms need not be 
completely at the mercy of their environment, as is implied by ecological perspectives 
in both regional and administrative science. Surprisingly, many ways and means can 
be used by small firms to mitigate local resource deficiencies. This does not occur 
according to grandly designed strategic plans aimed at autonomous goal achievement, 
as is suggested by the bulk of corporate geography literature in regional science and 
by the rational action approach in administrative science. Rather, firms tackle the 
environment by means of numerous measures of all kinds. These vary from high-cost 
to low-cost, from permanent to temporary, from locational to in situ, from conspicu-
ous to inconspicuous, from drastic to moderate, and so forth and so on. 
In general, the sample businesses give the image of being involved in an endless 
struggle to bring firm and environment in line with each other. In other words, a firm 
continually tries to satisfy its resource needs, not so much through selective, sophisti-
cated strategies but rather via trial and error and taking many different, ad hoc 
measures simultaneously. On the other hand, the firms do not have to fight for every 
single resource unit required. Through prestige and reputation, firms exert influence 
on elements of the environment. These are the spill-over effects of prior successful 
growth. Such effects have been found to operate in regard to acquiring labour, 
financing, suppliers and customers. 
At the time, the businesses studied frequently have to adjust their objectives and 
change their tack in response to environmental constraints in order to survive. Some-
times, at a later point in time, initial objectives are eventually realized, either 
expectedly or surprisingly. Other adjustments, in contrast, cannot be reconsidered 
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anymore. They will exert their influence for years to come, such as when autonomy is 
lost. In this way, the survey firms are undisputedly affected by the environment in 
their heyday. However, they are not determined by it. 
The organizations' responses to the environment have been arranged according to 
how they deal with perceived or actual environmental constraints and opportunities. 
As a result, four types of action have been distinguished: manipulation, immuniz-
ation, adaptation, and utilization. At this point it should be reiterated that although 
the firms' actions have been presented as discrete strategies having clear-cut effects, 
these methods and effects are inextricably intertwined. There are many possible 
combinations of the foregoing perspectives that can characterize the interaction 
between a formal organization and its relevant environment. For example, before 
firms are able to influence customers' behaviour they first have to adapt to the 
buyers' needs and desires. Or, in order to fulfil the requirements of one actor in the 
environment, firms may have to exert pressure on others. So it is worth noting that 
the characteristics of small-firm conduct towards the environment may function as 
both means and ends (see also Chapter Three, note 3). Because of this interwoven 
aspect it is sometimes difficult adequately to classify actions into one of the four 
categories used. Clearly, each of these four perspectives represents only a partial view 
of the complex reality of small-firm behaviour towards the relevant environment. 
Only together do they provide a useful repertoire of complementary ways to deal 
with external threats and opportunities. 
Reviewing how small firms manage and resist the environment in which they are 
located, the rigorous environmentalist may object that ecological views do not 
contend that firms remain inactive vis-à-vis environmental conditions; rather, they are 
not able to overcome disadvantages effectively (see also Chapter Two, Section 2.3.3). In 
other words, even if organizations act against their environment energetically, all their 
attempts and endeavours can have only a symbolic value. This matter will be dealt 
with in the next chapter. 
Notes 
1. Donders is not dissatisfied with the labour supply in the local business region. Nonethe-
less, he acknowledges that acquisition of new personnel is easier in the Randstad than in 
Limburg. Donders: "Why is acquisition of new consultants more difficult in Limburg than in the 
Randstad? Because the entire market structure is concentrated in the western part of the country. 
What one realizes that it is there inhere the key firms in the field of telecommunications, such as 
Alcatel and PTT, are located, it stands to reason that it is easier to attract new personnel there 
than here in Geleen ". 
2. Kragtwijk gives two reasons for the organization's orientation toward the regional labour 
pool: "In the first place, the wage level is lower in Brabant than in the Randstad. Secondly, if we 
succeed in making people from Brabant feel at ease in our company, and when they have the 
opportunity to show their abilities, they will be less inclined to leave the firm in response to a 
higher wage offer elsewhere compared with employees living in the Randstad. " Kragtwijk thinks 
that the farther people have to travel from home to work, the less loyal they will be to 
their employer and the more likely they will stay only for a short while at their current 
workplace. 
3. Elephant Industries constitutes an exception to this, since Brouwers received start-up 
capital from an American supplier firm. 
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Chapter Six 
Environmental responsiveness of small firms (II): its 
strength 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter described extensively how small to medium-sized firms respond 
to pressures from the environment, either by means of elaborate, intelligent strategies 
or through straightforward, everyday behaviour. An attempt was made to place 
entrepreneurial actions and reactions of all kinds in a spatial perspective. Of course, it 
remains to be seen whether this entrepreneurial jostling vis-à-vis the environment is 
really effective. Or is it little more than a futile show of opposition to an inescapable 
fate? This chapter devotes attention to the forces which can make a firm effectively 
overcome comparative disadvantages (i.e., research question number two). 
Therefore we have to distance ourselves from the sample firms and resort to 
theoretical thinking. The framework for explaining the efficacy of resisting compara-
tive disadvantages is basically drawn from the literature and from theoretical work in 
several closely related fields. Where possible, this picture will be documented by 
empirical evidence from the sample firms. All in all, this means that the explanatory 
framework cannot be supported by sufficient quantitative or qualitative information 
to be able to accept or reject it with certainty. The scheme draws together four themes 
in contemporary economic-industrial research: the growing importance of differential 
advantages in creating competitiveness and the concurrent demise of the role of 
comparative advantages; the dynamism and instability of competitiveness; first-mover 
advantages; and organizational learning. 
It should be emphasized that organizational action is a prerequisite for 
mitigating locational or environmental disadvantages. Allowing mismatches between 
organization and environment to persist means that organizations eat into their slack 
(i.e., excess resources or reserves). Especially small organizations, which usually have 
little slack, cannot afford to let discrepancies between firm and environment exist 
without harming their market position. For instance, if the diminishing supply of 
appropriately skilled workers negatively affects the product quality of certain 
enterprises in a country or region, that downgrading will more rapidly and more 
adversely hamper the market position of a youthful small enterprise than that of a 
well-known established company. Whereas the reputation of the latter may form a 
temporary buffer against the effects of certain external threats, the former does not 
have that slack and must counteract the threats immediately. 
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On the other hand, employing adjustment strategies does not necessarily imply 
that the adaptation is effective. Let us recall Figure 2.2, which posed the hypothetical 
case of two initially identical firms differing only in their location. One business lies 
in a well-provided-for region and enjoys comparative factor advantages. The other is 
sited in a poorly equipped peripheral region and faces comparative disadvantages. 
These territorial differences in the availability of resources manifest themselves in 
higher productivity of the favourably located, central area business relative to its 
remote contender (i.e. locational efficiency). In order to effectively overcome these 
locational disadvantages, catch-up strategies of the disadvantaged firm must fulfil 
three conditions. First, they must yield revenues in excess of costs. Secondly, their net 
result must be large enough to outweigh, or at least offset, the comparative disadvan-
tage vis-à-vis the favourably located counterpart. And thirdly, this catch-up must be 
resistant to being nullified by means of simple imitation behaviour on the part of the 
central area firm. The next sections will deal consecutively with the costs, the 
revenues, and the sustainability of adaptation measures to environmental constraints. 
6.2. Adaptation costs 
Counteracting local resource scarcities has a cost. For example, supplementary in-
service training of newly hired workers involves not only direct education costs but 
also important indirect costs of lost working hours. Compensating for labour market 
deficiencies by calling in headhunters to search for professional workers and hiring 
them away from other firms far and wide also bears extra costs. These consist, for 
example, of the fees of the headhunter bureaus called in; extra bonuses and other 
expenditures (e.g. moving expenses) to induce workers to leave their current place of 
residence and make a long-distance relocation; and the opportunity costs of a longer 
search time to find the appropriate workers. Or take another example: the extra high 
call-out charges or the opportunity costs of the accessory search and travelling time 
entrepreneurs have to incur when they must consult distant agents every time they 
need to call in external advice; or the extra costs of calling in either external sales reps 
or hiring separate salesmen to work distant markets when local market capacity is 
depleted or non-existent; or the greater need for distinct market research. Still another 
example concerns the extra costs attached to setting up internal supply capacity when 
this cannot be found in the vicinity; and consider the accompanying loss of flexibility 
and quality of inputs, to which flexible specialization theory devotes so much atten-
tion. Many more instances of extra costs attached to production in peripheral places 
vis-à-vis central areas could be mentioned, including partial or integral firm reloca-
tion. 
However, not all adaptation behaviour is equally costly; some forms are clearly 
less expensive than others. For example, firms such as System House Comdes and 
Intercai, which provide training courses for the external labour market in their 
respective lines of business, take advantage of this activity by training and refreshing 
the skills of their own personnel without incurring any costs. Such spill-over effects 
are not restricted to the field of education and training, but may also take place in 
other domains. Intercai, for example, as a form of product development, supplies 
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organizational advice concerning the implementation of new communication systems 
in organizations. The company also uses this know-how for the benefit of its own 
reorganization. This can be concluded from the response of the staff member Donders 
to the question why Intercai did not call in external consultants to guide the reorgan-
ization the firm was going through at the end of the 1980s. Donders: "If you can give 
outside advice, you should be able to give inside advice as well. We did not obtain 
external advice, apart from some legal counsel about statutory labour relations and some fiscal 
advice." 
It also occurs that entrepreneurs receive external support to fill a gap in the 
production environment. For example, three firms in the sample received financial 
support from Local Employment Exchanges in providing training courses to the 
external labour force, as a way to upgrade the skills and know-how of the local 
labour supply (see Section 5.2). Other employers made use of cheap students on work 
placments, tailored their skills to the requirements of the respective production 
processes and subsequently attempted to incorporate them into their firm as soon as 
they finished their study and entered the labour market (section 5.2). In these cases 
the employers had a free ride on the budget of the Ministry of Education. Bronkhorst 
High Tech, another example, lets its personnel take computer courses which are 
financed by the branch organization the company is a member of. In passing, it 
should be kept in mind that these examples mainly concern savings in monetary 
terms, and that many costs remain. Take, for example, the opportunity costs of 
internal training and advice, i.e productive labour capacity being sacrificed. 
However, sometimes adaptation is even virtually free. This is the case when 
adaptation results from a favourable reputation or image of a firm. For instance, the 
diminishing response from the local labour force to new job vacancies of Intercai is 
counterbalanced by an autonomous increase in the response from outside of the local 
business area. Equally, Elephant Industries is able to attract the great majority of its 
workers from a distance of at least 30 km without offering extra financial bonuses. 
Similarly, Intercai's extension of its geographical market area within the Netherlands, 
beyond the boundaries of the business region is achieved virtually without cost, since 
this is an autonomous process based on word-of-mouth advertising. Donders: 
"Territorial market expansion has never been a major goal of Intercai. We never said: now, we 
serve the Limburg market and within two years we want to supply tlie Brabant and Zeeland 
markets, and within five years the Randstad... In the field of cable television you have a 
government network to deal with.As long as you are able to supply a good product local 
governments recommend you in this circuit. Well then, it is a matter of leapfrogging from one 
local district to another. And from local authorities, linkages develop, both with Provincial 
authorities and with private businesses. " 
Furthermore, in a small country like the Netherlands, which is equipped with a 
very sophisticated road and communication infrastructure as well, distance costs are 
presumably modest. Thus, the extra costs of being located in non-central areas will be 
moderated according to urban field theory (cf Wever 1985). On the other hand, in 
spite of its elaborate road infrastructure, traffic congestion is an urgent economic 
problem. It jeopardizes the increased access of outlying firms to central facilities. 
Anyhow, the contention that in the Netherlands production cost differentials between 
regions can be ignored is in need of direct empirical verification. Up to now this has 
hardly occurred, mainly because of great methodological difficulties in measuring 
production cost differences across space. Nevertheless, such efforts would be most 
welcome to the field of regional science. 
But even if production and adaptation costs in outer areas, within limits, do 
exceed costs in central locations, this does not rule out competitive production in such 
places (provided factorial resource endowment is not below a certain prohibitive 
threshold). One also has to incorporate the revenues of adaptation behaviour into the 
equation. 
6.3 Adaptation returns 
It is pointless to emphasize the costs of adaptation behaviour while neglecting its 
revenues. In modern trade theory, comparative advantages - that is, relative costs 
savings of production because of favourable local factor mixes - are increasingly 
pushed to the background as an explanation of trade patterns and competitive 
advantage. Endowed comparative advantages are increasingly being replaced by created 
absolute advaiifages as an explanation for trade patterns and competitive advantage. 
Thus, first it is argued that we now live in a world where factors of production for 
technologically stable products are not endowed, but instead "...created through 
investments made by individuals seeking to develop their skills, firms seeking the tools 
necessary for competing, and social institutions or governments hoping to benefit 
society or the economy" (Porter 1990a, 80). Almost any developed country making the 
effort can become as efficient as the next country in a technologically stable manufactur-
ing sector. To buttress this contention, Storper (1992) refers to Amendola, Guerrieri 
and Padoan (1991), who show that technological variation among major countries 
tends to diminish steadily after major technological revolutions. An important force 
which diminishes the role of factor comparative advantages is technological change. 
As Porter (1990a, 14) states: "Technology has given firms the power to circumvent 
scarce factors via new products and processes. It has nullified, or reduced, the 
importance of certain factors of production that once loomed large." Porter gives the 
example of Swedish iron ore. The low phosphorous content of Swedish iron ores was 
an important advantage as long as the technology of steelmaking had difficulty 
dealing with impurities. As steelmaking improved, however, the phosphorous 
problem was solved, nullifying Sweden's factor advantage. Diminishing the import-
ance of factor advantages not only occurs with respect to 'traditional' natural 
resources but also regarding 'modern' agglomeration advantages, such as labour. 
Ongoing automation and robotization is reducing the labour content of products in 
some industries, not only of low wage labour but increasingly also of medium and 
highly skilled workers. 
Rapid interfirm and intercountry technological imitation behaviour makes such 
modem process and production techniques widely available. The result is conver-
gence in the costs of production of different countries in a wide array of markets. Yet, 
trade and trade specialization between countries and regions persist and are increas-
ing. So, as a second argument it is reasoned that something must make advantage 
possible in the face of rapid imitation by (potential) competitors. Many analysts now 
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suggest that this force is continuous innovation on the basis of technological mastery, 
which gives rise to absolute advantages. The latter differ from comparative advantages: 
they reflect productivity gaps between countries or regions that are so great that they 
are insensitive to almost any set of changes in input prices (Dosi, Pavitt and Soete 
1990; Storper 1992, 65). As such, the concept of absolute advantages is strongly related 
to the concept of differentiation, which incorporates the phenomenon of a firm creating 
a unique benefit that outweighs the disadvantages due to higher production costs 
(Porter 1985). 
It is this notion of created absolute or differential advantages which underlies 
the explanation of observed disruptions of established positions of nations, regions 
and businesses, pushing the capitalist economy to grow and keeping it from ever 
settling into (neoclassical) equilibrium. Disadvantages and falling behind play a 
crucial role in this everlasting process of leaders being outwitted by laggards. 
According to Porter (1990a), innovation and advancement results from offsetting 
weaknesses, from being challenged by bottlenecks and threats, rather than from 
exploiting strengths. Disadvantages prod or force a nation's firms to seek new 
solutions. Thus, stress instead of munificence is the moving spirit behind innovation 
and advancement. As Porter states (1990a, 174): "Competitive advantage emerges 
from pressure, challenge, and adversity, rarely from an easy life1." Furthermore, 
Porter stresses that innovation to circumvent (selective) factor disadvantages is 
disruptive. This means that innovations may generate all kinds of benefits, though 
sometimes hard to anticipate, which far exceed their costs and may even exceed the 
advantages of competitors. In this way, winners may turn into losers in the capitalist 
economy. As Storper and Walker (1989, 48) put it: "capitalism is a mode of production 
in which 'all that is solid melts into air'. Simply making the best use of current 
resources - the neoclassical vision of economic rationality - is not the point; overcom-
ing present limits to growth is." This dynamic disequilibrium model of 
competitiveness and economic growth manifests itself in space in the form of a 
process which Storper and Walker call leapfrogging. With this they mean the process 
by which (certain) lower-order centres, regions or nations, take over the lead of 
established ones every time new major innovations break through and new industrial 
ensembles emerge (Storper and Walker 1989,11-18). 
It is these dynamic disequilibrium forces, growing out of created absolute 
advantages, to which this section refers for a theoretical explanation of how busi-
nesses in non-central locations gain a competitive edge over firms located in well-
provided-for agglomerated environments by counteracting territorial resource 
scarcities. To that end, it must be shown that overcoming the limitations of the 
regional production environment generates important differential advantages. This, in 
turn, can reverse an initially bad position to create a leading position2. As Porter 
(1990b, 78) states: "a [factor] disadvantage in a static model of competition can become 
an advantage in a dynamic one." A number of examples of this reversal will be 
presented below. 
155 
6.3.1 Examples of advantages induced by factor constraints 
Advantages induced by labour market constraints 
In the early 1980s, Quekel and Kragtwijk of System House Comdes had the problem 
that they could not find sufficient highly educated automation staff within the 
regional labour market (i.e. in the Province of Brabant). Furthermore, there was no 
opportunity to contract out automation training of people who lack knowledge in the 
field of computer science. In those days no such facilities existed in the local region. 
In response to the regonal employment situation Quekel and Kragtwijk had no choice 
but to make people acquainted with the field of computer science themselves. They 
decided to invest in developing an automation course for new personnel. 
Subsequently, the two men hired unemployed but highly educated people and gave 
them computer training in-house. When other organizations got wind of Comdes's 
automation training activities, they approached the software company to provide 
computer courses for their staff as well. Kragtwijk and Quekel complied with these 
requests. Training activities eventually developed into one of Comdes's core activities 
and main money makers (Vaessen and Wever 1990, 82). 
The discovery of new business opportunities is but one advantage of tackling 
labour market constraints by means of extra internal education efforts. Several studies 
have examined labour market behaviour and training efforts of small innovative and 
high-technology companies in agglomeration areas on the one hand and outlying 
rural areas on the other. These studies reveal that the latter rely to a greater extent on 
internal labour markets and have higher training efforts than the former. This is 
precisely because of constrained external employment conditions (cf Oakey and 
Cooper 1989, Angel 1991, Meyer-Krahmer 1985). And it is precisely these greater 
training efforts and reliance on internal labour resources, commanded by external 
constraints, which possibly may give rise to extra differential advantages. For, it is 
widely recognized by economists and administrative scientists that investing in 
human capital by providing company training programmes and creating internal 
labour markets has an advantage over tapping external ones. The former alternative 
encourages motivation, initiative and creativity of workers to a greater extent than the 
latter (cf Lazonic 1989, 87; Reich 1989, 1990; De Smidt 1991). This effect is also clearly 
demonstrated by director Jansen of Casolith Sheets (Vaessen and Wever 1990, 47). 
A third advantage which may rise out of shortages of suitable personnel is that 
this constraint can lead to technological innovation. For example, severe labour 
shortages lead many firms in Japan to invest heavily in labour saving equipment, 
particularly industrial robots. This is likely to further strengthen an economy that is 
already murderously competitive in export markets around the world (Newsweek 2-
7-1990, cf also Porter 1990a). 
Advantages induced by financial environment constraints 
The sample firms also provide some examples of environmental resistance strategies 
from which differential advantages may be derived. Consider, for instance, the fact 
that director Jansen decided to let the employees take over Casolith Sheets when he 
couldn't find sufficient external investors who were prepared to buy shares (see 
Section 5.3). This step, bom of necessity, may well have engendered differential 
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advantages since businesses with employee ownership tend to perform better than 
businesses where this is not the case (Voûte 1991). This is mainly because employee 
equity participation enhances motivation and commitment, and thus raises productiv-
ity. 
Another example in the sphere of finance is provided by director Weishaupt of 
Rood Testhouse. The firm has had great difficulty in obtaining sufficient investment 
capital in the infancy stage. Weishaupt: "For financing we have crossed the whole 
country". After four years of searching and not giving up, an important breakthrough 
occurred (see Section 5.3). When asked whether these problems had seriously 
damaged the growth of the firm, Weishaupt answered: "Looking back, 1 would say that 
this lias not occurred. At the time, it was very distressing.You do not realize that you are 
undergoing an important learning process. You get to know so many people who turn out to 
be very advantageous afterwards ". 
Advantages induced by market constraints 
As indicated above, one possible adaptation to local resource constraints consists of 
extending the operational space and tapping extra-regional sources. This was done 
particularly with respect to limited sales opportunities in the regional business 
environment. The Randstad businesses in the sample still clung to the surrounding 
regional home market very strongly at least ten years after their foundation. Yet from 
the outset non-Randstad firms operated mainly on extra-regional if not foreign 
markets. This finding corroborates that of Meyer-Krahmer (1985), who notes that 
innovative firms in rural areas with adverse structures have a higher outward 
onentedness than innovative firms in dense agglomerations. Peters (1990, 203) observes 
that the faster-growth firms serve a wider spread of markets. Furthermore, "it is clear 
that this wide spread of customers served .... resulted in the growth of the high fliers 
[i.e. rapid-growth firms] rather than vice versa" (ibid). Thus, Peters suggests that firms 
derive growth incentives from surmounting space and distance. In a similar vein, 
Kotabe and Czinkota (1992) find that export significantly benefits a firm's 
competitiveness. Export improves sales, managerial skill and a firm's competitive 
position. 
In contrast, spatial researchers perceive the distance factor as merely a source of 
extra production costs, and as the main factor inhibiting remote firm growth. In the 
following, attention will be given to the advantages which can be reaped from 
overcoming the distance barrier. So, the extra expense incurred by tapping extra-
regional resources instead of regional ones should not be viewed as costs but as 
investments. To an extent, it is surprising that this viewpoint has not made its way 
into in regional science. Spatial scientists have recognized expenditures to overcome 
other kinds of barriers and time lags as investments from which differential advan-
tages may be reaped. A notable example forms the mastering of technological barriers 
by means of R&D investments. 
Future business development attached to operating in an extensive market 
space has some advantages over concentration on the same output in one single but 
affluent region. One potential advantage is that this may improve a firm's reputation 
and thus strengthen its position within the home market. This effect has been 
observed with respect to firms engaged in export activities (Daems and Douma 1989, 
Bakker 1980, Porter 1990a), but it may well apply to an interregional market outlook 
as well 
Secondly, having a foothold in several regions of industrial activity may well 
be more conducive to a firm's knowledge of the technical and customer standards 
which govern the market than concentrating all the sales in one area All of the most 
advanced and sophisticated buyers are rarely located at home, even under the best of 
circumstances (Porter 1990a, 607-608) The most demanding customers are not 
exclusively located in a country's economic heartland For example, regions with strict 
environmental policies may be marked agricultural or rural areas, where there may or 
may not be severe environmental pollution Similarly, product requirements reflecting 
specific structural, cultural and especially natural conditions which prod innovation, 
need not run parallel to the centre-periphery dichotomy within a nation Obviously, 
what applies to a firm with sales spread nationally applies to an even greater degree 
to a firm having its sales dispersed internationally 
Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, highly outward-oriented firms will 
encounter a diversity of market needs due to legal, cultural, sectoral, natural and other 
differences between nations and regions This diversity will be greater than that 
confronting their more inward-oriented counterparts So, the former group of firms 
may develop greater product and process flexibility in order to deal with these 
differences Director Aalberts of Aalberts Industries provides a clear example of this 
In the beginning of the 1970s, during a business trip in the United States, Aalberts 
came across a small firm which produces moulds by means of aluminium extrusion, 
which are sold to the aviation industry Aalberts was convinced that he could do the 
same, and he set out to study how to process aluminium In the beginning, the 
business did not come off the ground very smoothly, and hefty losses were incurred 
Aalberts himself travelled throughout the country, trying to sell his profiles In this 
way he gained a great deal of information about the variety of wishes and require-
ments of different types of potential customers Concerning this early start-up period, 
Aalberts (FEM, 25-2-1989, 68) said "We learned a lot Because of the experience we gained 
then, we now have become one of the few companies in Europe, which in close consultation 
witli the client are able to produce tailor-made products of aluminium and steel " Director 
Aalberts has made good use of these expensive lessons m the early beginning, since 
his company has grown very successfully 
Fourth, that which applies to the most demanding and elaborated standards as 
well as for diversity of market needs also applies to new developments Firms with an 
extensive action radius are more likely to be directly confronted with new develop-
ments at an earlier point in time than businesses with a more limited action radius (cf 
also Porter 1990a, 59) This may favour the timing of their innovations An example is 
provided by director Kragtwijk of the Comdes Group A major specialization of 
System House Comdes is engineering software for hospital automation, which the 
firm markets under the label Rodtas The initial software was developed in response to 
an order by the Lukas Hospital in Amsterdam, which in the early 1980s started 
automating its radiology department Subsequently, Comdes was successful in selling 
Rodias on the German and Belgian markets as well "Thereby," Kragtwijk said, "we try 
to introduce the experience gained m Germany, Belgium, and even in Oman here in the 
Netherlands You only have to look, for example, at a simple thing like cancer registration In 
Germany this lias been required by law for five to six years already. Over there, they biow 
exactly how to do this. In the Netherlands, no initiatives Imve been taken on this yet, but the 
time is drawing near. By now, we are already introducing tlie German system here in 
Holland. Well, in that way you gain a certain advantage over [domestic] competitors ". 
Another example of this is provided by Nedap. In the late 1960s director 
Paijens came into contact with chips technology as well as with synthetics technology 
for the substitution of metal and Bakelite casings by synthetic ones. This took place 
via very good relations the company maintains with Swiss watchmakers such as 
Omega. Via a subsidiary of Omega, Paijens got hold of an early electronic watch, 
made in Japan, and a synthetic one, made in Switzerland. From the Swiss, Paijens 
learned how to assemble synthetic coverings. However, to grasp the technology of the 
electronic part of the new Japanese watches Paijens requested professor Rodenburg of 
the University of Twente to give him more information. Rodenburg took Paijens and 
some of his fellow workers along with him to U.S. and showed him Silicon Valley, 
particularly Stanford Research Institute. This occurred in 1972. Paijens was very 
impressed. Paijens: "They showed us the articles which were going to capture the future. We 
got the fright of our lives over there." The long and the short of this is that Nedap was 
able to apply chips technology in the products it manufactured in the early 1970s (e.g. 
switches). The company saw opportunities to apply integrated circuit technology in 
the field of electronic detection systems. However, in those days, the market was not 
ripe for this yet. Paijens: "We took our ideas out on the road but couldn't sell anything." 
Nevertheless, the breakthrough of the company as a successful micro-electronics firm 
was only a matter of time. In 1976 its time had come, though rather unexpectedly. 
Paijens: "During a birthday party a fellow worker heard somebody telling that there was a 
need for a system with which cows could be automatically fed with concentrates in a 
programmed way. Our man responded that Nedap possessed the right knowledge for develop-
ing such a system. The day after, that person showed up on our doorstep. " The result is that 
the company started developing a so-called responder, an electronic system for 
identification in the form of a collar. Paijens: "It proved that our system lent itself 
perfectly to this. A year thereafter we had drawn in orders worth three million guilders. We 
were the first in the Netherlands with a good system for administering feed concentrates 
automatically" (cf also NRC 18-11-1987; Paijens 1987). By 1987 Nedap had about 40 per 
cent of the world market for electronic collars. 
A final example which demonstrates that a high outward-orientedness is a 
prerequisite for determining the right time to launch new products relates to 
Bronkhorst High Tech. BHT's major competitors are located in America. According to 
director Jouwsma, his firm has a lead of two years over the Americans. In order to 
retain this advantage, Bronkhorst must make sure that it has finished developing a 
new generation of instruments on the right time. Jouwsma: "Thus, the moment they 
show signs they are ready to come onto the market with a new product, we are able to deliver 
ours instantly." 
Timing is intertwined with a fifth important source of advantage for firms with 
a wide geographical (market) outreach relative to their counterparts, who are focused 
on their home region. The former enjoy so-called first-mover advantages associated with 
earlier extension of the action space. First-mover advantages are benefits which accrue 
to a firm not because it is better but because it is earlier than a competitor in taking a 
particular action (Porter 1985). This type of advantage arises when firms move first or 
early into new technologies. However, according to Porter (ibid), the same advantages 
can also accrue to the first firms to move into a geographical area. First-mover 
advantages are particularly important in that they are not very susceptible to rapid 
imitation behaviour by competitors. The next section will devote more attention to 
this issue, i.e. the (un)susceptibility of catch-up strategies to imitation by contenders. 
6.4 The sustainability of revenues from adaptation behaviour 
Let us recall the hypothetical two-firm case, consisting of one central and one remote 
firm. The latter does not resign itself to its locational disadvantage and takes certain 
innovative steps which make it strongly competitive3. The former, perceiving this, 
does not just stand around watching. It can restore its initial comparative advantage 
due to its location by simply imitating the strategic step of the disadvantaged firm. In 
this way, it can achieve the same revenues. For example, imagine that it proves that 
employee ownership, introduced by a peripheral firm because of lack of alternative 
sources of finance (e.g. Casolith Sheets, page 120), enhances its performance. Once 
aware of this, the central firm may also adopt this form of finance. Thereby, it re-
establishes its initial comparative advantage. 
Another example might be the case of a promising lean-area firm initiating 
robotization in response to labour shortages in the external environment. Its competi-
tor in the centre sees this occurring and fears being outstripped by this manoeuvre. It 
decides to follow its remote contender and starts robotizing too. Carrying through the 
innovation is likely to be more efficient in the central-area firm than in the one far 
away, for two reasons. First, the outlying-area firm is the first to develop robotization 
of the production process and therefore incurs pioneering costs (see Porter 1985). The 
central-area firm does not, since it may imitate this innovation (so-called second or 
late-mover advantages). Secondly, because of a wide range of factor advantages, it is 
much easier for the central-area firm to call in external support to overcome barriers 
and difficulties encountered in carrying out this innovation than it would be for its 
peripheral counterpart. Thus, the innovation process is likely to take place more 
smoothly and efficiently in the central firm than in the outlying one. As a result, the 
catch-up attempt does not get the latter firm anywhere. On the other hand, we should 
realize that this is only a theoretical case. In practise, firms may not always react so 
quickly to each other, for of all kinds of rigidities may interfere. For example, the 
central-area firm may become aware of the catch-up strategy of its disadvantaged 
contender rather late. It may underestimate the strategic move of its competitor. Or it 
may be unwilling to give up some of its initial comparative advantage, and so forth 
and so on. As a consequence, the innovating peripheral-area firm in our example may 
enjoy a competitive edge over its centrally located competitor for a considerable 
period of time. Nevertheless, this lead remains vulnerable to imitation by competitors. 
This is, however, not the whole story. In some instances, imitation behaviour 
on the part of the central-area firm may not suffice to close the gap created by a 
disadvantaged firm which has taken the lead by making a quantum leap. This is the 
case when first-mover advantages arise. 
6.4.1 First-mover advantages across space 
Porter (1985) mentions several types of potential first-mover advantages which may 
accrue to a firm taking a particular action first. In this section, only some of them will 
be mentioned. Here the accent lies on firms moving first into a geographical area. 
Pre-empting markets and resources 
A first (or early) mover may pre-empt resources, an attractive product, or market 
position, and thus force followers to use or adopt less desirable ones. This applies 
particularly to highly specialized niche markets, where resources are scarce on a 
world-wide basis. An example is Bronkhorst High Tech. The entire line of business in 
which the firm operates comprises only 13 firms, of which BHT belongs to the top-
five in terms of annual sales volume. And according to Jouwsma, the market cannot 
accommodate more businesses. After ten years of entrepreneurship, Jouwsma and 
Bruggeman are convinced that they started their firm at the right moment. "Now, it 
would not be possible any more. The pie has beai divided up. No room is left for a newcomer" 
(van Berkel 1991, 17). For the same reason, it is fortunate that Bruggeman and 
Jouwsma did not delay in addressing foreign markets. As from the very start-up, BHT 
still operates mainly on an international market. It now sells its products virtually 
world-wide. 
Channel selection and market expansion strategy 
The firm first operating on a extra-regional market can pick the best brokers, distribu-
tors, or retailers to deal with distant customers. Or it may pilfer the most attractive 
opportunities to address distant markets from right under the nose of its competitors. 
A case in point, is again Bronkhorst High Tech. In the beginning, the company used 
the more limited but more accessible international laboratory market as a launch pad 
for reaching the more prosperous but less accessible OEM market. Had Bruggeman 
and Jouwsma started their firm at a later point in time, the laboratory market would 
probably have already been exhausted by a predecessor. It would no longer be a 
useful springboard to reach the OEM market. Consequently, Jouwsma and 
Bruggeman would have been confronted with the difficult task of dealing with the 
OEM market directly. 
Institutional barriers 
Porter (1985) notes that being first in a country may give a company special status 
with the government. The case of Intercut suggests aiming at such an advantage, 
though not only with respect to entering a foreign country; for example, the annual 
report of 1989 showed a picture of the Belgian minister M. Colla visiting Intercai 
Belgium. It also seeks that advantage when it enters new domestic regions. On 18 
December 1990, for instance, Intercai Utrecht moved to new premises. The new office 
was opened by the Mayor of Utrecht, Mrs. M.W.M Vos-Van Cortei. 
Spatial learning advantages 
Small firms selling in distant markets have another important though intangible 
advantage over their counterparts whose trade is concentrated (mainly) in one region. 
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The former have already taken a difficult hurdle which the latter still have to 
surmount if growth is to be sustained. In other words, the former have a learning 
advantage in regard to addressing distant customers, who are difficult to reach . 
There is a large element of risk attached to such efforts. This is especially true when it 
comes to developing export markets. The expenditure can be considerable for small 
firms, while the sales potential is uncertain. However, even centrally located firms 
eventually have to break out of the local business region if they intend to continue 
growth. Promising peripheral firms are forced to take this step much earlier in their 
life cycle, if not from the beginning. This is because of limited market opportunities in 
their home region. However, if they succeed in accomplishing this, they may reap 
important competitive advantages simply by taking this step earlier than their central 
counterparts. From Taylor (1975) we may deduce that such spatial learning' constitutes 
a learning process by which firms expand their operational space and thereby cross 
progressively larger thresholds, i.e. local, regional and national boundaries. So, a firm 
may have to go through a process of geographical expansion within the domestic 
market before it is prepared to cross the national boundary. Welch and Wiedersheim-
Paul (1981) and Wiedersheim-Paul et al (1983) refer to this process as domestic 
internationalizntion, reasoning that the domestic expansion process can be characterized 
as a type of internationalization. They argue that as a firm expands its operations into 
more distant regions, it moves into less familiar territory, i.e. more 'foreign' markets. 
Communication is more difficult and costly than for the local region. But as these 
barriers are overcome, the relative 'foreignness' of distant markets is reduced6. Also, 
the firm is likely to develop skills in marketing a product at a distance. The first 
mover begins down the spatial learning curve earlier than his followers. For the latter, 
it is difficult to reach the same level, since spatial learning is a matter of learning-by-
doing or learning-by-experience (cf Denis & Depelteau 1985, Welch and Wiedersheim-
Paul 1981). And that is a highly individual or localized process. Because of these 
features of learning-by-doing processes, spatial learning advantages are sustainable 
and difficult to overcome by competitors (cf Stiglitz 1987). The occurrence of spatial 
learning processes is clearly suggested by an Australian investigation. This research 
reveals that non-exporters take almost three times as long as exporters to expand 
interstate on the domestic market (Welch and Wiedersheim-Paul 1981). 
6.5 Summary 
Although locationally disadvantaged firms may have higher production costs than 
businesses in well-provided-for areas, these higher costs do not necessarily prohibit 
the former from being able to outcompete the latter. The success of the sample firms 
is based on their superior market position. That superiority is the result of absolute or 
differential advantages, which eclipse the role of production costs. This explains the 
viewpoint of director Aalberts of Aalberts Industries. When asked whether the fact 
that many business services cannot be found in the business region is harmful to 
business performance, Aalberts replied: "It is all the same to lis whether such businesses 
are located in the vicinity of tlie firm or elsewhere. We simply let them come over here rather 
tlian Imving to travel to Amsterdam ourselves [181 km].... That really causes no problem." 
162 
Aalberts gives the impression that he considers the extra call-out charges as a joke. 
Against the background of high incomes such costs are 'peanuts' For the same 
reason, other directors in the sample can brush aside supposed disadvantages of 
having material suppliers that are not located in their vicinity (cf Chapter Five, 
Section 5.4) Actually no sample firm operates at maximal cost efficiency Yet this 
does not prevent them from growing bigger and bigger, thanks to their high incomes 
resulting from their superior market position Thus, for example, Bronkhorst High 
Tech's growth is not curbed by the persistent, wasteful difficulties the company had 
in implementing the nght business automation system System House Comdes, in its 
heyday, could permit some bungling to find the right organizational structure without 
hampering company growth (Vaessen and Wever 1990) The labour market defi-
ciencies which Waterland Automation encountered in the mid-1980s may have slowed 
down company growth, according to Schoneveld, but certainly did not block it And 
although Infotheek cannot hedge fully against delivery uncertainties caused by its 
hardware supplier (IBM), the company has nevertheless been growing very rapidly 
The one-sided concern with the costs of the 'distance' factor, leads to a 
significant narrowing of the scope of regional development theory, especially in 
regard to flexible agglomeration theory Regional scientists only consider the extra 
costs outlying area firms have to incur to deal with greater distances relative to their 
more favourably located counterparts With that focus, they fail to give consideration 
to the extra revenues which may be gained in overcoming this hindrance This 
chapter has given special attention to promising peripheral area firms which, driven 
by local resource scarcities, are forced to extend their market outreach beyond the 
boundaries of their regional home base earlier and more intensively than their 
favourably located counterparts We have argued that those firms can thus reap 
important differential or absolute benefits Such advantages are highly insensitive to 
the higher production costs which may be attached to a place of location outside a 
country's economic heartland Moreover, because these benefits include learning 
advantages, they may be immune to imitation strategies and therefore remain 
sustainable This is what Porter (1990a, 64-65) makes contending that the differential 
advantages of moving early in international competition can generate leadership 
positions which can be held for decades, if not longer 
One point remains to be addressed, however It cannot be denied that the 
responsiveness of small firms towards environmental limitations merely reflects the 
strength of the companies' human and material resources The crux of the matter is, 
of course, that these firms' capabilities do not appear out of thin air The last question 
to be posed in this research therefore concerns the ultimate origins of the resilience 
observed among the surveyed firms 
Notes 
1 The role of pressures and factor disadvantages is, however, not unconditioned, 
according to Porter Factor disadvantages must be selective to motivate and not 
discourage, involving some but not all factors A lack of pressure means that there is 
rarely progress, but too much adversity leads to paralysis An intermediate level of 
pressure, involving a balance of advantage in some areas and disadvantage in selected 
others, seems to be the best combination for improvement and innovation. Further-
more, disadvantages in basic and generalized factors (such as the absence of domestic 
raw materials or shortages of low and semiskilled labour) and high absolute factor 
costs can be much better circumvented by means of innovation relative to disadvan-
tages with respect to advanced and specific factors, such as highly and narrowly skilled 
workers, technological infrastructure and scientific knowledge bases in particular fields. 
Therefore, while the former adversaries act as triggers, the latter function as inhibitors 
of innovation and advancement. Thus, "A nation's firms succeed in an industry because 
pressures are juxtaposed with some advantages in responding to them, such as 
sophisticated local demand, a highly developed supplier base, and specialized factor 
pools (Porter 1990a, 174)." So, even though Porter keeps repeating the message that 
competitive advantage results from overcoming barriers instead of using advantages, 
ultimately his perspective is ecological, or - using Porter's own terminology - Ricardian 
(ibid, 173). 
2. It may be clear that this ability to turn negatives into positives is not granted to every 
firm. Otherwise small-business growth in peripheral areas would be a phenomenon 
much more common than it actually is. After all, in itself the occurrence of environ-
mental barriers does not trigger differential advantages; businesses must also have the 
right capacities and sufficient means to master these constraints. 
3. This is not to suggest that only scarcity of external resources stimulate innovativeness 
and that munificence does not. Arguing this would be ridiculous as in general the 
majority of innovative businesses are located in well-provided-for metropolitan 
heartlands. This applies even to the Netherlands (Davelaar 1989). In regional science 
several theories explain this phenomenon (Davelaar 1989, Malecki 1991). What is 
contended in this text is that innovations and advantages may arise both from liarsh' 
and from 'benign' conditions in the local business environment. For example, whereas 
a lean-area firm having its buyers widely dispersed across space may have better 
knowledge of the diversity of customer demands, a central-area firm having its clients 
located close by may have more intimate knowledge of customer demand. Differential 
advantages may be reaped from both factors. 
4. On the other hand, central area firms are more likely to grow larger in their business 
region, i.e. to accumulate more assets, than their peripheral contenders. Thus, the 
former may be better equipped to undertake the venture of breaking out of the home 
region. However, if first-mover advantages in entering a geographical space do exist, 
the central-area firms may need these extra resources badly as well, since late movers 
may face distinctive disadvantages which lead to higher costs (Porter 1985). This is 
aggravated by the fact that the market capacity outside of the core region may be so 
limited that in some countries central-area firms virtually have to jump from the 
regional to the international level when expanding their market space. It obviously 
requires large amounts of moneyand skills to accomplish this. On the other hand, if 
these central-area firms prove to be able to realize such a giant step across space, they 
may well have compensated for falling behind the outward-oriented peripheral-area 
firms in the spatial learning process. 
5. The term spatial learning has been borrowed from Harrison et al. (1979). 
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6. Apart from communication (and information) barriers, the so-called threshold fear forms 
another important barrier in the spatial learning curve. The threshold fear relates to the 
attitude and orientation of the decision-maker with respect to addressing distant 
markets. Thereby, Wiedersheim-Paul et al. (1983) see not only export markets as 
'foreign' or distant, but also regions outside of the local environment. They define 
international orientation as: "tine extent to which a decision maker perceives and 
considers as interesting events occurring outside his own country - or perhaps even 
outside his own local environment" (ibid, 48). Overcoming threshold fear is the first 
priority of non-exporting firms with the potential to actually become exporters (Dichtl 
et al. 1983). It has been shown that unless decision-makers possess certain opinions and 
attitudes, firms will not respond adequately to export opportunities, such as an 
unsolicited order from a foreign customer, nor will they adequately exploit internal 
potentials, such as the unique characteristics of their product (Dichtl et al. 1983, 1984). 
Furthermore, it appears that exporters have a higher level of education, less fear of the 
risks involved, lower cost estimates of export activities, and less fear of communication 
difficulties than their colleagues concentrating on the local market. 
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Chapter Seven 
Environmental responsiveness of small firms (III): 
its origins 
7.1 Introduction 
In attempting to discover the origins of the high level of adaptability and fitness of 
the sample firms, our attention is drawn to their history. After all, the ability of busi-
nesses to respond effectively to comparative disadvantages is dependent on their 
accumulated stock of assets, both financial and non-financial (e.g. experience, skills, 
knowledge). So a company's present adaptability results from a company's past 
success (see Levinthal 1991). Consequently, to trace the ultimate origins of a (contem-
porary) business's resilience, we have to review the determinants of its initial growth. 
The money made in this incipient period governs the organization's scope for 
subsequent development and survival. It determines the range of options available for 
organizational reflection and problem solving; it sets the stage on which management 
can act. In sum, the slack resources created in the infant growth phase define the 
opportunities for future survival and growth of a new firm. Growth, in tum, is 
dependent upon the firm's success in marketing the goods and services produced. 
The impact of the initial market position on the chance of survival can be illustrated 
in the light of an example borrowed from Levinthal (1991, 399). The first spreadsheet 
program for the MS-DOS operating system, developed by Lotus Corporation, was a 
phenomenal success. This successful initial product introduction buffered the 
company from imminent failure despite the turbulence of the computer software 
industry and Lotus's subsequent difficulty in introducing new products and extend-
ing its product line. 
The only viable way to generate enough money to cover the cash demands of 
the pioneering phase is by obtaining enough orders. Easy access to customers is 
crucial to rapid growth. The adage that business growth starts with access to markets 
is meant not in a deterministic but in a facilitative way; that is, market access is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for sustained growth. All the sample firms, 
irrespective of whether or not they ran into trouble afterwards, got past the phase of 
early growth. 
But what are the factors out of which initial success in the marketplace 
evolves? For the sample firms two sources influenced the market position of start-up 
firms, both lying outside of the companies' walls. One is the regional environment or 
ecology. 
7.2 The regional ecology 
Obviously, small firms located in a metropolitan core region, where large numbers of 
potential buyers are concentrated, may enjoy a major advantage over firms in the 
periphery. Those in the core may receive a greater impetus for growth because they 
are in much closer proximity to the market. Remember that a wide gap was observed 
between the opportunity for centrally and peripherally situated firms to rely on local 
customers. Proximity can facilitate access to buyers. Along the lines of spatial 
monopoly hypothesis in regional science (McDermott 1974, Greenhut 1974) Porter 
(1990a, 1990b), argues that this is because distance to potential buyers affects the 
producer's knowledge of their demands and needs. He suggests that the closer the 
potential buyers, the more intimate the producer's market knowledge will be, the 
better the manufacturer is able to adopt, and the more ready is his access to the 
market. Waterland Automation seems to lend support to this line of reasoning. The 
automation firm was founded in response to its founder's knowledge of the difficulty 
that locally based large manufacturing enterprises experienced in detaching from 
central computer centres for administration automation in the 1970s. 
As head of the 'process automation' department of the fairly big metalworking 
company VMF Stork in Amsterdam, Pieter Schoneveld had to deal with business 
automation. Schoneveld: "In those days [mid-1970s] mini-computer systems arose, which 
basically enabled organizations to break away from central computer centres. We conducted 
relatively much research into this phenomenon. Thereby we could also observe that this 
decentralization of business automation caused conflicts between the computer centre and the 
organization. This induced me to start a business of my own, to further develop administrative 
business automation.... To me it was perfectly clear that the preference to undertake automa-
tion at firm sites, which the rise of mini-computer systems made possible, was an enormously 
rapidly growing market segment. "Schoneveld appeals to the personal connections 
established in this period of research to get the first customers. His idea proved to be 
sound. Schoneveld: "I Imd no difficulty in finding customers, who were located in Amster-
dam - where I started the company - and in the middle of the country, in Utrecht [37 km) 
and its surrounding area." 
Not only was the perception of market opportunities underlying the start-up 
of Waterland Automation grounded within the business region. Also the initial trigger 
for acquiring a unique software product, called IMPCON, which gives Waterland a 
differential advantage, comes from the immediate business environment. After all, 
requests by customers - who were all locally based in the beginning - to implement 
production control systems on mini-computers led Schoneveld in 1981 to start 
investigating American Material Resource Planning (MRP) system software, albeit 
without much success. However, via his contacts with English software companies -
also dating from his period at Stork VMF - Schoneveld got into touch with a London 
company, Computer Systems Development (CSD). It appeared that CSD was ahead in 
developing MRP software. CSD was one of the first companies that was able to bring 
an MRP software package onto the market, called IMPCON. Waterland purchased 
IMPCON and was able to adapt it to the Dutch market successfully. IMPCON became 
the main money maker of the company. 
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The case of Groenendijk pic demonstrates how the density of the regional sales 
market can trigger business growth, in that market opportunities virtually impose 
themselves upon producers. Groenendijk was established in 1947 in Rotterdam by Mr. 
M. Groenendijk as a one-man transport business. This situation remained the same for 
about 20 years. Then, in the second half of the 1960s, the firm gradually expanded to 
about six or seven trucks, and director Groenendijk took on some drivers. An 
important breakthrough did not occur until the early 1970s. In those days 
Groenendijk transported mobile huts for construction sites, which are used by house 
painters, building contractors, and the like. Director Groenendijk Jr. "From the contacts 
with these people, at a certain point the idea emerged to let out these mobile make-shiß 
accomodations as well. This meant the start of tlie leasing company. Hiring out mobile site 
huts was something very new in those days. The market developed as we and our colleagues 
began to offer these huts to let." Furthermore, Groenendijk emphasizes that the combina-
tion of the transport activities and the rental enterprise is very fortunate. This makes 
it possible both to serve customers immediately and to provide day and night service. 
Anyway, the new enterprise was quite successful. The growth of the company then 
received a second, even larger impulse. It was discovered that the mobile huts can be 
made suitable for other uses besides construction works. Through standardizing the 
size and shape of the units, coupling them and piling them up, almost any type of 
accommodation can be created in any size desired. So the mobile site hut for con-
struction works developed into a cabin which can also serve as a temporary shop, 
school, and many other uses, even as a mobile operating room. The density of the 
local market again played an important role in this process of successful product 
development, as can be inferred from Groenendijk's account. "The one who was the first 
to hire a temporary shop from us was not approaclied by us. We did not know that we were 
leasing temporary shops. So not we, but the guy who rented from us was the one with the idea 
to use our mobile site hut as a temporary shop. But we energetically picked up this idea. This 
is the way it has occurred in many instances." Both valuable ideas, i.e. renting mobile 
huts to construction firms and adapting these huts to suit other potential users, 
emerged directly out of local market linkages, within the Greater Rotterdam area. It is 
much less likely that this feedback would also have occurred if the firm had been 
located outside of the Randstad, all else being equal, since the density of economic 
activities, and thus potential customers, is significantly lower in those areas. What is 
more, Groenendijk pic grew into the largest firm in its kind of business in the 
Netherlands merely on the basis of its sales to the local region. It has already 
established national market leadership before the owners decided to invest in 
penetrating domestic regions outside of the Randstad and the Belgian market. 
In the case of Database Consultancy International in Amsterdam, the density 
of the local economy has worked in a less direct manner, namely via employee 
relationships, to get the firm off the ground. Director De Zoete: "We liave always been 
focussed on large customer firms. In the beginning, Albert Heijn and Shell were very 
important clients. At tluit time, we were able to pull in Shell [The Hague, 57 km], because a 
number of workers who joined our com¡xiny already maintained good relations with Shell. 
This has been very important in establishing a good foundation for further development." 
Clearly, the greater the density of the regional economy, the more likely such 
opportunities will occur. By the way, DCI succeeded in acquiring Albert Heijn 
(Zaanstad, 15 km) as an early customer via the relationship between the founder of 
DO, i.e. Mr. Greystoke, and De Zoete, who was an employee of Albert Heijn in those 
days. 
Furthermore, Randstad companies appear to rely heavily on 'personal selling' 
to gain clients. Take Waterland Automation again as an example. Schoneveld: 
"Personally I am convinced that up to now personal selling lias been the most important 
aspect of our company." Director Van Leenen of the Infotheek Group seems to subscribe 
to this view. As outlined above in Chapter Five, van Leenen thinks that he probably 
would not have achieved the same growth with Infotheek if he had been located 
outside of the Randstad. Van Leenen: "Outside the Randstad, distance would tum up as a 
limiting factor. Bemuse our customers are located mainly in the Randstad, a location 
elsewliere in the country would have become problematical. For face-to-face contacts with 
clients play an important role in our line of business, and traffic jams would pose great 
difficulties in visiting them." Definitely, dense clustering of potential customers facili-
tates going after orders by means of personal selling. 
The regional ecology plays an important role in getting access to growth-
inducing clients of only one non-Randstad firm. This company is Intercai. Intercai's 
headquarter is now located in Geleen, but in the beginning it was not. The company 
started out in a small South Limburg village called Beek, a stone's throw from 
Maastricht (10 km). Over one year after its administrative foundation and about half a 
year after it was made operational, business was running smoothly for Intercai. Two 
major orders laid the foundation for this. The first was an assignment by the city of 
Heerlen (15 km) to assist with the construction of a local cable television network. 
According to Kivits'account: "We knew that tlie city of Heerlen luid plans for the construc-
tion of a cable television network. In the Province of Limburg, few cable television mains had 
been constructed yet. As a consequence, little expertise existed in those days. Our nearest 
competitors were located in Arnhem [139 km] and Gouda [201 km] or somewhere over there. 
The local council of Heerlen had to weigh the pros and cons between calling in broad 
experience from far away or placing their trust in guys nearby with little experience but who 
showed enthusiasm and personal commitment.... I think tluit we managed to convince our 
client tlmt the risk of taking their chances with us was lower than the risks posed by the long 
distance from other consultants. Apparently this did work." Kivits succeeded in gaining a 
second important order on New Year's Eve in 1981. The city of Maastricht intended to 
construct a cable television network as well. Kivits: "In Maastricht, I could, of course 
make a long story short. To them I could say: look, in Heerlen we are already doing such-and-
such." These two big orders laid the basis for drawing in other projects as well, 
including a very large order in 1983 by the provincial government of Limburg in 
Maastricht. This meant the company's 'decisive' break through. 
Thus, it has been shown that proximity and thereby the local ecological setting 
can play a decisive role in triggering initial firm growth. This seems to lend support 
to Porter's stance that businesses are only able to overcome certain environmental 
disadvantages if they can take advantage of other elements of the environment in 
which they are located (see Chapter Six note 1). This is surely true of the national 
economic environment, to which Porter primarily refers. However, it does not suffice 
to explain (non-basic) business growth in peripheral regions within countries. This is 
because regional development theorists assume that many peripheral areas have 
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disadvantages over (nearly) the entire range of factors of production, This includes at 
least the most important ones, such as skilled labour, information and know-how, 
services, advanced material supplies, and customers. So there must be some other 
force which sets the ball rolling for successful outlying-area firms. A number of 
sample firms suggest that to identify this force, one has to go back to the incubator or 
parent organizations from which these enterprises emanated. 
7.3 The incubator organization 
For the four Randstad firms as well as Intercai, the regional setting has been an 
important factor in creating initial market access and early firm growth. In contrast, 
five (younger) non-Randstad firms in the sample, namely Aalberts Industries, 
Bronkhorst High Tech, Comdes System House, Elephant Industries, and Rood 
Testhouse, were from the start able to make do without the benefits of many local 
sales opportunities and still achieve a rapid growth. They had to, since sales oppor-
tunities are virtually absent in their place of business. From the outset, these latter 
businesses succeeded in penetrating national and even foreign markets. At first sight, 
they seem to have ignored spatial learning processes and relegated the concept of the 
spatial learning curve to the realm of academic fantasy. Actually, however, these 
companies' founders had already gone down this curve a long way before they 
started their own firm. This occurred during their previous employment, which was 
in nationally or internationally operating companies. The following examples 
elaborate on their backgrounds. 
Before he started his own enterprise, Aalberts (Aalberts Industries) was vice-
president of the very internationally oriented, medium-sized, high-tech metalworking 
company Indivers pic (for more information about Indivers ltd the reader is referred 
to Van Twaalfhoven 1984). Bijsterbosch and Weishaupt, directors of Rood Testhouse, 
got to know each other at Philips Data Systems in Apeldoorn. There both men gained 
experience in testing electronic systems. They wanted to specialize further in this kind 
of activity and they wanted to switch over to a small (less than 100 employees) 
international trading company of electronic products, including testing systems. This 
company is C.N. Rood in Rijswijk (near The Hague), which forms part of the medium 
sized high-tech-group Phoenix Megatronica pic, to which Hulo International belongs 
as well. Quekel and Kragtwijk of System House Comdes had made a tour of five or 
six early and renowned Dutch automation companies, such as Volmac and Raet, prior 
to self-employment. In this period, Quekel mainly had commercial functions, while 
Kragtwijk had technical ones. Bruggeman and Jouwsma (Bronkhorst High Tech) came 
from a manufacturer of measuring and regulating equipment, named Brooks Instru-
ments. Brooks is a Dutch subsidiary of the American Rosemount Measurement and 
Control Instrumentation Group. Bruggeman fulfilled the function of delegated 
director and Jouwsma was head of the R&D department. Director Brouwers of 
Elephant Industries, finally, was head of the commercial department at the Dutch 
subsidiary of a French precious metalworks. 
This in itself suggests that these entrepreneurs possessed many relations and 
contacts on a supraregional and even international level through their prior 
employer(s), even before they decided to start their own business (for further 
evidence of this see Chapter 5, Section 5.6). Thus, it is the incubator organization 
where the entrepreneurs have developed their outward-orientation and have sur-
mounted the threshold fear in addressing foreign and distant markets. It is also 
through their previous employer that they discovered the niche or opportunity which 
they currently exploit. There they also gained a thorough knowledge of the standards 
which have to be dealt with in the national and international environment. And the 
organization the entrepreneurs came from is where they established the concrete 
business relationships to actually enter into distant markets. Take, for example, 
Bruggeman and Jouwsma (Bronkhorst High Tech) who knew the first sales reps for 
penetrating the Dutch and German markets from their previous posts at Brooks 
Instruments, and, perhaps more importantly, the brokers knew them. In the process 
of learning by doing at the parent organization, the entrepreneurs have overcome 
communication barriers with foreign customers and other business relations. Thereby, 
according to Kaynak and Kothari (1984), communication problems surpass verbal 
language barriers and impose other problems of a more subtle but pervading nature, 
such as symbolism in body language, non verbal-cues and responses, methods of 
doing business, and practices involving business relations and protocol. In sum, their 
outward orientation and their domestic and international contact networks allowed 
the entrepreneurs ofthese five businesses to surpass the limitations of their local 
business region, even at the beginning. Actually, none of these enterprises could ever 
have got off the ground if the operational space or the communication networks of 
the firms' founders had been confined to the regional scale. 
As has been argued above, it is clear that the entrepreneurs developed their 
wide geographical outlook and linkage network in their incubator organizations. They 
then incorporated this feature into their own enterprise when they started it. In this 
way, the new firms inherited their extensive task environment, and thus their accessi-
bility across space, from the organizations they grew out of. We may call the incuba-
tor organization the second source of initial market access and, consequently, of 
incipient small-firm success. 
Peters (1990, 196), who studied small-business growth, also contends that the 
incubator organization is a source of success. He states that "the nature of the 
incubator firm will influence the new founder's choice of product and his or her 
knowledge of market opportunities. Such opportunities need not necessarily be local: 
whilst most small firms tend to serve local markets (...), it is usual for innovative ones 
to supply non-local customers (...). Indeed, knowledge of such non-local markets for 
innovative products may well be gained from employment in local firms already 
serving distant markets." This may explain why the most rapidly growing firms, the 
so-called high fliers, tend to spin out from larger incubator organizations, particularly 
public and foreign-owned companies (ibid, 322). Cooper (1985) and Cooper and 
Bruno (1977) obtain similar results. These insights fit in with O'Farrell's and Hitchen's 
finding of a foreign dimension in the competitiveness of small (Irish) firms (O'Farrell 
and Hitchens 1987). They observe that, generally speaking, the products of small Irish 
firms are less quality-competitive relative to small Scottish firms. However, those Irish 
companies that are competitive reveal a remarkable overseas influence. This occurs 
either directly, when the company in Ireland is owned and run by a foreign propri-
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etor who has been trained abroad, or indirectly, through training and work experi-
ence abroad or being trained in an MNE branch in Ireland. "In this way they were 
made aware of international standards of training, productivity, quality, design and 
delivery" (ibid, 412). 
In this context, Peters (1990) as well as Cooper (1985) stress the powerful 
influence that incubator organizations may exert on the nature and growth perspecti-
ves of their spin-offs (see also Cooper and Bruno 1977). In sum, there may be some 
transmission of attributes from parent organizations to their offspring. Actually, this 
phenomenon is more familiar in economic and regional science than one would think 
at first sight. Anyhow, one feature is widely recognized to be transferred from parent 
organizations to their spin-offs. This is the choice of the new firm's product (Peters 
1990). Wever (1986), for example, finds a very strong relationship between the 
industrial composition of new firms and the existing firms in a region, with Pearson 
correlation coefficients of at least 0.90. 
A second group of attributes carried over from the parent to a descendant 
organization is organizational form and structure. Brittain and Freeman (1980), 
examining the development of the semiconductor industry, note, for instance, that 
semiconductor firms founded by persons from larger and older companies who come 
out of manufacturing tend to have a production efficiency style of operation and 
structure. In contrast, those founded by persons from engineering and research and 
development are organized somewhat more organically and have a product strategy 
emphasizing technical innovation. 
The present study adds to this a third attribute that may be inherited by new 
firms, namely their geographical outlook or, in other words, the nature and spatial 
extent of their linkage network1. In sum, there may be instances of what Betton and 
Dess (1985) term a genotype, spreading from incubator organization to its spin-offs in a 
way that success literally may breed success. 
Anyhow, the point is that new entrepreneurs do not start out as a tabula rasa. 
Instead, prior to start-up they may already possess certain valuable assets of a 
tangible (monetary) and especially an intangible nature. The starter can capitalise on 
these assets and thus withstand initial pressures from the production environment, 
including limited local market opportunities. In Figure 3.6, these assets have been 
termed pre-existence and start-up capital. They are made up of material (or tangible) 
and organizational (or intangible) resources. 
Recapitulating the findings on the external sources of early firm fitness, the 
possibility arises to supplement the ecological model (Lambooy 1984) with a heredity 
model. Drawing together these two kinds of forces creates a naturalistic framework2 
for the explanation of initial small-firm success. In contrast to the ecological perspec-
tive, this wider framework may also account for peripheral small-firm growth. From 
such a naturalistic model of the forces behind initial firm growth, it follows that the 
existence of new promising companies in outlying areas depends on the presence of 
appropriate incubator organizations. These carry over the right properties to their 
spin-offs and allow them to escape the stronger selection pressure from the environ-
ment in these regions. In more favourable ecologies, such as large cities and industrial 
districts, in contrast, where selection pressures are weaker, new entrepreneurs can 
manage on less capabilities3. In such environments relatively poorly equipped entre-
preneurs may also get the chance to grow rapidly, though sometimes not until they 
have led an inconspicuous life for years, as is the case with Groenendijk pic. This is 
due to local opportunities and support which a firm in a central, metropolitan milieu 
is more likely to find in its path than would its counterpart in a leaner, outward-
oriented environment4. 
There remains one subject yet to be dealt with in this research. This is the 
stormy weather a number of sample firms have landed in recently, including the 
complete break-down of three of them. 
7.4 Success and failure 
May I reiterate that the above explanation of central versus peripheral-area firm 
growth only explains the triggering of initial business growth. This early growth 
provides the basis for developing enterprise resilience and adaptability in a more 
advanced stage of firm development. From that point onward, a behavioural or 
adaptation approach may become increasingly adequate to explain firm performance. 
From this perspective, I can agree with Kimberly (1980), who finds that early success 
in the founding of an organization (i.e. an innovative medical school) is incompatible 
with its requirements for survival in the long run. The process of getting off the ground 
is strongly influenced by external forces, since the requisite assets, capabilities, or 
whatever may be needed to get production going, does not appear out of the blue. 
Instead, these inputs must be tapped from sources outside of the new firm. The 
potential of these external sources is largely evinced by initial business sales. 
However, successful passage through the creation phase enhances only the 
potential subsequent staying power of an organization. In general, as firms grow, the 
accumulation of resources increases the scope for strategic adaptation and self-control. 
What adunili/ occurs, whether or not a company is able to follow up its initial growth, 
however, depends on management decisions and organizational aspects. 
Consequently, as organizations mature, success and failure become more of an 
internal affair and less of an external one. For no president of Philips or IBM or any 
other established enterprise, can be excused when his organization gets into serious 
trouble and suffers heavy losses because of external head-winds encountered of 
whatever kind, wherever they come from. And there is absolutely no excuse for 
trouble due to local constraints. Research on firm failure has revealed that factors 
internal to the organization exert more influence than external factors in cases of 
bankruptcy (De Graaf and Jaspers 1989, GRAYDON 1991a, 1991b). 
Those sample firms which have got into trouble confirm this picture. Notwith-
standing, external factors, such as worsening market conditions, did play a role in the 
decline of these firms as well. In this respect it is telling that five out of the six 
companies which ran into a crisis after the start of the research in 1988 are in the 
computer industry. It is common knowledge that the latest economic recession hit the 
computer sector earlier and harder than many other sectors of business activity. 
However, on closer scrutiny market decline only explains a small part of the busines-
ses' distress. This applies most clearly to System House Comdes, as this company was 
already in trouble in 1987, prior to the start of the decline in computer business. (For 
more detailed information about Comdes's decline see Vaessen and Wever 1990.) Also 
with respect to Infotheek it is clear that developments in the industry cannot explain 
the company's failure. Infotheek's downfall occurred too rapidly to blame the 
industry. Within a time interval of only six months, the company turned from the 
nation's market leader in its field of business into a bankrupt estate (Het Financieele 
Dagblad 5-11-1991). The major direct cause of Infotheek's collapse, which received 
abundant attention in the media, is the failure of the company's internationalization 
strategy (Het Financieele Dagblad 29-5-1991)5. With respect to the other two automa-
tion firms which went out of business, Waterland Automation and Database 
Consultancy International, as well as the hard times Rood Testhouse is currently in, 
external forces probably played a greater role in these companies' declines. These 
firms would most likely have stayed in business or would not have experienced such 
severe decline if market growth had continued. On the other hand, the worsened 
external conditions laid bare some serious internal flaws, such as poor anticipation by 
the management and/or taking restructuring measures too late. Here we will not 
explore these weaknesses*. 
In sum, this section emphasizes that the naturalistic framework, addressed in 
the previous section, only serves to explain the perspectives for initial business 
growth, not for eventual growth. In other words, it is suggested that exogenous 
circumstances (environmental and/or progenitory), take precedence over endogenous 
forces (i.e. management and/or organization) to influence initial competitiveness and 
the market position of new small businesses. But this relation (gradually) reverses 
after the first substantial growth has been achieved. By then, in principle the assets 
have been accumulated to exert self-control and adapt to external pressures. The 
present research cannot and does not pretend to explain small business success and 
resilience in the long term. At most, it attempts to identify the major ingredients 
which lay the basis for initial growth capacity. So, as a consequence, irrespective of 
whether or not sample companies eventually got into trouble or even went bankrupt, 
they have experienced substantial growth. By that very fact, they belong to the select 
ensemble of promising small companies out of which an even more select group will 
achieve long-lasting growth, and out of which only one or two may go on to become 
giants. 
7.5 S u m m a r y and conclusions 
The research question dealt with in this chapter considers the origins of the adaptabil-
ity of the businesses investigated. It has been determined that adaptability starts with 
easy market access, allowing a firm to generate a sufficient cash flow to build an 
adequate financial and organizational basis. The (younger) sample companies' first 
successful market access can be traced back to two basic sources: 
(1) the regional ecology, and in particular its endowment with potential buyers; 
(2) the incubator organization, and in particular its spatial action radius and 
linkage networks. 
This suggests that there is scope in regional science to supplement the prevailing 
ecological perspective in regional science with an economic heredity approach. Both 
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approaches can be drawn together in a naturalistic framework of external sources of 
promising entrepreneurship. A purely ecological perspective strongly favours small-
firm growth in a nation's economic core areas. The heredity force - grafted onto the 
role of the incubator organization - offers an explanation for the phenomenon of non-
central business growth. Conversely, the lack of promising new firm activity in non-
central areas can be attributed to either inadequate environmental conditions or to 
inappropriate incubator firms. The latter are inappropriate in that they spawn too few 
new firms with the right attributes to overcome or even take advantage of suboptimal 
conditions in their environment. The question arises whether the finding that 
incubator organizations hold the seeds of small-business success is a fruitful clue for 
policy-making in peripheral areas. This question will be dealt with briefly in the 
closing chapter. 
Notes 
In regard to the survey firms, one observation seems to contradict the suggestion that 
new firms inherit their market space from their incubator organizations. This is that 
the founders of Randstad firms such as Waterland Automation, Database Consultancy 
International, and Infotheek maintained national and international contacts in their 
positions prior to self-employment. This may be inferred from the following state-
ments. Schoneveld: "Since 2975,1 maintain quite intensive relations with American software 
companies." Van Leenen, who comes from Control Data, said: "I have taken a long time 
for fact finding, to see xvhat's what in this line of business. When I went on a business trip to 
America, I always took a week off as well, to look for opportunities." The international scope 
of Mr. Greystoke, founder of DO, is self-evident. Greystoke himself is an Englishman, 
managing the Dutch subsidiary of an American automation company. In spite of this 
international dimension in these entrepreneurs' backgrounds, their firms' sales 
linkages are strongly concentrated on the regional market, although some export does 
take place. A similar finding has been observed by Peters (1990). A high proportion of 
successful businesses located in the economic heartland of Great Britain, i.e. the 
prosperous South, sell their products within their own county and region. In contrast, 
more peripheral North West firms sell outside their home region. This is surprising, 
considering that more owner-managers of Southern firms have an international back-
ground (i.e. they arc more likely to come from foreign-owned plants). However, as 
Peters suggests, the higher market potential in the South East removes the incentive 
for Southern firms to look far outside their own region. On this basis it can be 
hypothesized that affluent conditions at home may induce firms to leave an initial 
potential to address far-away markets unused, whereas poor market potential at home 
just activates this potency. With that, just as in biological evolution theory, potencies 
lying idle cause their degeneration, whereas breaking into potencies may develop 
them further. 
The terminology is borrowed from literary criticism. The naturalistic school dominated 
European literature from 1880 to 1900. It considers man as a product of unrelenting 
social and natural forces. In the novels of Emile Zola, the founding father of literary 
naturalism, two conditions determine man: environment or milieu and heredity. 
3. Simultaneously, this may explain the lower failure rates observed in outward areas 
realitve to other regions (see Chapter One and also Westhead and Birley 1992). 
4. On the other hand, a munificent environment may not only upgrade firms with 
moderate capacities, but it may also downgrade entrepreneurs or companies initially 
possessing great capacities, as has been argued in note 1. 
5. For further information about Infotheek's downfall, see Het Financieele Dagblad 31-10-
1991, 5-11-1991; NRC Handelsblad 29-5-1991, 31-10-1991; De Volkskrant 15-6-1991, 29-
6-1991; Trouw 5-11-1991. 
6. For more information about the decline of Waterland Automation and Rood Testhouse 
the reader is referred to Vaesscn and Wever 1990 (Ch. Seven) and newspaper reports 
(Hct Financieele Dagblad 7-9-1991, 22-4-1992, 27/29-6-1992, 7-9-1992, 8/10-8-1992, 5-11-




Summary and conclusions 
8.1 Summary 
Introduction 
Though prosperity is a quality generally attributed to distinct nations, its origins are 
not. Regional scientists observe that wealth is not produced nationwide but in one or 
a few subnational regions, designated as economic heartlands or core areas. They 
point out that the underlying processes of industrialization and economic growth are 
spatially concentrated. Consequently, theorizing in regional science has come to focus 
almost completely on processes of polarization and inequality across space. It is 
argued that territorial polarization and inequality are inevitable conditions of growth 
itself. And at the same time, it is acknowledged that economic advancement emerges 
from technological innovation. Thus it is argued that core regions offer environmental 
conditions which are important to organizations' innovativeness. Recently, this view 
has been applauded by experts in the area of management science. 
However, clustering of innovative activities is not a hard and fast rule. In 
reality, many businesses are able to start up and grow outside of a country's econ-
omic heartland. In some countries, such as in the Netherlands, the concentration of 
promising businesses in a few select regions is hardly observed. In other instances, 
there are large and unspecified gaps in the explanation of the location of economic 
activities. But even if non-central areas prove to accommodate low percentages of 
growth-inducing activities, the absolute number of firms may still be considerable. 
Their presence poses a challenge to prevailing theoretical insights about the import-
ance of territorial conditions for innovation and competitiveness. And that phenom-
enon forms the point of departure for this thesis: the formation and growth of small 
firms in contrasting regional environments, that is, in central as well as peripheral 
regions. The aim of the book is to find an approach to the clarification of business 
success in disparate environments. Accordingly, the general research question is: 
What is the underlying reason why some firms in non-central areas are no less 
competitive than their counterparts in the centre? This broad research question has 
been split into three more specific questions. These are: 
1 How do prospective firms respond to economic conditions in the production 
environment, both opportunities and limitations? 
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2 What can be said about the strength or the efficacy of environmental respon-
siveness of small firms? 
3 What are the ultimate sources of the firms' environmental responsiveness? 
Firm and environment in regional science 
In order to meet the research objective, first an analysis is conducted on the views 
prevailing in regional science about the role of the environment relative to the 
organization in explaining business growth. Basically, spatial theories can be arranged 
into two broad lines of approach. One line assigns primacy to the environment over 
the firm (i.e. location theories and regional development theories). The other, in 
contrast, assigns primacy to the organization over the environment (behavioural and 
particularly corporate geography). Environmental or ecological approaches have come 
to dominate theorizing in the field of regional science. Initially, traditional location 
theories ran the show, but gradually regional development theories took over this 
position. These latter theories concentrate on developmental differences across space 
between prosperous central and backward peripheral regions. Regional development 
theories have in common the central role of agglomeration advantages for economic 
development. The concept of agglomeration economies supposes that spatial propin-
quity allows better access to the inputs and outputs necessary for production, thereby 
raising revenues, lowering costs and increasing productivity (Walker 1986, 248). 
Behavioural and organizational approaches, on the other hand, have devel-
oped in response to criticisms of the shortcomings of ecological approaches. One such 
criticism concerns the subservience of the individual entrepreneur to the dictates of 
the surrounding economic environment. In location theory as well as regional 
development theory, the individual entrepreneur is deprived of any ability to counter-
act the constraints of the production environment. Organizational and behavioural 
approaches accuse ecological approaches of environmental determinism. Nevertheless, 
the former never succeeded in providing an adequate alternative for the latter in 
regional science, particularly not for regional development theories. This is because 
the geography of enterprise lacks an appropriate theoretical framework itself. Three 
shortcomings have been highlighted in particular. The first is the concentration of 
corporate geography on the big multinational company and its neglect of the small 
firm, which makes up the vast majority of profit-seeking organizations. A serious 
implication of this bias is that corporate geography fails to deal with the origins of 
growth. The second point of critique is that the geography of enterprise treats firms in 
isolation. As a consequence, corporate geography pays insufficient attention to 
processes of interfirm competition. Third, the geography of enterprise offers an inad-
equate definition of the environment a firm has to deal with from a spatial point of 
view. It tends to focus on geographical attributes of the environment as outcomes of 
organizational behaviour, passing over the role of unequal input conditions across 
space. As an input condition for organizational behaviour, the environment is con-
ceived of in terms of non-geographical attributes such as environmental dynamism 
and uncertainty, if indeed it is taken into account at all. The effect of this omission is 
that corporate geography does not develop a stance concerning the impact of 
comparative and agglomeration advantages on business development, which is a 
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crucial theme in the field of regional science. 
In order to explain company growth outside of a country's favoured core 
areas, it must be demonstrated how small businesses can resist and adapt to loca-
tional disadvantages while competitors enjoy comparative advantages. For developing 
such an adaptive or organizational approach in regional science, urban field theory 
forms a useful basis and starting point. It allows the broad framework to be deduced, 
within which opportunities arise for greater business autonomy vis-à-vis environ-
mental conditions. The urban field approach links the opportunities for non-central 
business growth to the degree of national economic and technological advancement. 
In the developed nations, economic facilities are so accessible and dispersed so widely 
that even deep in the periphery business growth is not inhibited by environmental 
conditions. This is not to say that unequal economic conditions across space have 
been evened out. Rather, it means that in the periphery, certain minimum require-
ments have been met which make it possible for certain outlying area-firms to take 
measures to overcome any locational disadvantages. In this way, urban field theory 
creates room for more managerial or organizational autonomy vis-à-vis the surround-
ing environment. In order to take advantage of this space and to buttress such an 
approach in the field of regional science, we have drawn some lessons from a 
different economic discipline which also deals with firm-environment relationships 
and interactions, namely organization theory. 
Organization and environment: a perspective from organization theory 
The quest for useful ways to incorporate greater organizational autonomy in regional 
science yielded the following conclusions. First, out of the constellation of environ-
mental forces, those which originate in the business region, as a rule, will be less 
compelling than those which originate in the macro environment. 
Second, munificence rather than dynamism or complexity is the crucial 
dimension of the environment which regional scientists have to deal with. After all, it 
is not so much the variability (dynamism) or the heterogeneity (complexity) but rather 
the available abundance (munificence) of the requisite resources that differ across 
space. Organizational approaches in regional science do not seem to recognize this. 
Third, within the field of organization theory resource dependence theory 
emphasizes the reactive organization as an intermediate form between the proactive 
and the inactive organization. At first sight, it looks as if regional science only 
acknowledges the latter two characteristics imputed to organizations. Corporate 
geography is preoccupied with the proactive firm, whereas location theory and 
regional development theory are focussed on the inactive or powerless firm. How-
ever, on further consideration, by a stretch of the imagination, we can name one early 
offshoot within the geography of enterprise school which does deal with a kind of 
reactive organization. This offshoot, which has remained underdeveloped in regional 
science, could be called adaptation geography. The concept of the reactive organization 
assumes that firms are affected by the environment without being determined by it. 
In line with this, adaptation geography describes how organizations (can) respond or 
adapt to environmental forces, paying special attention to spatial adjustments. This 
somewhat premature line of thought in industrial geography contains two major 
flaws. One is that it treats the adaptive organization in isolation. The other short-
coming is its inadequate treatment of an organization's environment from a regional 
science point of view. The adaptation approach in corporate geography conceives of 
the environment as a source of uncertainty instead of scarcity. Consequently, adapta-
tion geography bypasses the essential issues of comparative advantages and agglom-
eration economies. 
Fourth, the numerous ways in which firms can respond to environmental 
forces have been grouped into four basic categories. These are: manipulation, 
immunization, adaptation, and utilization. 
Fifth, while regional science is in the grip of the dichotomy between the big 
powerful corporate organization and the restrained small firm, thus obstructing the 
development of an adaptation approach for small firms, some organization theorists 
have paved the way for such a perspective. This is based on the recognition that 
although small firms possess less power to deal with external forces, they also make 
fewer demands on the environment. Therefore, they are exposed to fewer external 
pressures than big enterprises. So, although there irrefutably exists a wide gap in 
absolute power between large multiplant companies and small single-plant firms, the 
relative gap may be much smaller. If small companies' adaptive capacity exceeds a 
minimum level, they may be able to cope with the environment in accordance with 
their needs for survival. This is the basic notion which underlies the developmental 
model of organizational adaptability. Therein, a modest initial adaptive ability 
expands along with an organization's growth, the resulting rise in its external 
requirements, and the associated increasing environmental pressures. 
Research method and sample 
The empirical part of the research attempted to demonstrate the environmental 
responsiveness of the reactive small and medium-sized firm. To achieve this, it was 
decided to use a qualitative research method. Such a method involves the collection 
and analysis of qualitative data. Qualitative data are detailed, concrete, non-metric 
descriptions of people and events. So the research sought to obtain in-depth knowl-
edge about the interactions between firm and environment by means of semi-
structured face-to-face interviews with the directors of small and medium-sized firms. 
As a consequence, only a limited number of cases were investigated, albeit quite 
extensively. The thesis took a qualitative case-study approach because of its great 
potential for accuracy and specificity in understanding causal mechanisms. On the 
other hand, its reliability and representativeness is more difficult to assess than in a 
quantitative method, which is able to express these matters statistically. Nevertheless, 
various measures were taken to gain insight into the reliability and the representative-
ness of the research findings. Concerning reliability, the research used triangulation of 
interview questions and member checks, and also supplied precise information about 
the methods and procedures used. Representativeness rests on the logic of the 
inferences made as well as on comparison of the results with the outcomes of other 
investigations. Despite these measures, only future research of a quantitative nature 
will be able to measure the reliability and representativeness of the research findings 
more adequately. 
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The survey sample comprises 13 growth-oriented small and medium-sized 
firms. All but one of these are medium and high-technology companies. The sample 
includes enterprises in the fields of micro-electronics, metal components, synthetics, 
transport equipment, services related to computer software and hardware, telecom-
munication consultancy, and rental of temporary business accommodation. Four of 
the firms are located in the polycentric metropolis in the western part of the country 
known as Randstad Holland, which constitutes the national economic heartland. The 
other nine firms lie in the more rural northern, eastern, and southern peripheries of 
the country. With regard to age, the sample includes nine younger and four older 
enterprises. Of the younger companies, the founders were interviewed. 
Environmental responsiveness of small firms (I): its forms 
This chapter deals with research question number one, elucidating how small firms 
respond in practice to the conditions in the external environment, both opportunities 
and handicaps. In regard to the process by which the sample businesses satisfy their 
resource needs, three observations were made. First, in addition to Randstad firms, 
non-Randstad companies take considerable advantage of local resources. Centre-
periphery contrasts seem to be moderate in the Netherlands. Secondly, this contention 
needs to be qualified. On the one hand, the equal satisfaction of production require-
ments across space is related to the growth stage of a firm. As firms mature and 
professionalize, they raise their demands on quantity as well as the quality of external 
inputs and deliveries. Ultimately, a greater resource capacity of central areas may 
come to light. On the other hand, interregional convergence of economic conditions 
differs with respect to type of resources. Centre-periphery contrasts are greater and 
more discriminating in regard to local sales opportunities than to input resources. The 
third observation is that these comparative disadvantages did not prevent the 
peripheral firms from being competitive and successful. In general, the sample firms 
revealed a considerable ability to overcome the constraints of the production environ-
ment. They did so by manipulating external resource conditions, by immunizing 
themselves against them, or by adapting to them. In practice, the ability to cope with 
centre-periphery contrasts in availability of factor resources manifests itself most 
clearly in non-Randstad businesses that adopt a wider geographical market outreach 
earlier in their development than Randstad firms. This has been interpreted as a form 
of immunization against limited local sales opportunities. 
Environmental responsiveness of small firms (II): its strength 
This chapter dealt with research question number two, concerning the effectiveness of 
entrepreneurial jostling vis-à-vis the environment, as this can drive production costs 
upward. It should be noted that not all acts to counter external constraints involve 
high expenditures. For example, a firm may benefit greatly from a good reputation as 
it seeks to satisfy its needs and fulfil its requirements. Furthermore, in a small, 
affluent country like the Netherlands, production costs presumably differ moderately 
between regions. But even if these costs are comparatively high relative to another 
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region, due to locational disadvantages, nothing is proved until one considers the 
returns from adaptation strategies. There is evidence that businesses can gain absolute 
or differential advantages from overcoming comparative disadvantages. Differential 
advantages are benefits which are so great that they outweigh the drawback of higher 
production costs. It was argued that dealing with locational handicaps may yield 
important differential advantages. Special attention was devoted to the advantages 
that can be reaped from overcoming limited local sales capacity. It was reasoned that 
small companies which are forced to spread their sales widely across space and 
therefore gain a foothold in several geographical markets, as a rule, will possess 
higher market intelligence than their counterparts, which concentrate their output in 
their home region. A wide geographical market outreach may alter a company's 
insight in both domestic and international production and consumer standards, its 
flexibility in dealing with different customer requirements, as well as the timing of 
innovations and strategic actions. Furthermore, an outward-oriented company can 
reap important benefits from the very fact of having to expand its market reach 
earlier than locally oriented firms. These gains, which have been labelled first-mover 
advantages across space, are of particular importance in that they are resistant to 
catch-up attempts of contenders and therefore are quite sustainable. Anyhow, the 
central message of this chapter is that, under certain circumstances, environmental 
constraints in peripheral areas can provoke organizations to use catch-up strategies 
which improve their differential position, whereby the drawback of higher production 
costs attached to such regions is eventually outweighed. 
Environmental responsiveness of small firms (III): its origins 
Chapter Seven considers research question number three, which concerns the ultimate 
sources of the sample firms' environmental responsiveness. The ability to turn 
comparative disadvantages into differential advantages can not be taken for granted 
by any firm. Otherwise small-business growth in outlying areas would be much more 
common than it is now. It was determined that adaptability starts with easy market 
access. This allows a firm to generate the cash flow to build an adequate financial and 
organizational basis for further action. The earliest successful market access of the 
(younger) firms in the survey was traced to one of two basic sources. The first of 
these is the regional ecology, and in particular a region's endowment with potential 
buyers. For all the Randstad firms and one non-Randstad company in the sample, the 
initial success in customer acquisition resulted from contacts and processes within the 
home region. 
The second basic source of first thriving market access is the organization the 
entrepreneurs came from. The impact of the incubator or parent organization was 
clearly revealed by five younger peripheral sample businesses. From the outset, these 
companies proved to be able to counteract limited local sales opportunities by 
addressing extra-regional and even foreign markets. This is due to the extensive 
geographical scope their founders held at the time they started a firm of their own. It 
is quite clear that the entrepreneurs developed their wide geographical outlook and 
linkage network in the organizations where they worked before starting their own 
business. These incubator or parent organizations all operated on a national or 
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international scale. The new entrepreneurs then incorporated this outward-orientation 
in their own enterprise when they started it. In this way, the new firms inherited an 
extensive task environment, and hence their knowledge of and access to extra-
regional markets, from the organizations they had grown out of. 
This suggests that regional science might be able to supplement the prevailing 
ecological perspective with an economic heredity approach. Both approaches could be 
drawn together in a naturalistic framework of external sources of promising 
entrepreneurship. A purely ecological perspective is a forceful tool in explaining 
small-firm growth in a nation's economic core areas. But the heredity approach -
grafted onto the role of the incubator organization - offers an explanation for the 
phenomenon of non-central business growth. A policy issue then arises: does this 
finding that incubator organizations act as originators of small-business success offer 
a useful clue for policy-making in lagging regions? 
8.2 Conclusions 
Implications for policy 
In relation to regional policy, the main question is what can be learned from the 
counterfactual businesses in the sample. These companies have shown an ability to 
maintain their productivity and competitiveness in 'unfavourable' production 
environments. Regional policy has long been directed at improving input conditions 
and lowering production costs to firms in policy regions. However, as Malecki and 
Nijkamp (1987) and Miller and Coté (1985) point out, it is impossible to find a substi-
tute in smaller regions for the synergy found in large urban core areas. Analysing the 
sample firms, an alternative route is suggested for attempting to increase the number 
of new firms, and particularly their potential for growth. This alternative rests on two 
pillars. One is the familiar observation that the conditions of the production environ-
ment in less-developed regions deserve careful attention from policy-makers. Of 
course, we have no illusions that public policy can close the gap vis-à-vis metropoli-
tan core areas in this respect. However, this is not really necessary. What is important 
is that economic infrastructure in peripheral areas reaches an acceptable or threshold 
level over a wide range of factors which penetrate deeply into the economy as well. 
The presence of that level of facilities would ensure that no bottlenecks prevent 
promising, small companies from taking appropriate measures to offset environmental 
disadvantages. Such an approach is in accordance with the idea expressed by Thoss 
(1984) about endogenous development promotion. Thoss poses that a strategy of 
endogenous development must also embrace a strategy aimed at the elimination of 
obstacles. Meeting minimum requirements for several relevant factor conditions in a 
policy region is more important than developing one particular factor to its optimum. 
With respect to education infrastructure, for example, it is more important to provide 
good education on a primary and secondary level in several fields for the great 
majority than specialized academic education for the happy few (cf Reich 1989; 1991). 
The second tenet of such a policy involves improving the regional incubation 
structure for stimulating high-quality entrepreneurship in policy regions. Basically, 
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this can be achieved in two ways. One way is for local authorities to attract organiz-
ations which are most likely to function as incubators of new firms. Their contribution 
will be greatest as incubators of new firms which prove resistant, to a certain extent, 
to the less-favourable circumstances in outlying territories. The present research 
suggests that these are the more outward-oriented start-ups. In order to improve the 
regional incubation structure in this respect, it is of utmost importance to identify 
which incubator organizations should be attracted. Our understanding of this is still 
very incomplete. Nevertheless, a few qualities which may make an organization a 
good incubator will be suggested below. One such attribute emerges from the present 
research: that these organizations retain a national or international outlook. Such 
organizations imbue local workers, including the potential entrepreneurs among 
them, with the abilities to gain access to extra-regional resources, particularly markets. 
These are abilities they need to overcome the constraints of the local business environ-
ment when they start a firm of their own. Another property of fertile incubator 
companies is that they should not be too large, nor functionally organized. Firm size 
and functional organization systems are generally inversely related to the number of 
new firms spawned (Cooper 1985, Malecki 1991). So, acquisition of large production 
plants of big foreign companies, which make up the bulk of acquisition policy in 
peripheral areas, will not stimulate new-firm formation. On the contrary, such a 
policy is likely to stifle this process. Instead, research laboratories, sales offices, and 
headquarters of international companies, as well as independent nationally or 
internationally operating small and medium-sized companies, are more eligible 
candidates for acquisition, as they might improve the regional incubation structure. 
On the other hand, such establishments are few and far between and, moreover, 
difficult to lure to peripheral areas. 
However, there might be a second option for improvement of the incubation 
structure. The present research suggests that in remote areas, new firms, and particu-
larly the more promising ones among them, come from outward-oriented parent 
organizations. So, it can be inferred that a widening of the action radius, and 
especially of the market space, of existing small peripheral-area firms will improve 
their incubation function. This relates to the fact that peripheral-area firms in general 
are much more locally oriented than central-area ones, despite the limited market 
opportunities in the home region of the former. This applies even in a small country 
like the Netherlands. It has been abundantly demonstrated that businesses in the 
northern policy regions display a much greater degree of parochialism with respect to 
their sales and business contacts than central-area companies (Pellenbarg and Zalme 
1985; Buijs and Pellenbarg 1989; Dwars 1989; Machielse et al. 1990). It is necessary to 
break down this situation. Its demise would not only benefit the growth and 
competitiveness of the firms in question but would also enhance their function as 
incubators of prospective new firms. The first step to be taken in that direction is to 
stimulate and assist existing peripheral-area firms to extend their information and 
market space within the country. Only when such domestic expansion has been 
achieved is it feasible to stimulate those firms to cross international boundaries. After 
all, the mere use of incentives which are tied to international expansion (export) may 
be totally inappropriate when the target firms are in an early stage of domestic 
expansion (Welch and Wiedersheim-Paul 1980). Many policy measures can be 
designed to realize extra-regional expansion of locally bound peripheral-area firms. 
However, this issue is beyond the scope of the present research. 
Furthermore, before such a policy can be initiated, much more research is 
required on the process of spawning new businesses, particularly of promising ones. 
This process will be affected by many more factors than the one discussed above, i.e. 
the operational space of the incubator firms. 
Suggestions for further research 
As the present research took an explorative approach (see Chapter Four), the points 
made in this thesis require additional substantiation and testing. The foregoing 
analysis suggest several points for further research with regard to small-business 
growth in contrasting environments, using either a quantitative or a qualitative 
approach or both. But the question remains whether an analogous approach in 
another country with greater centre-periphery contrasts than found in the Nether-
lands would have yielded similar outcomes and conclusions. It should be noted that 
the more frequent occurrence of innovative small businesses in non-central areas in 
the Netherlands relative to other industrialized countries is only a difference of 
degree. It is not a fundamental difference, as rapid business growth in outlying areas 
can be found in any developed country. Anyway, to validate the research outcomes 
and to further develop adaptation theory in regional science, in-depth research on 
similar firms in different regions should be conducted in other countries as well. 
Secondly, at least three hypotheses can be inferred from the foregoing analysis. 
These require a quantitative underpinning. First, it was observed that rapidly growing 
firms in outlying areas tend to come from national or internationally operating parent 
organizations. The hypothesis has to be verified that they do so more than slow-
growth firms in the same territory and more than successful firms in central areas. 
Furthermore, it is expected that promising peripheral-area firms, driven by greater 
local resource scarcities, expand their operational space faster than promising central-
area firms (and, of course, also faster than unsuccessful peripheral colleagues). Thus, 
prospective small firms in outlying areas should have a wider action radius than their 
centrally located counterparts of the same age. Finally, the outward orientation of the 
former is expected to generate greater competitiveness in terms of timing of innova-
tions and product variation. 
Thirdly, more explorative research is required on the distinguishing character-
istics of fertile incubation organizations as well as on the spin-off process itself. What 
makes organizations either good or poor incubators of new firms is a severely 
underinvestigated issue. Research efforts should focus on the role of parameters such 
as sectoral impacts, organization structure, age, business growth, growth strategy, 
corporate action radius, business size, and how these variables interfere with a firm's 
environmental setting. Thereby, attention should be devoted not only to the quantity 
of new firms spawned but also to their quality, i.e. their potential for growth and 
survival. Such studies can link up with organizational innovation research, as many 
new firms can be considered externalized innovations. The relevance of this kind of 
research to the field of regional science is illustrated by Scott (1988a, 91). He points 
out the potential role which particular administrative structures of incubator organiz-
ations may play in generating regional economic growth. To explain why Silicon 
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Valley developed into the major hub of semiconductor industry, whereas initially 
conditions in other nascent centres of integrated circuit production (Phoenix and 
Dallas) were equally advantageous if not better than in Santa Clara County, Scott 
makes an interesting suggestion. The fundamental question is why Fairchild Semicon-
ductors (in Silicon Valley) produced so many more spin-offs than similar firms such 
as Motorola (in Phoenix) and Texas Instruments (in Dallas). Scott suggests that the 
particular corporate structures of Motorola and Texas Instruments discouraged 
horizontal and/or vertical disintegration (spin-off) and encouraged the internalization 
of new product and process innovations. In contrast, Shockley Laboratories and later 
Fairchild Semiconductors just externalized these innovations. Unfortunately, according 
to Scott, the available data do not allow a more careful sifting of these issues (cf Scott 
and Angel 1987). 
Fourth, there is a need to chart the growth path and growth strategy of small 
firms once they get started. In particular, more detailed knowledge is required about 
the growth of small firms across space. How do spatial thresholds to development 
(i.e. local, regional and national boundaries) affect the growth and expansion of small 
firms? And which organizational adjustments and changes are required to cross these 
barriers? Spatial science should have a better understanding of how the environ-
mental setting of a firm interferes with the geographical evolution of its market space, 
in regard to both successful and unsuccessful firms. A useful method to investigate all 
these questions seems to be longitudinal matched pair analysis between central and 
peripheral as well as successful and unsuccessful firms which are of similar age and 
operate within the same sector. 
In general we need more insight into why scarcity and constraints in the local 
area are destructive to many firms and prevent them from growing, while such 
adverse conditions just channel the growth of other, seemingly comparable, busi-
nesses organizations. What makes the latter different from the former? There is clearly 
much that spatial scientists can leam from deviant cases - that is, strong firms in 
unfavourable environments - no matter how many or how few there are. This applies 
not only to the further development of spatial theory but also, and perhaps more 
importantly, to the formulation of policy to stimulate industrial and regional develop-
ment. 
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Appendix 
The sample firms one by one 
Aalberts Industries pic 
Aalberts Industries pic is the holding company of, at present, 11 industrial enterprises, 
employing a total of about 1000 employees. In close consultation with the customer, 
these factories manufacture tailor-made products, mostly from high-quality alumin-
ium alloys, advanced kinds of steel alloys and synthetic materials. The group has 
customers spread over a large number of business sectors, including medical equip-
ment, aeronautical engineering, aerospace, computer peripherals, telecommunications, 
aluminium processing, precision engineering, and many others. 
The foundation of the Aalberts Industries Group was laid in 1975, when Mr. J. 
Aalberts started a company named Mifa Ltd. (Mini Fabrication) in Reuver, a village 
some 12 km from Venlo. This business manufacturered and assembled precision 
engineering components by way of a refined extrusion technique which had not yet 
been applied in Europe. The beginning was very difficult, even though Aalberts was 
on familiar ground and he knew many potential customers. When the early develop-
ment problems had been overcome, the very accurate production processes drew 
attention of big enterprises such as Philips, IBM, Siemens and Océ-van der Grinten. 
From that point, in 1977, the company started its impressive advance. The industrial 
premises in Reuver becomes too small, and Mifa moved to an industrial estate in 
Venlo. By 1983, the Aalberts Industries Group had a trunover of 14 million guilders 
and 133 employees. In the four years prior to the start of the present research project, 
sales figures rose by an average of 40 per cent per year (from 14 million guilders in 
1984 to 48 million in 1987). The number of workers hired increased to 255 in 1982. 
These figures compare very favourably with those of the basic metal industry as a 
whole. Sales in this sector grew in the same period on average 5.5 per cent per year. 
The profits of Aalberts Industries also towered above performance figures of the 
metal industry as a whole. Between 1984 and 1987, after-tax profit amounted on 
average to 5.7 per cent of sales for Aalberts Industries, in comparison to 3.7 per cent 
for the aggregate metal industry. 
Since 1987, Aalberts Industries has been listed on the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange. In 1988, the company won the FEM/ΡΑ medal, a distinguished prize for 
innovative entrepreneurship. After 1987 the growth and success of the company did 
not decrease. It took over one company after the other. In 1989, Aalberts relocated its 
holding seat from Venlo to Utrecht, though this involved only a limited number of 
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staff members (less than ten). Furthermore, up to now, Aalberts has hardly been 
affected by the decline in the world economy. By 1992, sales had mounted to nearly 
218 million guilders, and the number of employees had risen to 1006. Net profit was 
5.7 percent of net sales in 1992. 
The interview was conducted on 18 February 1988, with the president and 
founder of the Aalberts Industries Group, Mr. J. Aalberts. Director Aalberts was born 
in 1940. His educational background included Technical College. 
Bronkhorst High Tech Ltd 
In March 1981, Mr. T. Bruggeman contacted Mr W. Jouwsma with the proposal to 
start a business company together. The idea was to integrate the different pieces of 
equipment required for measuring gas flow, such as sensors, valves and accompany-
ing electronics, into one handy instrument. Jouwsma thought that this would pay off, 
and thus a new firm was created, named Bronkhorst High Tech (BHT). BHT is 
engaged in the production of electronic flowmeters. The two men started their 
enterprise in Vorden, a small village situated in a rural landscape on the eastern 
outskirts of the country, a region known as de Achterhoek. 
BHT sells its flow meters to the semiconductor industry and chemical labora-
tories, among others. Since actual production got off the ground, BHT has been 
operating very profitably. Soon, the industrial estate in Bronkhorst became too small 
and BHT moved to Ruurlo, a small village some ten kilometers away. To this day the 
enterprise has remained in this place. In 1987, sales amounted to approximately 7.5 
million guilders. Between 1984 and 1987, turnover expanded at a rate of 24.0 per cent 
per year. Growth figures of the industrial class to which Bronkhorst belongs (i.e. 
optical, instrument and other industry) only came to 6.6 per cent per year in this 
period. The number of employees at Bronkhorst increased from 16 in 1984 to 37 in 
1987. Profit after taxes has remained at a high and stable level of 10 per cent of sales. 
In 1987, Bronkhorst High Tech received the King Willem I plaquet for its achieve-
ments, a distinguished award for young entrepreneurship granted every two years to 
an excelling young business. 
In recent years, sales growth gradually slowed down to seven per cent in 1992. 
Of course, this figure is still higher than the annual 4.5 per cent increase in the optical 
and instrument industry as a whole in this period. Between 1987 and 1992, the 
number of employees hired increased at a slow but steady pace, i.e. from 41 to 50. 
However, notwithstanding the slower growth, BHT remains very profitable. Up to 
and including 1992, a hard year for the national economy when many firms went 
bankrupt, the net profit of BHT remained at the very high level of 10 per cent of 
sales. 
Bronkhorst High Tech was visited twice within the scope of the present 
research, once in early 1988 and again in January 1990. Both conversations were with 
Mr. J. Jouwsma, who is the Technical Director of BHT. Jouwsma was bom in 1943. He 
attended the Technical University of Eindhoven, where he graduated in electrical 
engineering as well as in business administration. 
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Casolith Sheets Ltd 
Casolith Sheets Ltd. was established in 1920 in Leeuwarden under the name of Dutch 
Casolith Works. Casolith started manufacturing products from natural milk protein, 
particularly synthetic hom. The company supplied this product mainly to the button 
industry. Apart from this, in the course of time Casolith increasingly buckled down to 
the production of cast acrylic sheets, known by the brand name Casocryl. Casocryl is a 
so-called PMMA product in the field of polymer chemistry. Casocryl sheets serve as 
semimanufactured supply products for the automotive industry, sanitary industry, 
illuminated advertising industry, the construction sector and others. Competing 
brands of Casocryl include, for example, Perspex (ICI, Great Britain) and Plexiglass 
(Róhm, Germany). In the mid-1970s, Casolith reached the largest size in its life up to 
now, i.e about 200 employees. However, soon thereafter, the company got in serious 
trouble, and heavy losses were incurred. In 1978, the Regional Development Corpor-
ation for the northern provinces (the NOM) decided to take over Casolith. The family 
managers left the firm. In 1980, a person from the NOM's own ranks came forward to 
take the lead over the firm. This man was Mr. E. Jansen. Jansen succeeded in making 
Casolith Sheets profitable again within two years. From 1983 onward, the company 
grew quite successfully. Between 1984 and 1987, the average annual increase of sales 
was 21.3 per cent (from 20 million guilders in 1983 to 46 million in 1987). The 
comparable figure for the chemical industry as a whole amounts to a mere 2.8 per 
cent. Employment expanded from 82 staff workers in 1983 to 128 in 1987. Annual net 
profit was on average 4.7 per cent from sales and 5.8 per cent of total assets in this 
period. For the chemical industry as a whole, these figures were 3.2 and 5.2 per cent 
respectively. By 1987, the company had grown into the fifth largest (out of about 20) 
European producer of acrylic sheets. Its share on the European market increased from 
two per cent in 1980 to seven per cent in 1987. 
In 1986, Casolith applied for quotation on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. 
However, the listing did not last very long. In Spring 1987, Jansen decided to go 
along with a take-over bid by the French state enterprise Chemie de France (CdF). 
CdF, which changed its name in 1988 into Orkem, merged Casolith with two other 
PMMA manufacturers within the Orkem Group. Director Jansen acquired general 
directorship over this new PMMA group, which is the biggest in Europe. Thus, he left 
Casolith in November 1988 and moved to Paris, where the headquarters of Orkem is 
located. Mr. J. Spoelstra, formerly Casolith's production manager, was appointed as 
Jansen's successor. In 1991 Casolith Sheets merged into Atochem Holland Holding 
Ltd. in Amsterdam. At that time, the name of the company changed into Atochem 
Leeuwarden Ltd. In October 1991, director J. Spoelstra also left the company. He was 
succeeded by Mr. F.M. De Haas. 
The take-over by Orkem1 has far reaching organizational consequences for 
Casolith Sheets. The integration with the other two PMMA manufacturers required a 
reorganization of the company and that was not without some difficulties. Neverthe-
less, Casolith was able to maintain its rate of growth. Between 1988 and 1990, sales on 
average increasd by 23.7 per cent and employment by 5.2 per cent per year. Average 
annual growth in the chemical industry as a whole was much slower: 4.1 and 2.6 per 
cent respectively. Furthermore, the annual report for 1991 mentioned that even 
though the PMMA market was in decline that year, which also affected Casolith's 
sister companies, Casolith itself was able to increase its sales by a modest 1.5 per cent. 
Average profitability remained about 4.5 per cent from sales, which is below the 
Chemistry sector's average, which amounted to 7.0 per cent between 1988 and 1990. 
Just like Bronkhorst High Tech, Casolith Sheets was also visited twice during 
the research. The first interview was conducted in 1988 with Mr. E. Jansen. Jansen 
was bom in 1948. When he finished his secondary education he went on to study 
economics, first at Rotterdam's Erasmus University and later at the University of 
Groningen. The second interview took place in early 1990 with Mr. J. Spoelstra. 
Spoelstra was bom in 1956 in a small village in the province of Friesland. Spoelstra 
completed the Technical College in Groningen. 
System House Comdes Ltd 
The year was 1978 when Mr P. Quekel approached Mr. W. Kragtwijk with the 
proposal to start a new software company. Their basic idea was to incorporate more 
material knowledge into software packages than was customary in those days in the 
world of software engineering. The two men sought to achieve this by specializing in 
a limited number of market segments, i.e. financial services and the legal and 
healthcare sectors. Furthermore, in order to stand out in the branch of software 
engineering, soon after start-up Quekel and Kragtwijk decided to take on automation 
projects at fixed prices instead of hourly wages. This approach led to very rapid 
growth. Within five or six years, the company has become one of the largest software 
engineering companies in the Netherlands. Between 1984 and 1987, the growth rate 
on average amounted to 60.5 per cent per year. In 1987, the turnover amounted to 
35.6 million guilders, which eventually increased to 51.6 million in 1988. Employment 
expanded from a staff of 57 in 1984 to 161 in 1987 (1988: 175). This represents an 
average annual increase of 41.6 per cent. These figures are far in excess of the 
achievements in the business services sector as a whole, where growth averaged 6.6 
per cent and employment increased by 10.5 per cent. Net profit of System House 
Comdes - 4.0 per cent of sales - towered less highly above the industry total - 3.6 per 
cent - between 1984 and 1987 than the growth figures. Anyway, Comdes took a fifth 
and an eighth place in the top 25 list of fastest-growing small companies in 1986 and 
1987 (Intermagazine, November 1986 and November 1987). 
However, already in 1987 things started to go wrong for Comdes, as the 
company suddenly suffered a loss of 1.9 million guilders. In 1988 this loss amounted 
to 7.6 million guilders. One year later, in 1989, System House Comdes was taken over 
by one of its shareholders, namely Modalfa Ltd., a private investment group from 
Amsterdam. Quekel and Kragtwijk were bought out and they left the company in 
April 1989. Modalfa appointed a new general manager, Mr. Th. Vissers, who had to 
make the company profitable again. In a radical reorganization, Vissers slashed the 
activities of Comdes drastically. As a consequence, sales fell to about 8 million 
guilders and personnel to 88 by the end of 1990. Nevertheless, it was not possible to 
make the company profitable again in 1989 and 1990, although the losses were cut 
back from 24.2 million guilders in 1989 to 10.9 million in 1990. Early in 1991, Modalfa 
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sold Comdes to the British information technology company ICL. In the meantime 
Vissers left the Comdes Group. 
Conversations were held made with Mr. W. Kragtwijk and Mr. Th. Vissers, in 
the early Spring of 1988 and 1990 respectively. Kragtwijk was born in the beginning 
of the 1950s. In the period when he and Quekel led the Comdes Group, Kragtwijk 
fulfilled the function of technical director, whereas Quekel was the commercial man. 
Kragtwijk's educational background was lower general secondary education, supple-
mented with evening classes in the field of computerization. Vissers was born in 1942. 
Vissers had secondary school (i.e. HBS) followed by several marketing courses, 
including NIMA-A and NIMA-B. 
Database Consultancy Investments pic 
The foundation for a group of companies which are united in the Holding company 
called Database Consultancy International (DCI) was laid in Amsterdam in 1980 with 
the establishment of Database Consultancy Europe Ltd. (DCE). The founder of the 
DCI Group is Mr. K. R. Greystoke. Database Consultancy International is mainly 
engaged in information management consultancy services. Areas of DCE services 
include information systems strategy, systems development methods and tools, 
information resource management and data communications. Between 1984 and 1987, 
the company's average annual growth rate (sales) was no less than 62.1 per cent -
business services as a whole grew by 6.6 per cent - whereas employment increased 
from 48 to 215 workers in those years. Average profit as a percentage of sales in the 
four-year period prior to the beginning of the research was 5.6 per cent per year; for 
the service sector as a whole this figure was 4.02. The year 1988 was a good one for 
DCI, as sales, profits and employment kept growing. However, in 1989, only employ-
ment retained its growth momentum, as the number of workers increased from 229 in 
1988 to 284 in 1989. The rate in growth of turnover diminished to 14.4 per cent and 
profit even turned into a loss, albeit a small one of 689,000 guilders (-1.3 per cent of 
sales). The decline of the company increased in 1990. In that year, sales diminished by 
10.1 per cent, losses rose to -4.0 per cent of sales and employment was cut back to 218 
workers. Greystoke resigned as chairman of the board of directors and was succeeded 
by the financial director of the company, Mr. E. De Zoete. Nevertheless, in 1991 the 
situation worsened further, and in 1992 the company was liquidated. 
The interview for this research was conducted in the Spring of 1988 with Mr. 
E. De Zoete. Although De Zoete is not the founder of the DCI Group, he had been 
engaged in the establishment of the company from the beginning. After all, he was a 
key figure in raising the start-up capital. During the first six years de Zoete was 
involved in DCI as a commissioner and adviser. In 1986, he became the company's 
financial manager. De Zoete was bom in 1936. He had received academic education in 
the field of economics. 
Elephant Industries Ltd 
Elephant Industries was established in Amsterdam in 1969 by its present general 
Director Mr. M. Brouwers. Elephant Industries manufactures dental products from 
precious metal and also from porcelain. They work with precious metal alloys, 
precious metal prosthetic devices and other similar items. Elephant Industries' 
products serve as input materials for prosthodontics. The company had its highest 
growth rates in the 1970s, according to director Brouwers. This forced the company to 
relocate three times in that decade. In 1970 Elephant Industries moved from Amster-
dam to Zaandam. Within Zaandam the company relocated in 1974. By 1977 its 
business office had become too small again, and the firm moved from Zaandam to 
Hoorn, its present location. In the 1980s, growth slowed down somewhat, but the 
company remained vital. Between 1984 and 1987 turnover increased on average by 
19.6 per cent per year (from 34.2 million to 48.0 million guilders). The total of 
Elephant's respective industry category, i.e. basic metal industry, grew on average 3.5 
per cent per year in this period. Employment at Elephant Industries rose from 43 
workers in 1984 to 63 in 1987. Average net profit amounted to 3.8 per cent for 
Elephant Industries. For basic metal industry this figure is not known; however, 
Elephant Industries was slightly more profitable than the entire metal industry (3.6 
per cent). 
After 1987, the company was able to continue both its growth and its profit-
ability, although there was a dip in cash terms in 1989 and 1990. That was due to low 
prices for precious metals on the world market. Between 1988 and 1991 Elephant's 
annual monetary sales growth averaged 5.7 per cent (basic metal industry scored 4.0 
per cent). Employment kept on growing at a steady pace from 66 employees in 1988 
to 83 in 1991. The company's average net profit was 2.7 per cent per year, which was 
below the average of 5.03 per cent for the metal industry as a whole. 
The conversation with director Brouwers took place in the beginning of 1988. 
Before Brouwers entered the labour market, he had had an advanced level of 
elementary education (MULO). 
Groenendijk pic 
Groenendijk pic was established in 1947 in Rotterdam as a transport firm by Mr. M. 
Groenendijk. However, significant growth did not get off the ground until 1972, when 
the company, in addition to providing transport services, began letting out mobile site 
huts. This line of business became increasingly important in the course of time. By 
now, Groenendijk has grown into the national market leader in the renting of 
temporary business accommodation. Between 1984 and 1987, the average annual sales 
increase was 33.7 per cent, whereas the comparable figure for other services (i.e. not 
including financial and banking or business services) amounted to 5.5 per cent. The 
number of personnel hired increased from 36 in 1984 to 62 in 1987. The company was 
extremely profitable. Profit as a percentage of sales was very high, averaging 25.4 per 
cent per year between 1984 and 1987. Measured as a percentage of total assets, the 
profitability of Groenendijk was 16.3, whereas services as a whole came to only 4.0 
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per cent. In 1985, the company moved to its present location in Ridderkerk, which is 
adjacent to Rotterdam. In 1986, Groenendijk applied for quotation on the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange. 
After conducting the interview in early 1988, these figures did not decline. 
Between 1988 and 1991 average annual sales growth came to 29 4 per cent, staff 
employed increased from 68 to 165 workers in this four-year period. Profitability 
remained at the high level of 20.4 per cent of sales and 11.8 per cent of total assets. 
However, in 1992, Groenendijk was affected by the latest economic recession. 
Turnover was still increasing, albeit at the modest rate of 5.6 per cent However, net 
profit diminished by no less than 54.6 per cent. Nevertheless, profit still reached the 
considerable level of 7.1 per cent of sales and 4.5 per cent of total assets. Many firms 
would be happy with these figures even when the economy is booming. 
The interview was conducted with director K. Groenendijk, who is a son of 
Mr. M. Groenendijk. Groenendijk Junior was bom in 1949. He became a fellow 
director of Groenendijk pic in the early 1970s. He received his education at the School 
for Business Administration and Economics. 
Hulo International Ltd 
Hulo International, which is located in the small village of Pannerden (Achterhoek), 
was established in 1916. Initially the firm was a modest engineering company catering 
to the needs of the brick industry in the eastern part of the Netherlands. However, in 
the course of time, the company developed into a modern firm in transport and 
logistics systems, special handling equipment, robotic manipulators and related 
appliances. At the time the interview took place, Hulo International was a member of 
Phoenix Megatronica pic at Oosterbeek This is a holding company of about eight 
smaller businesses engaged in developing systems for process control, environmental 
technology, measurement and test systems, and pumps. Hulo is by far the largest 
member of the group. As no information is available about the turnover of Hulo 
before 1985, performance figures about the year 1984 had to be left out We worked 
with the figures from 1985 onward. Furthermore, the annual reports of Hulo do not 
give absolute numbers for the company's turnover, only annual percentages of 
increase or decrease. In 1986 and 1987, the company's sales increased at a rate of 21.1 
and 10.2 per cent respectively. This compared extremely well with the annual sales 
growth of 3.1 and 5.1 per cent for the machine industry in the same years. Employ-
ment statistics of Hulo, on the other hand, are available from 1984 onward. The 
number of staff employed rose from 43 in 1984 to 65 in 1987. This is an average 
increase of 15.7 per cent per year, whereas in the machine industry as a whole 
employment rose on average only 1.7 per cent per year in the same period. From the 
public Hulo reports, net profits are known only from 1987 onward. In 1987 this figure 
came to 5 2 per cent of total assets, which was higher than the aggregate figure for 
industry as a whole (3.8 per cent) In 1988, Hulo's turnover increased by 12 8 per cent, 
but the company's profit declined. It fell below the aggregate industry figure (Hulo, 
2.4 per cent of total assets, manufacturing industry 4.0 per cent of total assets). In 
1989, the turnover diminished as well, skidding at a rate of 4.6 per cent Profit after 
tax turned into a loss that year, albeit a rather small one of 430,000 guilders. Employ-
ment, in contrast, increased from 60 workers in 1988 to 66 in 1989. In January 1989, 
Hulo International left the Phoenix Megatronica Group and became independent. 
Later on that year, the company was taken over by a Swedish enterprise, named 
MTHGruppen AB. In 1992 MTH terminated Hulo's activities in Pannerden and 
transferred them to Sweden. The interview we conducted took place in March 1988 
with the then director Mr. Meeus. 
Infotheek pic 
Infotheek is the brainchild of Mr. W. Van Leenen. Van Leenen established Infotheek 
in 1980 in the city of Leiden. The company was primarily engaged in the computer 
trade. From 1983 onward, the new firm experienced a dazzling growth. Between 1983 
and 1987, sales increased from 4.7 million to 100.2 million guilders, an average annual 
growth rate of no less than 124.9 per cent. Personnel hired increased in this period 
from 10 to 156. On average, the annual profit came to 5.7 per cent of sales (for the 
category of trade activities excluding wholesale and retail trade, this figure was 3.2 
per cent). In 1986, Infotheek was listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange parallel 
market. Three years later the company took the step to the official market. By 1988, 
Infotheek's office had become too small. The company moved from the inner city of 
Leiden out to the city limits, into a prestigious new office. In that year, 1988, and the 
subsequent ones, 1989 and 1990, sales skyrocketed to 146.8, 270.6 and 447.4 million 
guilders respectively. By 1990, personnel employed had increased to 701 staff 
workers. However, in 1990, completely unexpectedly, the management was con-
fronted with a financial loss, albeit not very large, of 433,000 guilders. Nevertheless, 
the firm did not survive the subsequent year of 1991. In a timespan of half a year it 
was wiped. The direct reason for Infotheek's sudden collapse, which received much 
attention in the press in those days, was the complete failure of the company's 
international expansion. This was accompanied by a number of very unfortunate 
large-scale foreign acquisitions. 
The conversation with general director Van Leenen took place in 1988. The 
Infotheek director was born in 1943 in The Hague. Prior to entering the labour 
market, Van Leenen had studied mathematics at the University of Leiden, although 
he did not finish this study. In addition, he had taken a course in Higher Business 
Management. 
Intercai Ltd. 
Intercai is a vital company which supplies telematics consultancy services. The firm 
was founded in 1979 in the village of Beek, which is close to Maastricht. The founder 
of Intercai is Dr H. Kivits. In 1982, the young firm moved to its present location, 
Geleen. Company growth got off the ground in 1981 and got larger in 1983. Between 
1984 and 1987, sales increased from 900,000 to 7.2 million guilders. The growth rate 
amounted on average to 71.0 per cent per year. The mean annual expansion of 
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aggregate business service activities was 6.6 per cent during this time period, and 
pales beside the growth of Intercai. Staff employed increased from 19 workers in 1984 
to 52 in 1987. Net profit was 9.7 per cent of sales on average per year in this period 
(cf service industry's, 3.6 per cent). Intercai successively occupied the 17th, 11th and 
13th place on the annual top 25 list of fastest-growing small companies between 1986 
and 1988 (Intermagazine November 1986, 1987 1988). In 1989, the company received 
the King Willem I plaquet, for young entrepreneurship, the award which Bronkhorst 
High Tech won in 1987. 
Up to now, the economic recession seems to give Intercai little trouble. In the 
years 1990 and 1991 sales increased to 20.0 million and 24.4 million guilders respect-
ively. The number of employees rose to 133 and 160 in these years. Net profit 
remained at the high level of 8.0 and 8.3 per cent of sales in 1990 and 1991 respective-
ly (for business services as a whole these figures were 5.8 and 3.7 per cent). 
Intercai Ltd. was visited twice within the context of the present research. In 
1988, an interview was conducted with general director Kivits, and in 1990 an 
interview with staff member Mr. J. Donders. Mr. Donders was instructed by director 
Kivits. For the benefit of the second interview, a list of questions had been sent to 
Kivits. Kivits' answers to these questions were considered in the conversation with 
Donders. 
Director Kivits was born in 1953. He studied chemical technology at the 
Technical University of Eindhoven, and in 1980 he took his doctorate degree in this 
field at the same university. At the time of the interview, Mr. J. Donders had the 
position of manager of the Regional Policy unit and was also responsible for the 
company's public relations policy. Like director Kivits, Donders was bom in 1953. He 
received higher vocational education prior to his work experience. 
Nedap pic 
The establishment of Nedap pic dates from 1929. At the end of the 1940s, the 
company relocated from Amsterdam to its present location in Groenlo. Initially 
Nedap manufactured Bakelite door/window fixtures, low and high-voltage current 
products such as bell transistors, bell push buttons, programme selectors, and 
transistors. In the 1960s, the company gradually hived off this entire production 
programme. In the 1970s, it buckled down to the production of electronic detection 
and identification systems, such as hands-free access control systems, electronic anti-
shoplifting systems, cattle code responders, tool identification systems and, many 
more electronic high-tech products. From these years onward, growth occurred very 
rapidly, although the company was affected by the economic crises at the beginning 
of the 1980s. However, after a reorganization and one year, 1982, of losses, the 
troubles were overcome. Between 1983 and 1987, sales increased at an average annual 
rate of 17.0 per cent (from 28.5 million guilders in 1983 to 60.3 million in 1987). The 
electronics industry as a whole grew in this period at a mean rate of 5.7 per cent per 
year. Furthermore, Nedap saw its workforce increase from 259 to 317. Mean net result 
came to 5.4 per cent of sales and 7.0 per cent of total assets per year. For industrial 
activities as a whole, excluding the metal industry, construction, food industry and 
chemistry, these figures came to 3.1 and 2.9 per cent. For its innovative 
entrepreneurship, Nedap was honoured with the FEM/ΡΑ medal in 1987. 
Thereafter, growth and profitability did not diminish. By 1991, sales had 
increased to 100.3 million guilders, and employees to 421. Net profit remained at 
about 5.8 per cent of sales and 8.3 per cent of total assets. Nedap is also listed on the 
official Amsterdam Stock Exchange. 
Nedap is run by a two-headed management team. In 1988, when the interview 
took place, management consisted of Mr. R. Paijens and Mr. A. Westendorp. Both 
directors were present at the meeting. Director Paijens was bom in 1924. He left the 
firm in 1989, when he retired. Paijens, who is the driving force behind Nedap's 
remarkable success, has worked at the firm for about 40 years (from 1967 onward as a 
director). His educational background consists of technical schooling at the secondary 
level (the Electrical Engineering School in Amsterdam). Mr. Westendorp has worked 
for Nedap since 1973, and since 1985 as a director. 
Rood Testhouse pic 
In 1979, a new firm called Rood Testhouse was started in a small village some 20 km 
from Zwolle. The founders were Mr. J. Bijsterbosch and Mr. W. Weishaupt. The new 
company was primarily engaged in providing services concerning the testing of 
electronic circuits. For four years prior to the beginning of the research, the company 
underwent remarkable growth. Sales increased from 6.7 million guiders in 1984 to 
13.7 million in 1987, an average expansion of 29.1 per cent per year. Personnel hired 
rose from 65 to 123 in this period. Profits fluctuated between 5.2 and 12.4 per cent of 
sales, which is significantly higher than the profitability in the service industry as a 
whole, which fluctuated between 4.1 and 3.2 per cent of sales. In 1985, the company 
received the King Willem I plaquet for young entrepreneurship. Since 1986, the 
company has been quoted on the parallel market of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. 
Between 1988 and 1991, sales growth increased further from 23.1 million to 
58.5 million guilders in 1991. Employment expanded to 407 workers in 1991. This 
growth was mainly caused by the acquisition of the German company SES Electronics 
GmbH (SES) on January 1, 1991. Notwithstanding these growth figures, Rood 
Testhouse went through a severe crisis in this period. In 1990, it suddenly found itself 
confronted with a financial loss of no less than 21.0 per cent of sales (9.0 million 
guilders). In 1991, a far-reaching reorganization was set in motion. As a result, the 
company's loss shrank to 400,000 guilders in 1991 (-0.01 per cent of sales). However, 
this was not the end of it. In June 1992, the two founders, directors Bijsterbosch and 
Weishaupt, were replaced by two new directors, Mr. E. Pfeilerder, who is the director 
of SES, and Mr. L. Van Bree. Furthermore, all Dutch activities of Rood Testhouse were 
closed down at the end of 1992, and the international activities of the enterprise were 
transferred to Singapore. By the way, the enterprise is still quoted on the parallel 
market of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. 
The interview was conducted with the two founders of Rood Testhouse. It 
took place in January 1988. Both directors were born in 1946, and both have enjoyed 
higher vocational education. 
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Waterland Efficiency Group Ltd 
The Waterland Group in Purmerend has its origin in two separate companies; an 
accountancy company and a system house for software engineering. Both businesses 
merged in 1979 into one enterprise, the Waterland Efficiency Group. In this research 
we concentrated primarily on the automation division of the Waterland Group. The 
core activities of Waterland Automation consist of developing computer software for 
the benefit of industrial production automation. It develops software packages to 
support careful planning of input materials required for ever-more complex and 
flexible production processes in manufacturing industry. 
Waterland Automation was establish on January 1, 1978 in Amsterdam by Mr. 
P. Schoneveld. In the course of 1979, the software firm of Pieter Schoneveld merged 
with the accountancy business of his brother. The new firm. Waterland Efficiency 
Ltd., located in Purmerend. The automation division accounts for about 85 per cent of 
the total turnover of the Waterland Group, whereas the accountancy division accounts 
for the remaining 15 per cent. The Waterland Group has become quite successful. By 
1983, the company achieved a turnover of nearly 10 million guilders. From then on, 
its growth accelerated. Between 1984 and 1987, sales increase on average by 34.2 per 
cent per year (cf aggregate business service industry, 6.6 per cent). The number of 
employees rose in this period from 53 to 149. Net profit came to 7.2 per cent of sales 
and 6.6 per cent of total assets on average per year. For the aggregate service 
industry, these figures are 6.6 per cent and 4.1 per cent respectively. It is not surpris-
ing that the Waterland Group appeared on the top 25 list of fastest-growing small 
companies in those years. In 1986 and 1987, the company took 19th and 16th place 
respectively. 
However, already in 1988 the firm fell into deep trouble, as it incurred a loss 
of 5.9 million guilders. In the subsequent year, this did not diminish. By early 1992, 
Waterland was declared bankrupt. 
Within the scope of this research, the Waterland Group was visited twice, once 
early 1988 and again two years later in January 1990. The first interview was con-
ducted while two directors were present, the Cenerai director Mr. P. Schoneveld and 
the Commercial director Mr. P. Haakmeester. The second conversation was conducted 
with the director, Mr. Schoneveld. Director Schoneveld, a middle-aged man, has 
enjoyed higher vocational education at a technical college. Mr. Haakmeester was 
responsible for the internationalization of the company. He was the manager of 
Waterland International, a subsidiary of the Waterland Group, located in Belgium. 
Notes 
1. In 1990 Orkem became dismantled. The French Ministry of Industrial Affairs decided 
to divide Orkem's activities among the oil and chemistry concerns of Société Elf 
Acquitaine and Total-Compagnie Française des Pétroles. Thereby, Orkem's PMMA 
production, including Casolith Sheets, was transferred to Elf. 
2. This figure for the aggregate service sector is slightly different from the 3.6 per cent 
mentioned previously, when describing System House Comdes. For the year 1984, DCI 
only had information available on profit before tax For reasons of comparison, the 
sectoral figure for 1984 is also based on profit before tax instead of profit after tax. 
For the year 1991, statistics on industrial subcategories have not become available yet. 
For that reason we used the profitability figure of total manufacturing industry. 
(Source: Statistisch Bulletin 1&4-1992). 
Korte Nederlandse Samenvatting 
Snelgroeiende bedrijven in ongelijke gebieden 
Hoewel welvaart vaak wordt toegeschreven aan de prestaties van afzonderlijke 
landen (we spreken bijvoorbeeld van rijke vs. arme tonden) is de voortbrenging 
daarvan niet een zaak die zich primair op het nationale niveau afspeelt. Ruimtelijke 
wetenschappers wijzen erop dat de rijkdom van een land wordt geschapen in één of 
een beperkt aantal gebieden binnen dat land. Zulke regio's worden aangeduid als 
economische kern- of centrumgebieden. Economische groei, zo luidt de opvatting, 
vindt geconcentreerd in de ruimte plaats en regionale ongelijkheid is inherent aan het 
verschijnsel groei. De achterliggende gedachte is dat er door opeenhoping van 
bedrijven en voorzieningen een gunstig milieu ontstaat voor het bedrijfsleven om te 
vernieuwen en te groeien. Gewezen wordt dan vaak op de veelheid van universi-
teiten, de aanwezigheid van hoog opgeleide mensen, professionele ondersteunende 
diensten en toeleveranciers en een grote afzetmarkt in dergelijke kernregio's. Het 
belang van de kwaliteit van de plaatselijke omgeving voor de groei van de nationale 
economie wordt recentelijk ook buiten de vakterreinen van de ruimtelijke weten-
schappen steeds meer erkend en benadrukt. In dit opzicht lijkt er sprake van een 
'(her)ontdekking' van de geografie. 
Globaal genomen zijn, naar alle waarschijnlijkheid, de krachten die leiden tot 
opeenhoping van economische activiteiten inderdaad sterker dan de spreidingsten-
denzen in de economie, zij het dat er grote verschillen kunnen bestaan tussen sectoren 
en landen. Hoe dan ook, lang niet alle goedlopende bedrijven zijn in economische 
kerngebieden gevestigd. Soms tref je ze aan op de Onmogelijkste' lokaties. Dergelijke 
bedrijven zijn altijd enigszins buiten de aandacht gevallen van het ruimtelijk econo-
misch onderzoek, mede omdat het vaak om beperkte aantallen gaat. In elk geval 
bestaat er geen goed uitgewerkte theorie die de locatie van snelgroeiende bedrijven 
buiten het economisch kerngebied kan verklaren. 
Het voor u liggende onderzoek stelt deze groep van snelgroeiende bedrijven 
op niet-centrale of perifere lokaties juist centraal. Het tracht een verklaring te vinden 
voor hun groei tegen de achtergrond van het veronderstelde belang van de omgeving 
voor het functioneren van kleine en middelgrote ondernemingen. Naar het beleid toe 
is de achterliggende doelstelling om te kijken wat we kunnen leren van 'sterke 
bedrijven in zwakke gebieden' ten behoeve van de ontwikkeling van achtergebleven 
gebieden. 
Om dit te realiseren zijn verspreid over het gehele land 13 snelgroeiende 
kleine en middelgrote ondernemingen uitvoerig onderzocht met behulp van zoge-
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naamde diepte-interviews. Van deze dertien zijn er negen gevestigd buiten het 
westelijk kerngebied, i.e. de Randstad. Deze negen hebben we vergeleken met vier 
bedrijven die wel in de Randstad zijn gevestigd. 
De centrale onderzoeksvraag luidt waarom sommige Ongunstig' gelegen 
bedrijven niet minder succesvol zijn dan hun 'gunstig' gevestigde tegenhangers? Het 
proefschrift tracht die vraag in drie stappen te beantwoorden. Op de eerste plaats 
hebben we ons afgevraagd hoe de onderzochte bedrijven concreet reageren op de 
mogelijkheden en vooral de beperkingen van hun vestigingsgebied. Niet verwon-
derlijk, blijkt dat de ondernemingen niet passief blijven ten opzichte van hun 
omgeving en er op honderd en een manier op kunnen reageren. Feit blijft dat 
theorieën over regionale ontwikkeling met dit gegeven niet goed uit de voeten 
kunnen. De interacties die we tussen bedrijf en omgeving hebben kunnen waarnemen 
kunnen worden ingedeeld in vier categorieën. Op de eerste plaats benutten onderne-
mers natuurlijk de mogelijkheden die de omgeving biedt. Alle bedrijven maken met 
name in hun beginfase intensief gebruik van lokale hulpbronnen (werknemers, 
adviseurs, kapitaalverschaffers, toeleveranciers, klanten e.d). Op de tweede plaats 
proberen de ondernemingen specifieke onderdelen van de omgeving ook te manipule-
ren of te beïnvloeden in hun eigen voordeel. Als beïnvloeding niet mogelijk is kunnen 
ze proberen het bedrijf in te dekken of immuun te maken voor 'gebreken' in de omge-
ving. Als ook dat niet mogelijk is trachten zij zich op meer of minder creatieve wijze 
aan te passen aan de externe omstandigheden. Terwijl het bij de eerstgenoemde 
categorie, i.e. het benutten van hulpbronnen, gaat om het profiteren van voordelen 
van de omgeving staat bij de overige drie categorieën centraal het tegenspel bieden 
tegen beperkingen in de omgeving. Hoewel we daarin niet moeten overdrijven blijkt 
uit het onderzoek toch dat waar de Randstadbedrijven profijt kunnen trekken van 
hun lokale omgeving, hun perifere tegenhangers meer of vaker worden gecon-
fronteerd met (dreigende) knelpunten en belemmeringen, waaraan zij weerstand 
moeten bieden. Het punt is dat dit soms (niet altijd) aanzienlijke extra kosten met zich 
meebrengt. Neem bijvoorbeeld de stormachtige ontwikkeling van de computersector 
in de jaren tachtig. Waar automatiseringsbedrijven in de Randstad in die dagen 
kunnen profiteren van een sterke concentratie van hoog opgeleide informatici in de 
westelijke provincies, moeten collega's elders in het land vaak luid met de geldbuidel 
rammelen om geschikte arbeidskrachten van heinde en verre weg te lokken en/of 
moeten zij zwaar investeren in dure bedrijfsopleidingen. Hoe je het ook wendt of 
keert, de minder gunstig gevestigde bedrijven lijken in het nadeel te blijven ten 
opzichte van hun gunstig gesitueerde tegenhangers. Men kan zich nu eenmaal niet 
aan de eigen haren uit het moeras omhoog trekken, of...? 
De tweede onderzoeksvraag die in het proefschrift wordt behandeld vraagt 
zich in elk geval of het zich teweer stellen van bedrijven tegen tekortkomingen van de 
externe omgeving wel echt zoden aan de dijk zet, met het oog op de genoemde 
kosten die daarmee gepaard kunnen gaan? Het antwoord daarop luidt als volgt. Je 
moet niet alleen kijken naar de kosten die gepaard kunnen gaan met het nemen van 
maatregelen tegen nadelen van de vestigingsplaats, maar ook naar wat zij opleveren. 
Het onderzoek levert aanwijzingen - geen bewijzen - dat de opbrengsten de kosten 
wel eens ruimschoots kunnen overstijgen. Neem bijvoorbeeld, een Leeuwardens 
bedrijf in het onderzoek, dat geen externe kapitaalverschaffer in de omgeving bereid 
vindt om flink in het bedrijf te investeren. Ten einde raad besluiten directie en 
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personeel om het bedrijf zelf maar op te kopen. Liefst 23 werknemers blijken bereid 
om ieder voor minstens 50.000 gulden aandelen van hun eigen bedrijf te kopen. In de 
literatuur over werknemersparticipatie blijkt nu dat bedrijven met werknemerspartici-
patie beter presteren dan bedrijven zonder werknemersparticipatie, omdat in de 
eerstgenoemde groep ondernemingen de werkmotivatie onder het personeel veel 
hoger is dan in de laatstgenoemde. Een ander voorbeeld vinden we op het gebied van 
bedrijfsopleidingen. Perifere bedrijven die in vergelijking met hun centraal gevestigde 
collega's grotere investeringen moeten doen in aanvullende scholing van het perso-
neel, omdat de kwaliteit van de externe arbeidsmarkt tekort schiet, zouden daar wel 
eens meer dan evenredig voordeel van kunnen hebben. Uit de economische literatuur 
blijkt namelijk dat bedrijven die de nadruk leggen op het intern opleiden van het 
personeel uiteindelijk beter functioneren dan bedrijven die vooral direct inzetbare 
mensen aannemen. Ook hier is de reden dat bij de eerste groep ondernemingen de 
motivatie en binding van het personeel met het bedrijf groter is dan bij de laatste 
groep. Een laatste voorbeeld betreft de afzetmarkt. In het onderzoek zien we dat waar 
de Randstadbedrijven minstens tien jaar na de oprichting hun omzet voor het 
overgrote deel nog steeds uit de afzetmarkt in het eigen vestigingsgebied halen, de 
perifere bedrijven al in een zeer vroeg stadium van hun ontwikkeling, zo niet meteen 
vanaf de start, hun produkton buiten het eigen vestigingsgebied en zelfs in het 
buitenland moeten afzetten om voldoende omzet te behalen. Zeker voor startende 
ondernemers is dat geen sinecure, maar indien zij daarin slagen levert het hun 
enorme leervoordelen op. Het management wordt immers al in een vroeg stadium 
gepokt en gemazeld in het overwinnen van een van de grootste barrières voor 
continuering van de groei, namelijk het binnendringen van ver verwijderde afzet-
markten. En naarmate een groeiend bedrijf dit tijdstip uitstelt wordt het probleem 
alleen maar groter. Dus samengevat kunnen we stellen dat het nemen van tegenmaat-
regelen tegen nadelen van de bedrijfsomgeving wel degelijk effectief kan zijn, omdat 
de opbrengsten of voordelen die daaruit kunnen voortvloeien de kosten ruimschoots 
kunnen overstijgen. Op deze manier kan er compensatie en zelfs overcompensatie 
ontstaan voor aanvankelijke vestigingsplaatsnadelen. In de economie duidt men 
situaties waarbij landen, regio's of individuele bedrijven nadelen omzetten in 
voordelen of een achterstand veranderen in een voorsprong aan met de term dynami-
sche onevenwichtigheid. 
De derde onderzoeksvraag heeft betrekking op de uiteindelijke oorsprong van 
het groei en weerbaarheid van de onderzochte bedrijven. Met het antwoord op de 
tweede onderzoeksvraag dat weerstandsstrategieën tegen knelpunten in de omgeving 
dus wel degelijk effectief kunnen zijn, zijn we er immers nog niet. Er zijn soms grote 
investeringen mee gemoeid en ook hier geldt dat de kost voor de baat uitgaat. De 
middelen waarover een bedrijf beschikt om bepaalde investeringen op een bepaald 
moment te kunnen doen weerspiegelt de groei van dat bedrijf in de voorafgaande 
periode. De vraag is dus welke factoren of krachten ten grondslag liggen aan de 
eerste betekenisvolle 'groeistuip' van de onderzochte bedrijven. Deze bepaalt de 
armslag die het management heeft voor verdere ontwikkeling van de onderneming. 
Bij de Randstadbedrijven spelen, in overeenstemming met regionale onwikkelingsthe-
orieën, de voordelen van het grootstedelijk vestigingsmilieu duidelijk een belangrijke 
rol. Het meest aansprekend is dat gebeurd bij een onderneming waarbij de lokale 
afzetmarkt zich zowat aan het bedrijf 'opdringt' met innovatieve ideeën. De onderne-
ming pakt die ideeën op en verandert daardoor binnen enkele jaren van een klein 
eenmansbedrijf tot nationale marktleider in zijn branche. Bij de bedrijven in overig 
Nederland ligt de zaak echter anders. Zij illustreren niet zozeer de rol van de 
bedrijfsomgeving, maar veel meer de betekenis van de aard van de moederorganisatie 
waaruit ze zijn voortgekomen. Het blijkt dat deze bedrijven bepaalde sterke eigen-
schappen van het ouder-bedrijf hebben overgeërfd. Daardoor zijn zij van meet af aan 
uitstekend in staat om de beperkingen van een minder gunstige omgeving te 
overwinnen. De ondernemers die deze bedrijven hebben opgericht vervulden in hun 
vorige werkkring leidende posities in nationaal en internationaal opererende (niet 
noodzakelijk grote) ondernemingen. In deze sterk naar buiten gerichte moeder-
organisaties vergaren zij technische en commerciële kennis en vaardigheden en 
bouwen zij eigen contactennetwerken op die het regionale niveau verre overschr den. 
En het is precies deze buitenwaardse oriëntatie, die zij als het ware hebben overgeërfd 
van de organisaties waaruit zij zijn voortgekomen, die de snelgroeinde bedrijven 
buiten de Randstad zo kenmerkt. Daardoor hebben zij er bij wijze van spreken geen 
centje pijn van dat er in hun 'schrale' vestigingsregio nauwelijks of geen potentiële 
afnemers zijn gevestigd. Deze ondernemers verkopen hun produkten al in een zeer 
vroeg stadium, de meesten meteen vanaf het begin, in alle uithoeken van het land en 
zelfs in het buitenland. Daarin verschillen zij sterk van het gemiddelde bedrijf in de 
periferie. De meeste van deze bedrijven zijn uitgesproken lokaal ge-oriënteerd terwijl 
ze dat, gezien de beperktere capaciteit van de omliggende afzetmarkt, juist het minst 
zouden moeten zijn. Het onderzoek suggereert dat hier een taak voor de overheid is 
weggelegd. Het is zaak dat het 'parochialisme' van het bedrijfsleven in perifere 
gebieden afneemt en hun actieradius zich uitbreidt. Dat lijkt niet alleen belangrijk 
voor de groei van de bestaande ondernemingen, maar meer nog voor de kwaliteit en 
de groeikansen van hun 'nageslacht', i.e. de nieuwe bedrijven die zij afsplitsen. 
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